

LIVING RELIGION AND MODERN THOU

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LIVING RELIGIONS AND
MODERN THOUGHT

Living Religions and Modern Thought

BY

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ROUND TABLE PRESS, INC.

NEW YORK

1936

BL 85
W 63

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PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BY SELECT PRINTING COMPANY, NEW YORK

1169659

To

KENNETH C. M. SILLS
President of Bowdoin College

P R E F A C E

What do men really need for their complete satisfaction? What can they actually get? Those are ever recurring questions. At the present time the answer is not infrequently given: Simply the physical and cultural goods of a life limited in its outlook and its duration to this earth. Another answer is found in the great religions, one which presents a wider vision. It is the purpose of this book to give an account of living religions in modern forms of presentation. Some may think I offer too favorable a view of most of the religions discussed; but I have not been concerned here with destructive criticism. Even on the constructive side it is possible to present comparatively little of what I have learned in twenty-five years of study and of personal contact with adherents of the different faiths. I owe more to those contacts than to the vast literature studied, only a small part of which is referred to as illustrative. The main attitude adopted may be contrasted with that manifested by many, but by no means all, of the contributors to "Modern Trends in World Religions," edited by Dr. Eustace Haydon.

The present volume contains the substance of a course of lectures delivered on the Tallman Foundation at Bowdoin College. I wish to express my appreciation to the President and Trustees for the honor of the invitation. It is impossible to refer here specifically to the scholars of the various religions to whom I am

PREFACE

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The notes and bibliographical references have been placed at the end of the volume so that they may be disregarded by the general reader.

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LIVING RELIGIONS AND
MODERN THOUGHT

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY: MODERN LIFE AND RELIGION

To the philosophic observer modern life both in its activities and in its ideas presents very much that is chaotic. In face of this condition, leading contemporary philosophers mostly refrain from the practice, common among their immediate predecessors, of indulging in edifying utterances concerning the Good, the True, and the Beautiful. They consider their task to be not abstract speculation occupied with general ideas but an intimate study of existence and events in their own intrinsic character and in their specific relations. Not only are their reflections carried on with more definite reference to the results of the natural sciences; they are also concerned with the detailed consideration of particular human values as they have manifested themselves in the past course of many-sided historical life and in the attitudes and strivings of the modern world.

Notwithstanding the chaos which appears so conspicuous a feature of contemporary life, the close observer may find in it a number of more or less definite characteristics and tendencies. Even the chaos itself is a sign of the tremendous mental and physical activity of the age. Compared with this, past ages almost seem to have been half asleep. Whatever else the World War did, it certainly aroused enormous energy which has not yet abated. That is true of the East as well as of the West. Living in the latter we see for ourselves evidences on all sides. From the former proof comes not only through the reports in the daily press but also in a number of recent books.

The peoples of the Orient used to be represented as in a condition of stagnation and apathy, due, it was frequently asserted, to pernicious effects of their religions, which were regarded as incapable of adaptation to advancing civilization. It is no longer possible to hold such views. The Orient is awakening: is in large measure already awake. Evidence abounds of the great changes in China supposed to have been in a state of cultural stagnation for a thousand years. "Never before in our history have our youth been so enthusiastic over matters of education, religion, social service."¹ "The old mental apathy of China is a thing of the past."² "The Chinese people are trembling on the edge of a phenomenal renaissance in politics, in finance, in commerce, and in spirituality."³ It is not that the Chinese have yet become clear as to the details of their forward movements: they are still engaged in conflicts of old and new. Thus it is possible for other writers to say: "Every year in China sees an appalling increase in the number of highly intelligent persons who have thrown off old moral restraints, and therefore an increasingly rapid breakdown of the whole Chinese fabric."⁴ "There is neither a civilization nor a society, but a flux, a turmoil, and a heaving mass."⁵ These may nevertheless be regarded as signs of the increased energy, of action and reaction of a time of transition. That the modernist forces will eventually triumph seems assured. "One may assert that, with all its crudities and vacillations, the new culture movement provides one of the firmest bases for hope for the future of China."⁶

Similar evidence comes from the people of the predominantly Moslem countries. The Moslem Near East is experiencing a revolution in the social life, the religious and moral outlook of its peoples. "No single country is uninfluenced by this renaissance. Every

part of the Moslem world is passing through a period of momentous changes. New life is taking the place of an indifferent lethargy. Western civilization is becoming increasingly an ideal in these lands, and with it goes a burning thirst for new knowledge on the one hand and democratic government on the other. Nationality is the universal cry. Islām has struck its tents and is on the march.”⁷ Analogous conditions exist in India and Japan.

In all the leading countries of the Orient, Western influences in the systems of education and in industrial developments have led to an increasing adoption of scientific methods. Standard works on most subjects by Western thinkers are studied, and many are translated into Oriental vernaculars. There has been created a new Asian intelligentsia in the main through Western forms of education. “The West,” says Yusuke Tsurumi, “taught Japan the scientific method of research, which she is going to apply to her own culture and the institutions bequeathed by her ancestors. New researches in Japanese history with special reference to politics, social changes, economics, literature, ethical thought, and all kinds of institutions, are recasting our fundamental ideas. We now look at our past with new eyes and find there are some things in the course of our natural development that we had not realized before. It also opens up a new road for original thinking.”⁸

It is not so very long since Rudyard Kipling thought he was justified in saying: “East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet.” Today such an idea is contrary to innumerable facts. On almost every side of life we have now to deal with developments shared in by East and West. All countries are intimately bound together by economic relations; the problems of government are assuming similar forms among most peoples; the leaders of thought are concerned

with the same fundamental questions connected with nature and with man and his destiny. The lives of the great masses everywhere manifest common features; and the highly educated are evolving similar forms of culture. Mankind is nevertheless still only in the early stages of such a development. The Oriental who is striving to acquire what the West has to offer feels the difficulties of uniting it with what he regards as worth retaining from his own particular conditions and his historic customs and traditions. On the other hand, while the Orient is rapidly assimilating elements from the West, the Occident has not to anything like a similar degree endeavored to learn from the East. This indicates a serious defect in the Occidental attitude, a cause of loss, and a possible source of danger. In the words of a learned Chinese: "The greatest problem confronting those who are anxious about the maintenance of the peace of the world is the apparent inability of the West to change its heart and to broaden its outlook."⁹

A survey of the conditions of modern life and thought in this development reveals a number of common features to be found among all peoples. There is a world-wide attitude of secularism, expressing itself chiefly in practical conduct, but also in theory. In all parts of the world nationalism is a leading motive for a very large amount of the activity within the countries and between the different countries. Not only is there a conspicuous neglect of religion; there is also a very large body of opinion in aggressive opposition to it. Nevertheless, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that there are signs of an awakening to and rising interest in the significance of religion with relation to the fundamental problems of life, and many attempts to formulate modern views of the religions with reasoned defense of them. There is an increase of scholarly investigation of religion. There are movements among

laymen, often inspired by religion, which in opposition to nationalism advocate a universalistic attitude.

The World War aroused tremendous energy in the West. While for many the time was one of great privation, for others it brought increased opportunities for luxuries. The many looked forward to the time when with the cessation of war, they also should enjoy these things. In spite of all which may be truly said to the contrary in particular directions, the general standard of living and enjoyment of the peoples of the West has been markedly raised as compared with the pre-war period. The mass production of motor cars, the widespread use of the radio, the development of the cinematograph, and a host of other things have provided opportunities for enjoyments which occupy most of the time snatched from the daily toil. Consequently a mainly secular life has been cultivated. It is the physical sciences which seem to have contributed most to this widening of the range of human enjoyment, initiating mankind more and more into the marvels of the physical world. Hence now it is not so much to religion in its traditional forms that educated men look for guidance as to science and to forms of philosophy which claim to be based upon it. In the Orient, especially in India and Japan, the inability of the Western peoples to export the usual commodities during the war and the years immediately following, led to a vast development of their own industries and commerce. This brought wealth and increased possibilities of enjoyment to many, and did much to encourage an attitude of secularism. The education received through or supported by Western agencies has largely been secular. So far as it has been in any way religious, through the educational activities of Christian missions, it is related with a religion with regard to the ideals and power of which the war disillusioned many of the more thoughtful. These have become aware of the advances of modern science

as throwing doubt on and leading to alienation from traditional Christianity even in the West itself. In the forms in which their own traditional religious systems had been presented they find little claiming attention. Even when they have not openly abandoned them, they are too much occupied with the secular to be seriously concerned with them. To a marked degree secularism is a feature of Occident and Orient.

Nationalism is certainly a characteristic of modern life. Evidences of this in Europe, in Asia, and in Egypt, have been so much in the forefront in recent times as scarcely to call for explicit references. "It was the spread of Western education and the atmosphere of freedom created by increasing intercourse with the West, and by the very influence of the Englishmen in their midst that engendered among the Egyptian people a new sense of nationhood."¹⁰ "The most drastic cultural change we have brought about in Asia is the conversion of its races to nationalism."¹¹ In India, China, and Egypt, nationalism has become the dominant idea in the minds of youth. "Nationalism, with its practical policy of self-determination, is the outstanding primary idea fermenting in the mind of Moslem youth today."¹² In all countries the movement is far beyond its initial stages. Though it involves in the first place emancipation from a foreign yoke, it leads beyond that to emphasis on indigenous national characteristics and national economic welfare. Under the influence of nationalism, the different peoples have begun to take a more definite interest in aspects of their own traditional culture, including their religions. There is a claim on the part of Asian peoples to "racial, social, moral, and cultural equality" with the peoples of the West, and a demand that the latter shall cease to expect special privileges in the countries of the East. What has been said of China is true also of most other Oriental countries. "China is not prepared to admit any sort of in-

herent inferiority in herself as compared with the modern Western world.”¹³ Arising out of the nationalistic movements there has been some measure of reaction against aspects of Western civilization which the Oriental peoples were in process of adopting. The result has sometimes been the assertion that the Occident and the Orient stand for different types of civilization which are in conflict. “The discords and conflicts which divide them arise out of the clash of different, and in many respects mutually antagonistic civilizations, and the phase upon which they are now entering may be roughly described as a general movement of revolt throughout the Orient against the ascendancy of the Occident on the plea either that it has learned all that the Occident can teach, or that all the lessons of the Occident are a snare and a delusion.”¹⁴ But this type of reaction is an expression of an extreme and in some measure misunderstood nationalism, and is only partly successful.

There were those who during the World War thought that its tragedies would lead to a religious revival, causing men to seek relief from the evil of the world in turning to the realities of the spiritual life. Instead of this it is seen that many have centered their attention on material enjoyment. In the World War the organized Christian bodies, the representatives of religion in the West, seemed to be disloyal to the ideals they professed to uphold. It was not to be wondered at that many in the West turned from organized Christianity. It was not to be wondered at that thinkers in the Orient pointed to the World War and its atrocities as practical evidence of the weakness of Christianity in face of human evil. “The recent war,” say a group of Buddhists, “proved many things, among them being the failure of Christianity to stand the acid test of emergency, and the danger of scientific knowledge ahead of national morality.”

The age is marked not merely by wide-spread secularism with neglect of religion: it includes much aggressive opposition to religion. That is none the less so when the opposition, as in the Occident, is veiled under poetically described naturalistic and humanistic substitutes for religion. Opposition to religion has also arisen in the Orient which has always previously been considered as essentially motivated by religion. Souad Hanum, a Turkish woman writer, makes the hero of a recently published story say these words about religion: "Religion is as harmful as opium drunkenness. Prayer is the hope of men who are weak, without will-power to do anything; worship is an insincere egoism to save one's self from the tortures of hell; prophets are the greatest liars among men."¹⁵ In China it has been widely maintained in recent times that religion is obsolete, and does not promote human progress; that mankind does not need it, and that it has no fundamental connection with morality, even that it is frequently opposed to the genuinely moral. In 1922 a manifesto was issued by the so-called "Anti-Christian Student Federation," stating among other things: "The sins of religion are too numerous to mention. Speaking of its moral side, we find that it teaches men obedience, which is the moral code of slaves. Speaking of its intellectual side, we find that it propagates superstitions which hinder the search for truth. Speaking of its material side, we find that it asks its believers to despise temporal things and to dream of the Kingdom of Heaven and Hell, which would end in the destruction of human life. Its teachings are absolutely valueless, while its evils are incalculable."¹⁶ There is a vague and less frequently expressed skepticism with regard to religion among the university students and educated professional men in India. But it is interesting to observe that the movement there which has most definitely opposed traditional religion and professed to base itself on the teachings of modern

natural science, claims to be a religion, calling itself "the Dev Samaj: The Science-grounded Religion," though it has more of the character of an ethical culture movement.¹⁷

What have we to say to all this? Are we to suppose that religion is now being transcended, that it is something definitely to discard as the magic and superstitions of earlier ages? To think so would be as superficial as those whose leadership has been largely rejected. To think so would be to shut one's eyes to the obvious signs not simply in the lives of individuals but in many incipient modern movements, that the need of something more satisfying to the human spirit is felt, even though spasmodically, among the men and women of our time, not in one country but in all. "Religion moves, vast and potent, in the world today. One must be blind, indeed, not to see the evidences of its power in both the structure and the movement of our modern world. Indeed, when we turn from the external contrasts of history and anthropology to the question of its vitality we strike a different problem. Religion seems as constant a factor in humanity as gravitation in the material world."¹⁸ "There is a keen interest in religion at the present time in free discussion."¹⁹ In China the critics of religion have been answered by adherents to the different religions who are striving for a modern expression of their faiths. They have maintained that religion and science are not in conflict but have their uses in different ways. Science itself rests on some kind of faith, and is not the only solution of human problems. It is described as too abstract and as tending to make mankind hard-hearted and pessimistic. Religion is a natural expression of man, and ultimately is an inevitable attitude of the human spirit. In India, in spite of the pressure of the tremendous economic poverty of millions, and the secularist attitude of those embarking on industrial and commercial ventures, there has been in recent times a

great increase in the number of publications, chiefly small brochures and periodicals, dealing with religion. "There are divided counsels, and there is the clamor of many counsellors. But still, as of old in India, the claims of the spirit are reckoned paramount, and India's spiritual inheritance her most precious possession." ²⁰

The reviving interest in religion is not primarily, is in fact only very incidentally, due to the need of a compensation for the misfortunes and failures on other sides of life. The tragedies of the World War, while stimulating individuals to more or less spasmodic occupation with religion, nowhere led to a deeply rooted or wide-spread enduring revival. The psychological depression accompanying, and a part cause of the prevailing economic depression is not leading to a transference of attention from the physically economic to religious values. Rather it is leading most to more occupation with the task of recovering again the means for replacing their financial losses, and attaining physical wealth. The present beginnings of a revival of interest in religion are due to a keener recognition of the inadequacies of mere secularism to satisfy the deeper needs of human nature; and further to an increasing appreciation of the limits of the theories of natural science with which such secularism has been associated in many minds. The application of scholarly methods to the study of religion itself as an enduring factor in human history has made it clear that there is something other in it than mere superstition.

One of the most influential factors in modern life is the world-wide use of scientific and scholarly methods of research. Universities have arisen in India, China, Japan, and Egypt under the influence of Western scholars and of Orientals trained in Western countries. Scientific and scholarly publications now have an almost world-wide circulation. Though proportionately to their populations the number of Oriental scholars who

apply modern scientific and philosophical methods is small, they are the leaders of the thought of their countries. The spread of Occidental natural science is having its effects on the attitude of Oriental scholars to their traditional religions. As in the West it has led some to reject religion altogether as superstition: but that is the exception rather than the rule. Others have turned to a reconsideration of the basal literature and principles of their faiths, applying scientific methods of criticism to them. Within recent years many new editions of Oriental sacred scriptures and canonical writings have been published, prepared as the groundwork for their renewed study in the light of modern thought. In the West and the East there is a rapidly increasing amount of scientific and philosophical study of religion in the universities by independent scholars. It is significant that this should be happening in the West just at a time when the older forms of philosophical Idealism, with the truth of which religion has for so long been thought to be inseparably bound up, are being largely abandoned. For the first time in history, religion is becoming a subject of free inquiry, emancipated both from ecclesiastical trammels and preconceived philosophical theory.

Modern thought has aided the movements for reform in religions through its bringing into relief the essential differences between magic and religion. These have been closely associated from the earliest times right up to the popular religions of our own day. Nevertheless, with advancing civilization, religion has persisted and developed while magic has tended to disappear. The main difference between magic and religion is one of attitude. In magic there is an implication of compulsion. By the actual performance of particular acts, by the saying of certain precise forms of words, the results are expected necessarily to follow. As a rule the magical acts or words have been considered efficacious

only when done or pronounced by specific persons accredited with special powers, magicians or initiated priests. Its aims have usually been individualistic, generally for some physical result or for the production of emotional conditions such as fear or subservience to the magician or priest. That the popular religious organizations still have much of this character allied with them is evident in the East and West. But religion is intrinsically quite devoid of the attitude of compulsion from the side of man. Its results depend on the attitude of an Other than man as he immediately knows himself. There may be an element of compulsion from the non-human side, in that man may feel compelled to adopt a certain attitude, even to perform certain types of acts, if he is to obtain the benefits which may accrue in his religious relationship. In religion man supplicates, but does not compel.

Modern study is also making clear the distinction between religion and morality, in spite of the tendencies within the last few decades to describe religion as though it is identical with morality, or contains nothing of real significance other than the moral. A large part of the criticism of religions in the past has been directed not so much to their specifically religious sentiments, doctrines, and rites as to the associated moral ideas and practice. Christian missionaries, for example, have often occupied themselves much with criticizing the permission of polygamy by Islām and less with the rationalistic character of its leading theological ideas. For long they were more concerned with condemning the abuses of the caste system in India than seeking the truth in its forms of religious philosophy. Much of the criticism of Christianity by non-Christian Orientals is directed against the alleged materialistic character of the civilization of the so-called Christian countries. The fundamental ethical ideals associated with the religions are

important, but these have often to be distinguished from their detailed forms of expression which have been largely determined by specific conditions of time and place. What is more important for our present purpose is to understand and appreciate the distinctively religious features of the different faiths.

In spite of the prevalent nationalism and of the opposition to the traditional forms of the religions, there is much striving after a broader view, with loyalty to mankind rather than to a particular national or religious organization. In wider circles than those of scholars there has been a rapidly growing interest in the great living religions of the world. Though the interest is often superficial rather than profound it is promoting tolerance and breadth of religious outlook. It is becoming more fully recognized that as religion is a social and historical phenomenon it cannot be adequately understood simply by an examination of an individual's own personal experience.

There are evidences of an effort for a universalism in place of sectarianism and nationalism. "Instead of fighting for supremacy and trying to stamp out the opposition, Japanese philosophers and ethical teachers have sought a way to forge all different systems of thought into one harmonious whole. That tendency is clearly seen in Japan at present in the efforts to bring together the leaders of three different religions. I dare say that you recently read in the newspapers the story of Japanese Shinto, Buddhist, and Christian leaders meeting for cooperation. It doubtless looks very queer to you, but it is the national trait of Japan."²¹ In 1921 the Church of the Five Religions (Taoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Islām, Christianity) was founded to promote unity and an era of good-will and mutual helpfulness. "The future work for Hinduism," says

a modern Hindu, "is the creation of cosmopolitanism." ²²

This age is in a definite sense one of transition. Traditional orthodoxies of religion, ethics, and politics are being abandoned; richer and more intelligent views are in process of formation. As so often in an age of transition there is a definite tendency to eclecticism. This tendency is important. For though it may not yet be clear how the old values and the new can be organically related in their entirety, an endeavor should be made to retain them all. The enlightened members of the different religions strive to attain a broad and profound experience of religion, endeavoring to develop their own religions toward a comprehensive ideal. They are prepared and even anxious to learn from other religions. Their attitude is often syncretist but not in any bad sense: the values they receive from other religions are taken up more or less organically into their own.

In earlier times a member of a particular Christian denomination finding himself in disagreement with the usual interpretation of a doctrine officially held by his sect would leave it and join another. This has become more and more rare. The reason is that a person now usually finds that he is allowed very great freedom of interpretation of doctrines within the community in which he has grown up. With liberal tendencies in his own community he has often insufficient reason to separate from it: while strong ties of sentiment hold him to it. The same holds for the cultured members of different religions as it does for the enlightened members of the different Christian sects. Hence they rarely change from one to another.

There is a need of a survey of the living religions of the world, not as they are viewed by the uneducated or by the traditionally orthodox but by their advanced thinkers, those who have some scientific method in the

study of their religion and a modern philosophical attitude in its estimate and presentation. A modern view of one religion should be compared with modern views of the others. The religious life of the masses in India is in many respects analogous with that of the Christians of Europe in the Middle Ages. It is unfair to contrast popular Hinduism with an enlightened modern view of Christianity or Judaism. The forms of presentation of Indian religions as expounded by Indian thinkers cognizant of modern science and philosophy should be mainly considered. Even in the Christian West modern views of religion are still fighting for general acknowledgment.

It is only within the last few decades that Oriental scholars have begun effectively to study the ancient texts of their religions with modern scientific and historical methods. They have only just begun to present the essentials of their religious conceptions in modern forms. Though their influence has not yet extended to the great masses, their work suggests how the masses may be expected to view their religions when the process of education has advanced and become more wide-spread. One great defect in the earlier study of religion was too much concentration on formulae of the past, and the neglect of present independent expressions of religion. But this defect is being remedied in East and West. That religion in history has been associated with many superstitious elements both in ideas and practices cannot be denied, but it has lived and still lives on because there is something fundamental in it. Leading thinkers in the different religions are endeavoring with the best means of scientific and philosophic method to make clear what this is. Their efforts have only recently been seriously begun and it is unreasonable to complain if their results do not yet appear in all cases to amount to any clearly marked advance. It may be said of much in the reli-

gions of both East and West that "we have not yet reached the point where it is possible to separate the kernel from the shell, nor shall we do so for a very long time." ²³ To consider religions in their highest forms, to examine them by a method at once scientific and philosophical, and thus to get the material for an accurate judgment of their worth and truth, may lead to a fundamental conception of what the highest religion should be and include, and to cooperation toward the attainment of comprehensive ideals.

CHAPTER II

HINDUISM

India is a land of religions: in no other country have the different aspects of religion been so variously manifested. One may probe back to earlier times in Egypt than in India; but Egypt has no continuous religious tradition from ancient times to the present such as is found in India. In its ancient literature and its living faiths are expressions of almost every conceivable form of religion. India is a vast continent. Ethnologically its population is very varied. Indeed, it has been called a museum of races. Nevertheless, in religion and in social matters generally, the dominant race has for more than two thousand years been Aryan. The Aryans entered India from the northwest and conquered it more by superior intelligence than by physical force. Comparative studies show that the fundamental features of the main religious tendencies have been Aryan. But religion as included under the term Hinduism* has been by no means purely Aryan. Dravidian and other races conquered by the Aryans contributed to its multifarious forms. Detailed research might with some accuracy bring into relief the contributions of the main streams, but such an inquiry would be chiefly of historical interest. What is important to recognize is that in the history of religion in India elements from widely different sources have been brought together and absorbed into an imposing whole.

This capacity of absorption is due to two characteris-

* The term Hinduism is very unsatisfactory from the strictly scientific point of view, yet through common use it has acquired the status of an omnibus expression for most of the religions of India not included here under special names, such, for example, as Jainism, Sikhism, etc.

tics of Hindu religion, evident from almost the earliest times of which there is record. Religion was felt in close association with the vast world of Nature, the all-comprehending Father Heaven and Mother Earth, within the unity of which all minor objects of reverence had their place. But this Nature-worship became combined with pre-Aryan cults and animistic practices forming part of the later conglomerate known as Brahminism. Religion from early times was also the inspiration to and found nourishment in all-embracing philosophical reflection which strove to find one fundamental reality in all the varied manifestations of existence. This comprehensiveness of Hinduism has continued throughout its history. It has become associated with the principle of "fitness," or *adhikara*, according to which each type and phase of religion has its place. Each individual or community can have the level of religion for which it is fit. One form does not exclude another: each is looked upon as a particular stage in religious life. Reaching a higher stage, the individual may look back upon his earlier faith and practice and say: At the level at which I then was, that was the religion for me, but now I see more clearly. In other words, the diverse elements in Hinduism represent something corresponding to "degrees of truth." The non-dualist philosophers, who have formulated this principle in India, have naturally considered their own view as the highest possible,¹ nevertheless it has to be admitted that actually the majority of Hindus regard the Absolute as personal deity and worship him most often in the form of an incarnation.

The past history of Hinduism can for practical purposes be marked out into periods. The earliest may be described as the Vedic Age. There is no need to set any definite date to this, but it may have begun three thousand years ago. It is reflected in the Hymns of the Vedas, in which the appeal and expression of religion is

in large measure associated with the vast world of Nature.

A later distinctive period was that of the *Upanishads*. The influence of the Vedic hymns still continued, but existence came to be looked upon with philosophical speculation of the most profound order. The reflections enshrined in the *Upanishads* have been the starting points for most of the distinctive forms of Hindu philosophy of religion. The nomenclature of the polytheistic religion continued, but it was associated with another type of interpretation of existence. This is evident in a famous passage from the *Maitri Upanishad*:

Thou art Brahma, and verily thou art Vishnu.
 Thou art Rudra. Thou art Prajapati.
 Thou art Agni, Varuna, Vayu.
 Thou art Indra. Thou art the Moon.
 Thou art food. Thou art Yama. Thou art the Earth.
 Thou art All. Yea, thou art the unshaken One.
 For Nature's sake and for its own
 Is existence manifold in Thee.
 O Lord of all, hail unto Thee!²

For a thousand years, roughly speaking, Buddhism spread over India and, as far as can be judged, dominated much of its religious life. Along with the religion of the Jains it was responsible for fundamental influences in the development of Hinduism. But the power of Buddhism collapsed in India and Jainism is now professed by a comparatively small community. The reasons for the almost entire disappearance of Buddhism from India are not definitely known and their investigation forms one of the most interesting tasks in the history of religion.

By the time Hinduism triumphed over Buddhism in India, the conditions existing there were in many respects similar to those in medieval Europe. Traditional stories, legends, myths, moral tales, hymns, the stock in

trade of wandering teachers, were becoming more fixed. In the course of time, much was embodied in the two great Indian epics, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*, and in the literature known as the *Purāṇas*. Thought on religion took on a much more systematic philosophical form. What may be called a Hindu scholasticism developed. A number of great philosophical thinkers arose, preëminent among whom were Shaṅkaracharya and Rāmānuja. Much of the orthodox Hindu thought of today is a continuance of Shaṅkara's scholasticism. This scholastic Hinduism and the superstitions and magic of the less educated led to conditions calling forth reformers, just as those of medieval Catholicism did. The reform movements of the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries arose largely from the religious life of the laity, especially from the inspiration of individual saints. They differed from those of the late nineteenth century and our own day which have resulted in no small measure from Occidental influences.

Nevertheless it can hardly be doubted that an impetus to reform in certain directions came through the influx of the Moslem conquerors. The simplicity of their faith, their rigid monotheism, and their intense antagonism to idolatry had its influence on Hindu thought and practical religious life. During Moslem rule the number of adherents to Islām increased enormously, chiefly by conversions from the lower strata of Hindu society, and mosques with their severe dignity and simply daily prayer arose over most of India, typifying a religion less dependent on rites and ceremonies. Among some of the peoples more closely in contact with Moslem influences a number of religious leaders of outstanding merit arose. Virile physically and morally, they had an intense religious enthusiasm. They taught forms of religion blending features of Hinduism and Islām. One of these was the religion of the Sikhs, a religion shorn of many of the abuses of Hindu practice

and combining with Islamic simplicity something of the depth of Hindu mysticism.

For nearly two hundred years the British have been dominant in India. In many ways this has been a disadvantage for Indian culture. The British attitude with regard to the religion of the subjects of the empire has been one of complete tolerance. But just as Indian art has decayed because of the lack of patronage such as former rulers had shown it, so religion has suffered through loss of that support which from early Buddhist times had been given to it by the great ruling monarchs of India. British rule with its neutrality in regard to religion has involved loss to Indian religion. The system of education officially organized by the British authorities has been entirely secular in character, thus, though not intentionally, promoting the modern tendency to secularism. The British occupation has also brought important gains for Indian religion. Opened to intercourse with the West, India has become an object of intense interest to Occidental scholars. Many of these embarked upon critical study of Indian religions and philosophies and following them, Indian scholars have themselves begun a more thorough-going investigation of their heritage. This has been one of the main influences leading to the modern expressions of Hinduism.

Hinduism has a multiplicity of doctrinal and ceremonial forms. Nevertheless they have certain common fundamental features. They have drawn in large measure from a common fund of religious literature, even though individual sects have also developed independent literatures of their own. In Hinduism generally, the *Vedas* have been accorded a position of supreme authority. They embody the teachings of the ancient Rishis or saintly teachers. Though they are not to be thought of as a revelation in any external sense, the

claim has been made that the Vedas contain eternal truth and in this sense that the Vedas are eternal.³

Copies of manuscripts of individual Hindu books were not numerous. It may be doubted whether at any time even the great Hindu thinkers of the past were personally acquainted with all of even the most important scriptures. Some knew some books well, others knew other books. All that the majority of Hindus could learn of the scriptures was from occasional recitation and exposition of portions by wandering teachers or local scholars. Many of the teachers did not expound the scriptures but gave a simple exposition of the fundamentals of the religion along with stories concerning the popular mythological forms of the deity and tales with moral implications. But one small book—itsself incorporated in the great epic, the *Mahābhārata*—has been widely known, the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, the Lord's Song.⁴ To understand this book adequately a wide and deep study of Indian thought is required, for it may be looked upon as a summary of most of the fundamental attitudes of Hinduism. It has been and is a main source of inspiration in the religious life of India, and its importance cannot be exaggerated.

Much has been said and written about Hindu polytheism. There is a great variety of names of deities and there are many different images of deities. But while in practical worship first one and then another may occupy attention, the dominant Hindu thought about deity has been other than polytheistic. What is most important is to recognize that for Hinduism God is the fundamental reality. It is a secondary matter that there are various divergent ways in which this Reality is described in philosophical and religious terminology. The two most influential descriptions are those of the Advaita and the Vishistadvaita systems of thought. Advaitist means non-dualistic: God is One without a second. Compared with His reality, the world, you and

I in our finite form, are all appearances, all at most His dream. This infinite, unconditioned Being is veritably indescribable, for our human terms suggest limitation. With this conception of God, religion at its highest is an experience of God in which there is no division, no differentiation, felt between the worshiper and the worshipped. This Advaita view is that of Shaṅkaracharya and the dominant Hindu scholasticism still widely accepted in India through the influence of tradition. The other view, Vishistadvaita, or modified non-dualism, though it regards the ultimate reality as One, insists on a measure of reality in the world and in individual souls. For it religion has a more definitely theistic character, and the terms used express a more personal and emotional relation between souls and God.

As distinguished from philosophical speculation, practical religion is virtually theistic.⁵ Followers of the Advaita philosophy are frequently Shaivite, worshiping deity as Shiva, often represented in images in human form. Followers of the Vishistadvaita definitely adopt personal forms of expression, and their religion is intimately associated with the worship of incarnations of the god Vishnu. Shiva and Vishnu, along with Brahma, who has little importance in practical religion, constitute the Hindu Trinity. Broadly speaking, Brahma is God as creator, Shiva God as destroyer, Vishnu God as preserver. God is "the inner Soul of all things . . . who makes His one form manifold."⁶ "His form is not to be beheld, no one soever sees Him with the eye. They who know Him with heart and mind as abiding in the heart become immortal."⁷ He is reality, truth, and bliss, the infinite. He "is the origin of all; from Him the all proceeds; with this belief the enlightened possessed of the spirit pay worship to"⁸ Him. In completely Advaitist expression: "He is the unseen Seer, the unheard Hearer, the unthought Thinker, the understood Understander. Other than He there is no

seer. Other than He there is no hearer. Other than He there is no thinker. Other than He there is no understander. He is your Soul, the Inner-controller, the Immortal.”⁹

No account of deity in Hindu religion is adequate which does not give some attention to its feminine representations. Though in the villages goddess worship is closely associated with fertility rites for the promotion of good crops, it is evident that the worship of the divine mother though sometimes allied with sexualism is also due to a religious demand for characteristics of love, pity, and mercy in the divine reality. It may be true, though I am by no means certain, that Kali has been viewed most often as a dread being—depicted as she often is, black and with a necklace of skulls. Religion has recognized that existence is not all roseate. As Dr. Pratt writes: “The popularity of Kali as an object of worship is in part an expression of the fascination of the terrible,” yet, “this Terrible One is throughout Bengal not only feared but loved.”¹⁰ In the following two hymns to the goddess it will be seen that for the time she is treated as the ultimate divine power. It is in this manner that different aspects of the infinite object of worship become symbolized in India in the forms of different deities. This shows a practical attitude rather than final philosophic or religious belief.

“I shall never forget Her who is the giver of happiness:
 She it is, O Mother, who in the form of the Moon
 Creates the world full of sounds and their meanings,
 And again, by Her power in the form of the Sun
 She it is who maintains the world.
 And she it is, who in the form of fire, destroys the
 whole universe at the end of the ages.
 Men worship thee under various names—
 As Narayan, as she who saves from the ocean of hell,
 As Gauri, as she who allays the griefs of mankind, as
 Sarasvati,
 As the three-eyed giver of knowledge.”

"O Devi Mahalakshmi!
 Thou art the supreme Brahman,
 The ever-pervading Atman,
 Thou art the great Lord,
 And Mother of the world.
 O Mahalakshmi, salutation to Thee!" ¹¹

The "God-realization," which is the central motive of Hinduism as a religion is not to be attained by the theoretical exercise of reason. "Intellect is subordinated to intuition; dogma to experience; outer expression to inward realization." ¹² But this does not imply that Hinduism is in any way obscurantist; its vast philosophical literature provides evidence that Hindu thinkers have endeavored to follow reason to the extent of their capabilities.

As early as the Upanishads the Hindus began to express their convictions about the spiritual nature of man. The soul, the *ātman*, is fundamentally real; but it is not to be confused with its own experiences. The Hindu thinkers distinguish four states of spirit: that of waking consciousness; that of dreaming; that of dreamless sleep; and one beyond human description. The soul is not just what we are aware of in ourselves when we are awake: it is that which is present in and through all these states. That, it might be supposed, suggests a large number of souls, yours, mine, and those of the millions of persons who exist and have existed, and certain types of Hindu thought would regard this as correct. Others, however, carry the argument to further implications. The self, as you and I know it, has relations with other selves; its intellectual and emotional contact with them. So it is asked: What makes this apparent social intercourse possible? And the answer is given: As the real soul is that which exists in waking, dreaming, and sleeping, so it is the one reality in all selves. The self is in relation with the physical world, so again it is asked: What makes the interaction between

man and nature possible? The same answer is given: the reality in the self and in nature is one. That which is the core of the self, the soul, is at the same time the core of the world; one fundamental reality exists in both. It is not difficult to see that this course of thought gives a conception not only of the human soul but also of God, for the fundamental reality which thought thus arrives at, is the ultimate reality of all, and hence is deity. In Hindu terminology, *jīva-ātman* or individual soul is in essence one with, is identical with, *param-ātman* universal soul or God.

Nevertheless, man is not immediately aware of this as he knows himself in waking consciousness. In that state he is a limited individuality, and with his finitude he suffers discontent. Through religion he is to become free from this finite condition: that is the essence of Advaita Hinduism. The form of expression of Vishistadvaita Hinduism does not entirely correspond to this. For it the sense of finitude is overcome by relation with the fundamental reality of the deity, though the soul is not represented as metaphysically one with it. Corresponding with this difference in the conception of the soul and its relation to God there are differences of emotional attitudes, theoretical expression, and religious practices.

Two doctrines concerning the nature of man appear to be universally accepted by adherents to Hinduism: those of karma and the reincarnation of the soul. The precise historical connection between these two has never been investigated. Was the belief in reincarnation adopted in order to support the belief in the law of karma; or was the law of karma propounded in order to interpret, to find a reason for reincarnation? Only this is certain: that in Hindu thought both go together. As it is expressed in a Upanishad: "Obtaining the end of his action, whatever he does in this world he comes again from that world to this world of action."¹⁸

The word *karma* has come to be used as a short term for the belief that man suffers or enjoys the fruits of his own action and conversely that all a man enjoys or suffers is the result of his own action. This is quite logically allied with the belief in reincarnation. For, if a man experiences happiness or suffering which he cannot trace to any conduct of his own in this life, he supposes that it is due to fruits of his own action in a previous life. Similarly, if he does not reap the consequences of his action, good or bad, in this life, he regards it as inevitable that in some life in the future he will experience those consequences. Rebirth is due to the accumulation of good or (and) bad karma.

And this, from the Advaita point of view, brings us to the heart of the practical problem of religion. For rebirth is birth again as a finite individuality, and finite individuality is as such a condition of discontent and unrest. Redemption, escape from finitude, involves a cessation of rebirth. A great difficulty appears to arise here. For good actions have their fruits just as bad actions do, so that it might be supposed that the only way of escape is by complete inaction, laying up no consequences either good or bad. But that is no way out of the difficulty, for inaction is often enough a form of bad conduct. It is in this connection that the important teaching of non-attachment is introduced. Freedom from rebirth may be attained by acting without any thought or aim of acquiring fruits for any individual finite self or selves. In other words, action must be "selfless," in Western terminology, entirely unselfish. Actions must be done without any thought of personal gain. This doctrine of "non-attachment" is not a doctrine of indifference. Rather it is ultimately a doctrine of the love of good for its own sake, divested of personal considerations whether mine, yours, yours and mine, or even those of the whole of humanity. Or, in other words, all action is to be done as an offering to God.

The attitude of non-attachment, the love of the good for itself, or for God's sake,† is possible for the followers of Vishistadvaita as for the followers of Advaita. When this attitude is realized in its perfection, rebirth is no more: *moksha* or redemption is attained. The descriptions of this state differ in the two systems, but the experience implied seems essentially the same. In religious phraseology it is called "God-realization." For the Advaitist this is conceived as the ultimate realization of one's soul as identical with the infinite; it is not the loss of self but the loss of finitude. For the Vishistadvaitist it is conceived rather as the communion of one's soul with the completely satisfying reality of God.

The doctrine of karma rests on a conviction of an order in existence, an order which may be described as that of universal justice. It affirms not simply that happiness *should* go with virtue and that suffering *should be* the consequence of vice but that in the essence of things they always are so. Clearly this principle is not accepted on the ground of the experience of present lives, for appeal is made from them to other lives in order to rectify the apparent contradiction of the principle in present conditions. The principle cannot rest on empirical evidence. It is of the character of an ultimate assumption which one is in no wise compelled to make, and it may be questioned whether one ought to make it. Virtue and happiness, vice and misery may not coincide in future lives any more than they do now; and even taking all lives together they may not do so. Reality may not be constituted on such a principle of justice. This problem of the relation of suffering to sin, and of happiness to virtue, is one which different religions treat differently. For Hinduism it may be

† This is one of the fundamental teachings of the Bhagavad-Gītā.

said that this forceful enunciation of a universal principle of justice indicates a level of moral attainment of no mean kind. Properly conceived it may lead to a dignified attitude to suffering on the part of the sufferer.

The ideal of Hinduism is the attainment of redemption, *moksha*, the bliss which comes through the cessation of rebirth, and the transcendence of finitude. It is expressed in the Upanishadic prayer: "From the unreal lead me to the real; from darkness lead me to light; from death lead me to immortality."¹⁴ But, along with the fundamental attitude of non-attachment, there are various modes of advance toward attainment. According to the *Gītā*, final bliss is open to all. It may be reached by a member of any caste. But as the caste into which a soul is born depends on the character of his previous lives, it is claimed that members of the highest caste of Brahmins are nearest to the best conditions for its pursuit. Nevertheless this universalist doctrine of the *Gītā*, however much it appeals to those affected by modern thought, does not seem to have dominated in the history of Hinduism nor does it yet do so.

It is unnecessary here to discuss the actual origins of the Indian caste system, or the abuses to which it has given rise. From the religious point of view, it is maintained as an essential step toward redemption that an individual shall perform faithfully the functions of his caste. By this is meant primarily the functions of the main castes, the Brahmin or priestly caste, the lovers of wisdom; the Kshatriya or warrior caste; the Vaishya or merchant caste; and the Sudra or peasant, laborer caste. It is probable that in early periods of Indian history some persons assumed the functions of a particular caste because of special fitness, and on such grounds were regarded virtually as of that caste even though they might have been born in another. At the present time, due largely to modern education and economic conditions, members of particular castes do not always adhere

to the main type of function of the caste into which they are born.

A very prevalent misunderstanding and very frequent misrepresentation of Hinduism is that it is ascetic and unsocial, that it turns from the well-being of this life, and has no social ethics. It is sometimes maintained that it is radically pessimistic. Such descriptions appear more false than true. From one point of view this life of transitory experiences is indeed *māyā*: it is not the fundamentally real, the abiding. To treat it as though the ultimate reality is to be in a state of bondage from which religion is the deliverance. Nevertheless, if one realizes the essence of one's being as transcending it, then one may experience this life as *līlā*, the sport of the divine mind, of divine creation. Such *līlā* is symbolized in the joyous life of Krishna. With "non-attachment," genuine Hindus, those who understand the true significance of their religion, are anything but pessimistic in their sentiments. An adequate conception of Hinduism involves recognition of the significance of all sides of life. This may be seen by reference to its teachings concerning the *Purushārtha*, the *Āshrama* of the individual life, and the paths of redemption.

The *Purushārtha*, the great objects of human life, are classed as those of *pravṛtti*, or fulfillment, and *nivṛtti* or renunciation. To the life of pursuit belong *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma*; and to renunciation, *moksha*. *Dharma*, which has various meanings, implies a religious attitude with the cultivation of particular virtues and the performance of social and individual duties. *Artha* is concerned with all the benefits of social organization, and the activities that involves. *Kāma*, desire or love, is interpreted to include not only the highest sex love but also all sides of the life of esthetic culture. The literature dealing with *kāma* and *artha* gives sufficient evidence that Hinduism properly and fully understood is not simply ascetic and other-worldly.¹⁵

This is seen also in the *āshrama* of the individual life. In one life or another the individual has to fulfil the requirements of the four *āshrama*. The first, the life of the student, *brahmacharya*, is to be one of celibacy, the preparation of a healthy mind in a healthy body; a life of discipline and of search for knowledge. In the second, the life of the householder, *grihastha*, the values of sex-love, the care and love of children, and work in the community, have their place. The third stage, *vānaprastha*, is really a preparation for the fourth: it is one of wandering in the forest, and partial relinquishment of human ties. The fourth, of *sannyāsa*, is the life of complete renunciation, even perchance of seclusion. The last two stages are predominantly ascetic. In them the soul frees itself from its bondage to earthly joys and duties, and turns to definite meditation on God, to mystical intuition of ultimate reality.

There are other important teachings respecting the path to redemption, especially those contained in the *Bhagavad-gītā*. Three ways are advocated: *Jñāna-mārga*—the way of knowledge; *karma-mārga*—the way of action; *bhakti-mārga*—the way of devotional love. These appeal to the three sides of human nature, and for most, if not indeed for all men, the three paths are all necessary.¹⁶ They may be interpreted in a narrow orthodox fashion or in a more profound philosophical manner. *Jñāna-mārga* may be said to be knowledge of the truths of the sacred scriptures of the Hindus; *karma-mārga*, the practice of the duties of one's caste and the performance of the ritual ceremonies of Hinduism; *bhakti-mārga*, loving devotion to the deity and His manifestations. Understood in this orthodox manner their real significance is largely lost. The more profound interpretation accords more definitely with the spirit of the *Gītā* and the genius of Hinduism. *Jñāna-mārga* may be understood as the way of knowledge in general, anything which widens the outlook and makes it

more capable of comprehending the vastness of existence, until ultimately one is led as in meditation or contemplation to a mystical intuition, a beatific vision, of the fundamental infinite reality, God. *Karma-mārga* may be considered as the way of action in general, including the duties of caste or vocation and of religious ritual. All action is to be "non-attached," aiming at the good for itself not for personal gain. In the life of action, one may forget self, may even be quite unreflective of humanity, and absorbed in the task may attain redemption from restlessness and discontent. Voltaire seems to have recognized the truth of this: that one may find peace in "digging one's garden." *Bhakti-mārga* may be conceived as any form of true love, whether centered in a divine object of worship in the traditional sense, or in any object personal or artistic, so that the idea of self being forgotten there is an experience of harmony in or of mystical communion with something wider than one's finite personality.

It is the way of *Bhakti*, of devotion, of the school of the philosopher Rāmānuja that appeals to the great mass of Indians, even though the educated mainly do lip service to Śaṅkara. It is typified in this hymn of a Maratha saint:

"Who day and night are from all passion free,
Within their holy hearts I love to be,
Dwelling in sanctity.

Hearts of a fervent faith to them belong,
Where Dharma reigns, in them that power is strong
That knows or right or wrong.

They bathe in Wisdom; then their hunger stay
With Perfectness, lo, all in green array,
The leaves of Peace are they. . . .

So dear the path of Bhakti, they despise
The great Release; e'en in their sport there lies
The Wisdom of the Wise.

With pearls of Peace their limbs they beautify
Within their minds as in a scabbard I,
The All-indweller, lie.

Therefore their love waxes unceasingly—
These great-souled ones; not the least rift can be
Between their hearts and me.”¹⁷

These paths to equanimity, *moksha*, God-realization, may be practiced by any in any station of life. The *sannyāsi* who has given himself up solely to the highest form of religion may adopt various methods for the achievement of his object. Some of these are the practices of yoga.¹⁸ The preliminaries are important, but should not be confused with the actual conditions of *Yogic* contemplation and trance. The principles of *Yoga* have colored many ideas as to practical details of life. One reason for the avoidance of animal food (besides the desire not to kill animals) is that such food is supposed to have effects of arousing or increasing the violence of the physical passions. The mind may be more fit for religious achievement if one eats only moderate quantities of food which while nourishing is not physically stimulating. For contemplation it is supposed beneficial to keep the body in perfect restfulness. To this end not only are particular poses adopted but also the condition is aided by control of the breath. As the mind cannot be at rest unless it is free from immoral feelings toward others, moral attainment is essential as a preliminary to the highest religious ecstasy, to be reached in *Yogic* contemplation.

Hinduism has diverse forms of ritual, public and private. The Hindu temple is primarily the palace, the home of the deity, whether god or goddess, or both. Some temples have as the chief image the symbols of generation, the emblems of the mystic creative forces of existence. Vaishnavite temples and most others have images of the deities. The worshiper goes to the temple

as an individual rather than as one of a social group, to make his bow in the "royal" presence, "to pay his respects" to the deity. This may be a simple act of reverence and worship, or it may be accompanied with prayer. The priest attends to the image as the servant of a king, waking him in the morning, bathing him, dressing him, and eventually putting him to rest. As marriage is also felt to be divine, at times the deity may be taken in marriage procession from his own temple to that of a goddess. Much of such ritual may seem childish—one should rather say, childlike. Yet the important thing is not the ideas suggested to persons of an alien religion but the attitude of mystic relation to the deity, the reverence and joy, which are thereby nourished. Here a sympathetic understanding gained through actual observation is worth more than an estimate on a mere description of the facts.

To the deity, as to a king, offerings are made. The actual gifts are not supposed to be of any importance to the deity: it is the attitude of the devotee that counts. The enlightened modern Hindu is surely justified in regarding the fundamental attitude of his faith as expressed in the *Gītā*, notwithstanding widespread survivals of a lower order. "If one of earnest spirit set before Me with devotion a leaf, a flower, fruit or water, I enjoy this offering of devotion. Whatever be thy work, thine eating, thy sacrifice, thy gift, thy mortification, make thou of it an offering to Me, O son of Kunti."¹⁹ There is certainly nothing radically harmful in the practices in Hindu temples in this respect. Chief objection is to animal sacrifices still continued in some goddess temples, but there is a growing sentiment against them among Hindus.

Hinduism is rich in rites and ceremonies connected with special events in the life of the individual. Coming from earlier times they include practices of a sanitary and social rather than a distinctively religious character.

The religious sanction has helped to insure their performance. The sacred thread ceremony of the higher castes is a solemn rite of initiation, after which the individual is counted as one of the twice-born—born physically and born spiritually. At the time of this initiation he learns the *Gāyatrī Mantra*, which is to be the form of frequent meditation throughout his life. "May the divine Spirit inspire our hearts and enlighten our intellects." The marriage ceremony is the initiation into the life of the householder, a plighting of troth, a supplication for the blessings of the gods, especially for male offspring. The ceremonies connected with the disposal of the dead by burning on the funeral pyre are partly sanitary, and partly an expression of filial respect.

Among all peoples at certain levels of culture, rites are apt to be treated as though magical. The remedy for this defect is not necessarily the abandonment of the rites but may often be their symbolic interpretation. The ritual bathing of the Hindus, as for example, in the sacred Ganges, with its supposed purification from sin, is often magically conceived, but it is also interpreted as symbolical of the purification of the heart in a spiritual sense. The Hindu has his daily rites. He is to remember the deity when he sits down to his meals. He is to consecrate himself to God by daily meditation. There are times when the Hindu withdraws himself from his daily occupation in order to attain spiritual peace. He does not journey to a gay seaside resort but sets out on a pilgrimage to one or more of the many sacred places of India. It may be to the sacred Ganges, where he sees those who have retired from active participation in mundane affairs to meditate on the things of the spirit, and he may sit and be instructed by them. Or he may travel to far Kashmir, high up in the Himalayas to the shrine of Amar Nath amidst the eternal snows. For the majority who make them, such pil-

grimaces are fraught with much physical discomfort and privation, yet withal they are a sort of triumphal march of the human spirit.

On such pilgrimages a man may learn much of what asceticism means, both in his own life, and still more in that of the sadhus and sannyasis with whom he meets and associates. He will come to feel that at some time in this life or in a later one, he also must embark on the path of renunciation: that he also must at last give up all that seems desirable in this flow of temporal things that he might rise above them to the experience of an eternal vision of truth, reality, and bliss. The attitude attained is well expressed in the following passage: "I am sitting on the banks of the Bhagirathi and a dense forest is surrounding me on all sides. The vernal goddess seems to be all a-smiling in the sweetness of the flowers. . . . The Upanishads have accomplished their task. Divine bliss has at last been obtained. Have all my faculties put together the power to describe the infinite joy I feel? O what a great satisfaction! Till now, on account of the darkness of ignorance, I could see but a blurred vision of my Beloved. But today I am lost in His being. . . . O fleshy heart, come not between us, but leave my soul to feel its unity with the Divine. Away all difference! Away, away! I am the Beloved! The Beloved am I! O, the joy of it, how it is melting into tears and flowing down my cheeks." . . . "Like darkness before the blazing light, all trace of misery and poverty has disappeared. The chain of good and evil has been broken. O head: today you have justified your existence. O eyes: you are all happiness today. O ears: you are all joy today."²⁰

The influences of modern thought are beginning to be definitely felt within Hinduism, and the fundamental characteristics, here briefly surveyed, are being emancipated from a great mass of mythological fantasy and superstitious practice. During the nineteenth century

there were many movements for reform, some of which were definitely indigenous and others in large measure due to Occidental influences. It is these nineteenth century movements continued into the present century that constitute the basis for the more organized modern presentations of Hinduism.²¹ Nevertheless it is obvious that they do not represent adequately the wealth of Hinduism, and the recent work of individual scholars involves a more profound consideration of India's religious heritage.

Throughout a large part of Western India, especially in Kathiawar and northern Gujerat, there has grown up a vigorous movement to which the name Swami Narayan has been given.²² This is now a well-established community. It was founded by Sahajanand at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It is claimed for him that he "re-established Hindu worship in its virgin integrity." The movement had a wide influence on the lawless bands of the countryside and united men of all classes aiming at revival and reform. In essence it is based on a Vaishnavite theism. "It is said that he (the founder) first forbade the worship of idols and exhorted to the service of only one God, Narayan." Nevertheless, two images are used as symbols: Dharma, duty; and Bhakti, love. Nowhere among Hindus of Western India does religion seem more wholesome than as practiced by this sect. A simple catechism embodying the principles of Hinduism has been drawn up and has become the handbook of the adherents. The attitude is one of devotion and duty, and in the love of God strength is gained for the life of day by day. In this Swami Narayan Sect the essential atmosphere of spiritual Hinduism seems to be retained.

It is interesting to contrast this movement, well-established in Hindu sentiment, with that of the Brahmo Samaj and its various allied bodies in Bengal and the Prarthana Samaj in Western India. These are reform

movements originated by men of culture and Western learning: the former by Rama Mohan Roy, Debendra Nath Tagore, and Keshub Chandra Sen, educated aristocratic leaders of Bengal. They had imbibed the spirit of Western rationalism and much of modern Western Unitarianism. The meetings of the Samaj are after the fashion of the most meager Occidental Protestantism, with prayers and hymn-singing, passages read from religious scriptures of the great religions, and edifying discourses. With their general rejection of practical symbolism and ritual they have lost much of the natural Hindu reverence and sentiment. Within the movement itself attempts were made to restore what had been lost, but those attempts along with other causes led to division. Eventually there were in Bengal three communities instead of the original one. In the somewhat similar Prarthana Samaj of Bombay under the influence of the great judge Ranade, the social side of life has been emphasized. Social problems had for long been neglected by orthodox Hindus. Though the social influences of the Samaj have been important, religiously the movement has proved unsatisfying. In the process of rationalization, forms of religious expression not simply intellectual were mostly lost, and enthusiasm departed. The emphasis on social ethics could not provide satisfaction for the profound mystical needs nurtured by the traditional religion.

The question of the place of authority in religion occupied the attention of the leaders of the Brahmo Samajes for a long time, with the tendency toward an increasingly liberal and wider view.²³ In 1845 a controversy arose in the Samaj as to the infallibility of the Vedas. The periodical *Tattwabodhini Patrika* maintained that the Vedas alone are authoritative in Hindu theology. "What we consider as revelation is contained in the Vedas alone; and the last part of our holy scriptures treating of the final dispensation of Hinduism

forms what is called Vedanta." But after a few years of emphasis on Vedic infallibility, about 1850 the fundamental principle of intuitive religion was placed in the forefront of the periodical by a passage from the Upanishads: "The Rig Veda, Yajur Veda, Sama Veda and Atharva Veda, and Siksha, Kalpa, Vyakaran, Nirukti Chhandas and Jyotish are inferior: that is truly superior which enables a man to attain to the Eternal and Immutable Being." And Devendra Nath Tagore contended that religion explains the scriptures, not the scriptures religion. While the original Brahmo Samaj used in its service extracts from Hindu shastras only, one of the later divisions resolved to publish a compilation from different scriptures. In opening a new place of worship in 1869 one of the principles enunciated was: "No book shall be acknowledged or revered as the infallible word of God; yet no book which has been or may hereafter be acknowledged by any sect to be infallible shall be ridiculed or condemned." Similarly the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj declared in 1881: "No book or man shall ever be acknowledged as infallible and the only way to salvation; but nevertheless due respect shall be paid to all scriptures and the good and great of all countries." Keshub Chandra Sen propounded a broad view of revelation. "The first manifestation of God is in nature." He also reveals Himself in conscience and in history "through great men." "Great men are sent by God into the world to benefit mankind." The tendency to universalism is seen in this leader's conviction that the cardinal feature of his own task was to inaugurate "a unifying mission among the conflicting creeds of mankind." In 1881 he declared: "The glorious mission of the New Dispensation (the name of Keshub Chandra Sen's branch of the Samaj) is to harmonize religions and revelations, to establish the truth of every particular dispensation, and upon the basis of these particulars to

establish the largest and broadest induction of a general and glorious proposition."

The leaders of the Brahmo Samajes and the Prarthana Samaj have been serious-minded men with a Western form of education, but not religious saints in the Hindu sense. They have been of the type of the comfortable Protestant Christian pastor. Their appeal has been in no small degree cold and ineffective. Ramakrishna Paramahansa, a saint born in Bengal about the year 1834, was quite different: a man of religious ecstasy and devotion, who adopted the traditional life of the Hindu ascetic and teacher. From him has sprung the wide-spread Ramakrishna movement. Its well-trained teachers travel over India expounding a doctrine of the unity of the purified soul with God. With the spirit of Hindu devotion they arouse interest in the social welfare of mankind and in its religious peace and blessedness. Ramakrishna was a striking personality. One of the leaders of the Brahmo Samaj thus wrote of him: "a childlike tenderness, a profound visible humbleness, an unspeakable sweetness of expression, and a smile that I have seen on no other face that I can remember." The devotion that touched his own heart was one which called forth a warm response in those who came in contact with him. His attitude was no cold rationalism, but one of intense love for the universal Mother. One of his disciples records the intensity of his longing for the assurance of living ecstasy: "Oh, Mother show me the truth! Art thou there? Art thou there? Dost thou exist? Why then should I be left in ignorance? Why can I not realize? Words and philosophy are vain. Vain is all this talk of things. Truth! It is truth alone that I want to realize. Truth that I would touch! Truth that I would feel." His teaching was essentially pantheistic in theory, but this background was secondary to the religious attitude he endeavored to arouse. The following are typical of his published sayings: "The

devotee should love the Lord with all his heart and soul." "When egoism drops away, Divinity manifests itself." "Verily, verily, I say unto you, that he who yearns for God finds Him." "He finds God the quickest whose yearning and concentration are the greatest." "Knowledge leads to unity, and ignorance to diversity." "The virtuous cannot but take care of the body, the temple of the soul in which God has manifested Himself, or which has been blessed by God's advent." ²⁴

A current of religious fervor was started by Ramakrishna. His chief disciple, Swami Vivekananda, the actual founder of the Ramakrishna mission as it exists today, came to America to the Parliament of Religions in Chicago. Vivekananda had a keen perception for the essentials of the Advaitist form of Hinduism which formed the root of his master's teaching. He expounded its principles not in relation with Hinduism as a practical ritualistic religion of the people but as found in intellectual presentation in the *Upanishads*, in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, and in the *Yogasūtras*. It was a teaching meant to free men from attachment to the trivialities of life, to free them from all forms of egotism based upon inadequate views of the nature of the human self. In opposition to all selfishness and superficiality he preached redemption through the recognition of the essential unity of all life, endeavoring to break down all those personal prejudices dividing men from their fellows and from God. Religion for him was essentially mystical. He was too wise to diverge much from the ideas and practices with which the mystic life of his people had become associated. For this Dr. Farquhar classed him as a defender of the old faith and not as a reformer. That implies a complete misapprehension, a lack of inner understanding of the nature of reform, which consists not chiefly in rejection but in a new appreciation, a new enthusiasm for spiritual truth. This Vivekananda undoubtedly

had, and has indubitably transmitted to the Ramakrishna movement.

The essence of Vivekananda's teaching is that of Advaita Hinduism, but with a profound fervor he applied its principles as affecting life on every side. "There are much higher states of existence beyond reasoning. It is really beyond the intellect that the first state of religious life is to be found. When you step beyond thought and intellect and all reasoning then you have made the first step toward God; and that is the beginning of life. This that is commonly called life is but an embryo state." ²⁵ Every soul being as such potentially divine it must aim at manifesting its divinity in "work, or worship or psychic control or philosophy" and so reach true freedom. Religion is fundamentally that: doctrine, rituals, temples are but secondary details. "We all have to begin as dualists in the religion of love. God is to us a separate being and we feel ourselves to be separate beings also. Love then comes in the middle and man begins to approach God, and God also comes nearer and nearer to man. Man takes up all the various relationships of life as father, mother, as son, as friend, as master, as lover, and projects them on his ideal of love, on his God. To him God exists as all these, and the last point of his progress is reached when he feels that he has become absolutely merged in the object of his worship." ²⁶ But though we may have to begin as dualists Vivekananda insists that we cannot rest in that position. "There is no half-way house. . . . You are the omniscient, omnipresent being of the universe. . . . You are all one: there is only one such Self, and that one Self is you. . . . He is the background of your soul. . . . You are one with Him. Whenever there are two, there is fear, there is danger, there is conflict, there is strife. When it is all one, whom to hate, with whom to struggle, when it is all He, with whom to fight? This explains the nature of life. This explains the nature

of being. This is perfection, and this is God.”²⁷ “The greatest sin is to think yourself weak. No one is greater: realize you are Brahman.” “Love and ask nothing.” “The adamantine wall which shuts us in is egoism.”²⁸

Vivekananda summed up his view: “God will appear as the very self of ourselves.” Those who receive this knowledge: “become one with the universe. . . . They attain their real individuality, infinitely beyond these little selves which we now think of so much importance. No individuality will be lost; an infinite and eternal individuality will be realized. Pleasure in little things will cease. We are finding pleasure in this little body, in this little individual, but how much greater the pleasure will be when this whole universe appears as our body? If there be pleasure in these separate bodies, how much more when all bodies are one? The man who has realized this has attained to freedom, has gone beyond the dream, and known himself in his real nature.”²⁹

The cry of the reformer has often been for a return to the supposed simplicity and purity of teaching and practice of some earlier time. Swami Dayanand thought to find the undefiled wells of the religion of the Hindus in the *Vedas*. His reform was virtually a form of simplification based on the call: Back to the *Vedas*. He aroused much moral enthusiasm, and established a powerful community called the Arya Samaj. One important feature of this movement was its social and religious work among the lowest classes of the people. In orthodox practice these are often deprived of most of the benefits of organized Hinduism. By admission into the Arya Samaj they have acquired a more definite place in the Hindu fold. On the basis of the *Vedas*, with little emphasis on mystical interpretation or on methods of contemplation, the Arya Samaj has presented a simple monotheism as the central conception of religion. While making use of early Vedic

symbolism, especially that of the sacred fire as the symbol of purity and truth, it has discarded most of the temple ritual associated with idolatry. It has a distinctly ethical aim in teaching love and justice to all according to their merits, and the duty of aiding in the physical, social, and spiritual advance of mankind. Its lack of appreciation of the mystical side of Hinduism is probably due to its almost sole appeal to the *Vedas* and its virtual neglect of the work of the Hindu philosophers and saints. Consequently, as of the Brahmo Samajes, though not to the same degree, it must be said that the movement lacks religious warmth and enthusiasm.

As the founder of the Arya Samaj turned to the *Vedas* of the distant past another movement claims to be based upon the most advanced views of modern science. Pandit Agnihotri, for some time a drawing master, then a missionary of the Brahmo Samaj, abandoned its theistic teaching and sought a basis for a new movement in the Occidental theory of evolution as he understood it. This theory he supposed enables man to dispense altogether with belief in deity. He opposed theism as not merely false but as also detrimental to human life. "Neither does God exist nor is He of any use, but on the contrary His belief has made men blind followers of a wrong and most imperious belief and led them to commit many kinds of evils which would not be so if this harmful belief in God were removed and fact, reason, experiment, and higher senses of highly evolved masters would guide humanity."³⁰

The Dev Samaj which he founded teaches what is called "the science-grounded religion." Its leading ideas are partly those of a Spencerian type of evolution theory. To these are added ethical precepts chiefly of a negative kind. The Dev Samaj has something of the character of an ethical culture movement which wars against flesh-eating, smoking, child-marriage, and vice in all its forms. It has established schools with the main

aim of moral training. The leader is aware of the human need for an object of reverence, and this is provided by his own personality. The theory seems to be that if mankind is the highest species which evolution has produced, there must be one man among men who is the highest yet produced. The founder is that man, and as no deity is acknowledged he is to be accepted as the most worthy object of veneration. Notwithstanding the value of its emphasis on the moral, the movement has failed to appreciate the deeper mystical significance of the religious life of Hinduism. "The Bhagwan Dev Guru goes on shedding his higher Light and life-giving power constantly." "Every day early in the morning, when the physical sun has not yet appeared on the horizon, the Spiritual Sun rises up and sends out his higher vibrations in psychical atmosphere by singing a song which he calls his Life-song." ³¹

The influence of modern thought on Hinduism is having now a much wider and deeper effect than any of these sectarian reform movements. A Hindu scholar who knows his India well can justly say: "After a long winter of some centuries, we are today in one of the creative periods of Hinduism. . . . Leaders of Hindu thought and practice are convinced that the times require, not a surrender of the basic principles of Hinduism but a restatement of them with special reference to the needs of a more complex and mobile social order." ³² The most important factor in this modern Hinduism are the works of very high merit expounding Hinduism by scholars trained in Occidental methods of research. This scholarly literature ³³ is increasing year by year and the religious leaders and youth of India are being markedly affected by it. In face of what the West has to offer, they are becoming convinced on good grounds of the profundity of the religious thought of their race.

These works are not concerned primarily with social

problems or with forms of rationalism, such as were evident in some of the reform movements of the nineteenth century. They are more true to the inner genius of Hindu mysticism, and they will feed the Hindu spiritual life in a way which most rationalistic reforms failed to do. It is in this direction that they make their chief contribution to world thought and life. "I believe," says Dr. Prabhu Dutt Shastri, "that our main contribution to international philosophy lies to a very great extent in our rich mysticism. Mysticism, if viewed from without, will always appear as a nebulous confusion of thought, but judged from within it appears as the light of a living faith."³⁴ With the rise of this scholarly literature there seems to be a decline of influence of the so-called theosophical movement. In its earlier years that movement may have done some good in India in attracting the attention of those dissatisfied alike with the traditional religion in its orthodox form, and with the religiously unsatisfying reform movements. But it was inevitable that its milky platitudes and its pretense of occultism should eventually be found to be a misrepresentation of what Hinduism has to offer.

The heads of the great orthodox monasteries are encouraging the study of the scriptures and are expounding them with evident appreciation of their spiritual import. There is dissatisfaction with the merely secular character of the education of youth in schools and colleges. The foundation of the Hindu university of Benares was inspired by a desire for something more. In it religion is a definite subject of study and the students are encouraged to devote themselves to its practice. In place of the decadent traditional schools of Hindu learning, modern pathshalas have been established for the study of the sacred scriptures. During the last twenty years there has been a vast increase in the number of translations of the scriptures into the languages of the people of today. There comes from the press

a steady stream of books, mostly small and popular, appealing to wide circles, presenting the essence of the religion in modern terms. The leaders of this modern advance are open to the influences coming from other religions. They are prepared to accept all that may enrich their outlook on life, but they see no adequate reason for changing their allegiance from one religion to another. Oppositions and conflicts, as between Hindus and Moslems, occur only among the less educated on each side.

The modern study of Hinduism is beginning to bring a broader idea of its scope. Evidence is being assembled to show the error of the frequent contention that Hinduism has no truly ethical content and that it is radically ascetic. The claim that Hinduism is comprehensive, that there is no valuable element of life or thought for which room may not be found in it, that indeed it has already a very broad and detailed richness, is being justified before the bar of unprejudiced scholarship. And partly in consequence, and partly in parallel with this development, societies have been founded whose purpose is to strengthen Hinduism in its practical organization against the attempts of members of other religions to undermine it. The Maha Sabha is a rallying ground for Hindus of all schools. The Sadharan Dharma Society is concerned with exposition of the fundamentals of Hinduism. The Vedic Mission and the Hindu Missionary Society aim at reconversion and bringing back to the fold of Hinduism those who have been led in earlier times to adopt the faiths of Islām or of Christianity.

For more than twenty years there have been interesting and significant forms of propaganda of types of Hinduism in America.⁸⁵ A considerable amount of the attraction of these has been due to a wide-spread notion that Hindu thought has mysterious occult sides. On the other hand, some persons dissatisfied with mere secu-

larism and repelled from orthodox Christianity have sought in these forms of Hinduism some satisfaction of their religious needs. It seems probable that the literature that is growing up in this connection, for presentation to American readers, will in due course have an influence upon Hindu thought in India itself. Apart however from those who have come to America with the purpose of developing Hindu cults, or for personal financial reasons of exploitation of those who seek the occult, within more recent years Indian scholars have visited and lectured in America without any such propagandist motives. That the West has much to learn from India may be reasonably admitted, but it is more likely to come from scholarly investigation than from the activities of popular preachers. On the basis of such investigation Dr. Pratt has indicated in an impressive summary the common conceptions of Hinduism. Though it inevitably raises some questions, chiefly as to forms of expression, it corresponds closely with my own conclusions: "If these common conceptions should be formulated in an Indian creed it would read in part somewhat as follows: 'I believe in the soul. I believe in its endless progress as it takes its way through changing forms, in worlds that rise and pass. I believe that the natural world with all it has of luxury and wealth and with it the human body itself are but the means in the education and refinement of the soul, and that whenever they stand in the way of the soul's progress they must be renounced and despised.' And to this, the overwhelming majority of Indian thinkers would add: 'I believe that the human soul may enter into, or is already and forever in, immediate communion with the divine.' " ³⁸

CHAPTER III

BUDDHISM

Though it originated on Indian soil and for about a thousand years had a great history in India itself, Buddhism should not be regarded as primarily a reform of Hinduism. In its inception it was remarkably independent: in some respects more independent of Hinduism than Christianity was of Judaism. It arose from the teaching and the personality of its founder, and his own experience and reflection on the problems of life just as definitely as Christianity did from Jesus. Yet Christianity adopted the scriptures of the Hebrews and embodied them in its bible; Buddhism did no such thing with the Hindu *Vedas*. Among earlier Occidental scholars Jainism and Buddhism were frequently confused. Though they are now seen to be different in various ways, it may be suggested that Buddhism may have been in some measure a revolt from Jainism. During the last fifty years Buddhism has aroused the keen interest of scholars of the West, an interest rapidly increasing in the scope of its appeal. Modern Buddhist thinkers contend that Buddhism is consistent with modern natural science and is a suitable religion for our age.

The question has been raised as to whether Siddhāttha, the founder of Buddhism, was a real historical personage. He has been considered to be only mythological. But such doubt of his historicity seems to be unreasonable. While there is no demonstrative proof, the evidence suggests that he was a real human person. Nevertheless, much in the records can hardly be regarded as historical, and the actual details which can be safely affirmed concerning his life and teachings are few. He appears to have been a remarkable personality

who captivated the affections of men and women of his time, and has aroused the reverent veneration of millions of followers since.

According to tradition¹ Siddhāttha was born in about the year 563 B. C. the son of a "prince" of the Sakya clan, somewhere near the borders of Nepal, at Kapilavasthu on the slopes of the Himalayas. At the age of twenty-nine he renounced all family ties and worldly possessions and went forth in search of religious truth and peace. For six years he practiced great austerities and extreme forms of asceticism, in association with five monks who may have been Jains. At the end of this time, nearly dead from lack of adequate food, he abandoned these methods of extreme asceticism which had failed to give him what he sought. Shortly afterward the great principles which he was to promulgate as the basis of the new religion dawned upon him. He had attained enlightenment: thereafter he is to be called Gautama the Buddha, Gautama the Enlightened One. He set out to tell others of the truth that he had found. The records tell of a first great sermon preached in the deer park at Sarnath near Benares. In course of time he attracted large numbers of disciples and established his monastic order. After many years of wandering and teaching he died at the age of eighty.

There are evidences that the personality of Buddha was one of great strength and of equally great kindness and practical wisdom, of great patience, tact, and love in his dealings with mankind. One brief story shows the Buddha as looking upon himself as a servant of mankind. The Buddha with Ananda saw a diseased and helpless monk left unattended by his brethren. They had said: "That monk, lord, is of no service to the monks, hence they do not wait on him." And in a phrase which has its Christian parallel the Buddha exhorted them: "Whosoever, monks, would wait upon me, he should wait upon the sick."² What a powerful

impression this man and his teachings made may be gleaned from the legends which grew up around him. Legends are not always to be discarded as mere superstitions. For though they may not as such be accepted as statements of actual fact, they teach us something of the attitude of the mind of those who originated, accepted, and perpetuated them. They point to the nature and the intensity of feelings aroused, even though it is only indirectly they add to our knowledge of the person who aroused them. The legends concerning the Buddha were the result of a long development, and in the present state of knowledge it cannot be definitely said when particular legends first appeared. Later philosophical developments took certain parallel courses with the legends, suggesting that these represent not merely an expression of human devotion but also have some relation to aspects of reality and human demands upon it. A few examples will show the manner in which imagination and thought played around this figure.

The birth of the Buddha was made the subject of a legend ascribing to him a heavenly origin. His mother is said to have dreamed that the Buddha entered her side in the form of an elephant. Telling her husband of her dream, he called the Brahmins to explain it and they said: "Be not anxious, O king, the queen has conceived, a male not a female, and thou shalt have a son, and if he dwells in a house he will become a king, a universal monarch; if he leaves his house and goes forth from the world, he will become a Buddha, a remover in the world of the evil (of ignorance)." ⁸ At his birth "great splendor appeared, (in the spaces between the worlds) surpassing the divine majesty of the gods." Legend then tells how the father sought to prevent his son from the temptation to go forth as a teacher, for he wished him to become a universal monarch. He provided him with palaces for the different seasons of the year; gave him all the pleasures that riches could buy;

and tried to guard him from the sight and knowledge of evil which might turn his thoughts away from worldly happiness. And, as likely to bind him to a life of worldly happiness, he had him married.

Working back from some main aspects of his later teaching a story was formed of some experiences while out on four different days with his chariot in the park. The gods, thinking the time for his renunciation had come, took on the forms of an old man, a sick man, a corpse, and a man calm and serene in countenance who had renounced the world. Thus Siddhāttha learned of old age, of sickness, and of death, as the common lot of all men. Thus also he learned of the path of renunciation. In vain did his father endeavor to keep him by the enticements of all kinds of luxury. The day of his renunciation had arrived, and on that day, says legend, his son Rahula was born. This did not hold him back. Awaking, and seeing his female musicians sleeping around him in loathesome attitudes, he was filled with disgust for worldly pleasures. He ordered his horse Kanthaka to be prepared, and he rode forth. Māra the tempter appeared and endeavored to draw him from his purpose, promising that on the seventh day afterward vast earthly sovereignty should come to him if he would turn back. But his resolve was made: he would not turn back. He had a desire to look once more on his native city, but the earth turned around so that it was shut from his sight.

He began to meditate: "Verily this world has fallen on trouble; one is born and grows old, and dies; and falls from one state and springs up in another. And from this suffering, moreover, no one knows of any way of escape, even from decay and death. O, when shall a way of escape from this suffering be made known, from decay and from death?" Thus he started on his search for "the peerless way of desirable peace." He resorted "to remote places in the lonely depths of the

forest," overcame all fear and all doubt, and attained to serenity of mind. "There I dwelt, strenuous, serene, attentive, mindful, with body cool and calm, with mind collected and tranquil. . . ." ⁴

Like most of the other great founders of religions, the Buddha felt the necessity of times of retirement into solitude. On some of these occasions when meditating in privacy Māra is said to have come again to him, trying to persuade him to exercise worldly power; trying to dishearten him by saying that he would bind him and that he would not be delivered from him. But Māra always retired defeated, sad, and afflicted. After Siddhāttha had reached enlightenment Māra tried to urge him to enter into the enjoyment of the bliss he had achieved, and to leave mankind as incapable of understanding. Later forms of thought represent the Buddha as conscious of a mission for which he had come to earth. So he replied that he would not go hence until he had taught mankind the great truths he had discovered and inaugurated their practice among men. Though much is said in the Pali Canon suggesting that the Buddha first brought this saving knowledge, it is also reported to be said by him that his teaching is of an "ancient path," an "ancient road," traveled by the truly enlightened of earlier times.

It is not surprising that wonders and miracles should have been ascribed to Gautama. A large proportion of these represent a power of mind over body which though considered unusual in India is not regarded as contrary to the real nature of existence. He rose in the air and passed over the water to a boat; he made Yasa invisible to his father and then visible again; he caused the water to recede from him to give him a dry place on which to stand; he transported himself with enormous speed from place to place, going for example to one of the heavens and back; he read the thoughts of others accurately; he made smoke and fire come forth from him-

self to overcome a savage snake king; and so on. At his death there was a great earthquake and terrifying thunder and the gods Brahma Sahampati and Sakka uttered verses inspired by the event. These legends are part of a development of thought around the Buddha which led to his being regarded as having existed in the heavens and as having come to earth in order to teach mankind.

The great claims put by the records in the mouth of Buddha were more probably idealizations of a later age than the utterances of such a man. He is made to say: "I have overcome all foes; I am all-wise; I am free from stains in all things; I have left everything; and obtained emancipation of craving. Having myself gained knowledge, whom should I call my master? I have no teacher; no one is equal to me; in the world of men and devas no being is like me. I am the holy one in this world, I am the highest teacher, I alone am the perfectly enlightened one; I have gained coolness and have obtained *nibbāna*. To set in motion the wheel of the *dhamma*, I go to the city of the Kasis; I will beat the drum of the Immortal in the darkness of the world." ⁵ Finding none to whom he could look up with reverence, he asked: "This Norm then, wherein I am supremely enlightened, what if I were to live under it, paying it honor and respect?" ⁶

Buddhism has a short confession of faith, the going for refuge to the three jewels: "I take my refuge in the Buddha; I take my refuge in the Dhamma; I take my refuge in the Sangha." By Sangha is meant the Buddhist community of those who have "left the world" and donned the yellow robe; and by the Dhamma is meant the doctrine and way of life.

The organization of the Sangha, the community of monks and nuns, must have been far advanced even in the lifetime of the Buddha, if he actually lived as its leader and teacher for more than forty years. The ad-

mission of women into the order is represented as having happened in his lifetime, though not without a demur on his part that their admission would eventually lead to decay of the faith. The early monks were not concerned simply with their own redemption. The records state that very early in his mission the Buddha sent forth sixty of them to go one by one to spread the teaching: "Go ye now monks, and wander for the gain of the many, for the welfare of the many, out of compassion for the world, for the good, for the gain, and for the welfare of gods and man. Let not two of you go the same way. Preach, monks, the *dhamma* which is lovely in the beginning, lovely in the middle, lovely at the end, in the spirit and in the letter; proclaim a consummate, perfect, and pure life of holiness."⁷ "In the confused state of world activities the Order of the Sangha was instituted not as an adjunct to this material struggle but as a separate and distinctive institution with a clearly defined function, a function that cannot in any sense be performed by those in the vortex of life and struggle. . . . That function is the building up of their character by training themselves to destroy avarice, passion, and delusion."⁸

In a few centuries Buddhism had spread over India, into Ceylon and Burma, Siam and Java, to Tibet and China, and finally to Korea and Japan.⁹ During this progress the religion developed in many ways. In the earliest times there had been no images of the Buddha. By stages the veneration of the Buddha increased and images of him were made. In its march across Eastern Asia Buddhism led to the foundation not merely of simple monasteries but also shrines and temples where the image of Buddha could be installed. The religious sentiments of the various peoples were appealed to, and in large measure their previous religion was absorbed into and reinterpreted by Buddhism. Thus Buddhism was expanded and assumed a very different general ap-

pearance from that which it had at the time of its origin. These developments occurred more especially in the regions of Northern Buddhism.

Buddhism continued in India until toward the eighth and ninth centuries A. D. after which it disappeared from almost the whole of the Indian peninsula. It still continues there in the more or less inaccessible countries of Nepal and Sikkim in the heart of the Himalayas, and in small districts of Orissa. That so profound a religion, which could spread and live over so vast an area for a thousand years, during which it promoted literature and art, and had widespread effects on moral life, should vanish so completely is almost impossible to explain. Perhaps Buddhism developed too vastly along monastic lines until at last public support became inadequate. Monasteries may have fallen into decay for lack of funds. Monks traveled off to other countries, others returned to common life. Great leaders of Hinduism were gaining power, and in particular gaining the adherence of kings and princes whose patronage now turned to them. In its dealings with ordinary lay folk Buddhist teachers had offered little opposition to traditional religious mythology and to ordinary religious practices. The result, however, was not that Buddhism swallowed Hinduism but rather that Hinduism swallowed Buddhism. In the great scholastic system of *Shāṅkaracharya* which arose during the decline of Buddhism there is much that is Buddhistic in sentiment and ultimate principle. But Buddhism continued in Ceylon, Burma, and Siam, and it made vast conquests in Tibet and China, Korea and Japan.

It would be incorrect to conceive of Buddhism simply in terms of the supposed teaching of the Buddha. The history of Buddhism has involved developments beyond its earliest elements. Its elaboration had been toward a view of life and existence more in accord with the nature

of man and of reality. There has also been an absorption of much out of accord with its inner spirit. This assimilation of the good and of the bad, this progress on some sides and degeneration on others, was inevitable in the long life of a religion expanding for more than 2,000 years beyond the narrow circle of its earliest enthusiastic disciples to the wider world of mankind. It has been customary to make a broad distinction between two main types of Buddhist exposition, called *Hīnayāna*, the "low-career," and *Mahāyāna*, the "great-career," the latter of which had very diverse philosophical developments. Nevertheless a truer appreciation of the movement as a whole may perhaps be obtained by trying to understand first the factors which originally aroused men to accept it. Though it is not possible to decide what were actually utterances of the Buddha himself, it does seem possible to get an impression of the main character of his teachings.

In origin Buddhism was essentially ethical, and this ethical character it has to a large extent maintained in and through its later developments. Reference has already been made to the story of the Buddha, while still a "prince," meeting the old man, the sick man, the dead man, and the man who had renounced the world. This story was probably a later representation of aspects of the Buddha's teaching as it came down in the formulas learned by the monks. These formulas may have been actually due to the Buddha himself, or they may have been worked out at a very early time in the *Sangha*. As the story mentioned indicates, the primary problem for the Buddha was the problem of suffering. He sought to understand suffering in its nature, in its origin, and in its cure. The conclusions he arrived at are expressed in the so-called Four Noble Truths:

"This, monks, is the Noble Truth of Suffering: birth is suffering; decay is suffering; illness is suffering; pres-

ence of objects we hate is suffering; separation from objects we love is suffering; not to obtain what we desire is suffering.

"In brief, the five aggregates which spring from grasping, they are painful.

"This, monks, is the Noble Truth concerning the Origin of Suffering; verily it originates in that craving, which causes the renewal of becoming, is accompanied by sensual delight, and seeks satisfaction now here, now there; that is to say, craving for pleasures, craving for becoming, craving for not becoming.

"This, monks, is the Noble Truth concerning the Cessation of Suffering. Verily, it is passionlessness, cessation without remainder of this very craving; the laying aside of, the giving up, the being free from, the harboring no longer of, this craving.

"This monks, is the Noble Truth concerning the Path which leads to the Cessation of Suffering. Verily, it is this Noble Eightfold Path, that is to say, right views, right intent, right speech, right conduct, right means of livelihood, right endeavor, right mindfulness, and right meditation.

". . . Thus, monks, . . . have I obtained insight, knowledge, understanding, wisdom, and intuition."¹⁰

In his early life Siddhāttha had been enticed by luxury and pleasure, and around him he saw many given up to strivings for similar ends. During the first years of his life as a wandering monk he had practiced extreme asceticism, the extreme opposite to this life of pleasure: and there were not a few at that time in India who thought thus to attain redemption. The Buddha revolted from both these ways of life and taught the Middle Way. "There are two extremes, monks, which he who has given up the world ought to avoid. What are these two extremes? A life given to pleasure, devoted to pleasure and lusts; this is degrading, sensual, vulgar, ignoble, and profitless. And a life given to

mortification: this is painful, ignoble, and profitless. By avoiding these two extremes, monks, the Tathāgatha has gained the knowledge of the Middle Path which leads to insight, which leads to wisdom, which conduces to calm, to knowledge, to *Sambodhi*, to Nibbāna. Which, monks, is this Middle Path which leads to insight, which leads to wisdom, which conduces to calm, to knowledge, to supreme enlightenment, to Nibbāna? It is the Noble Eightfold Path, namely, right views, right intent, right speech, right conduct, right means of livelihood, right endeavor, right mindfulness, right meditation. . . .”¹¹

Gautama seems to have come to the conclusion that metaphysics gives no help in overcoming suffering. Affirmation or negation of an ultimately metaphysical character had for him no value in connection with that problem. His teaching endeavors to express a practical attitude with regard to it. Later thought developed diverse metaphysical theories on questions to which the Buddha himself is represented as refusing to give any answer, and with regard to which he seems to have maintained that no answer was of practical importance for the aim he was trying to achieve.

So it was, for example, with reference to the self or the soul of man. The doctrine of *anatta* or no-soul has not merely by Western scholars but also by Buddhists in long periods of their history and in much of their literature, been maintained to be the Buddhist view. But it seems correct to maintain that the Buddha would neither affirm nor deny the existence or the non-existence of the soul. The Buddha was silent when Vachagotta repeatedly asked, “Is there or is there not an *attā*?” Asked why he was silent he said to Ananda: “If I say there is, he would figure it as immutably eternal; if I say there is not, he would think he perishes utterly at death. Or he would say, is it consistent with your teaching; no *dhammas* are *attā*? or he would think, then

I was *attā*, but now am no longer so.”¹² To say “Soul is”; “Soul is not” is a merely speculative matter.

He believed that far more important than metaphysics was to consider the nature of the self as it appears to common sense in ordinary life, and there the self and the body in relation with it are seen to be ever changing. The self appears as a stream of events: it is in this stream that suffering arises, and it is with reference to this stream that suffering is to be cured. It should not be forgotten that the conception of soul that came thus into consideration by Gautama and his followers was the Hindu doctrine of *ātman*, upon which Upanishadic and later thinkers had placed so much stress. The subject is a difficult one because in spite of the non-committal attitude of Gautama indicated above, it is possible to contend and has been contended by Occidental and by Oriental thinkers that the implications of some other alleged sayings involve the actual rejection of the conception of a soul while others involve its acceptance. The idea of “self” had almost of necessity to be used in ethical phraseology. Thus there is talk of “the self reproaching the self”; “the taming of the self”; and “the right poisoning of the self.”¹³

One idea is constantly reiterated in the exposition of early Buddhist teachings: the impermanence of all component things. “Whatsoever is a beginning thing, all that is an ending thing.” “Alas, impermanent is everything in life! Growth is its very nature and decay.”¹⁴ The recognition of this lack of permanence is accompanied by a feeling of sorrow. The attitude implied suggests that the genuinely good, if there is any such, must be permanent. A similar doctrine is involved in Platonism and would seem also to be fundamental to the Hindu contention that truth and bliss is to be achieved only in unity in or union with the eternal unchanging One. The Buddha opens to all who are hearers “the door of the undying.”¹⁵ He has won “the immortal.” Escape

from the world of the born, the originated, the created is possible because of the unborn, the unoriginated, the uncreated.

The expositions of Buddhism which oppose the idea of the soul as a substantial entity, nevertheless include the doctrine of transmigration. Attempts are made to illustrate the idea of transmigration without the idea of a substantial self: though none are satisfactory. It is like one fire giving rise to another, that to another, and that in turn to still another, and so on, always understanding that each fire itself goes out in causing the succeeding one. This continuity, this series of births, is due to the continuation of the results of conduct. For according to the early Buddhist teaching there is no escape from the consequences of one's actions, good or bad. Part of the enlightenment of the Buddha consisted in the coming to know the series of causes¹⁶ which lead to this wearisome round of births and deaths. They lead back eventually to forms of craving to be, forms of passionate desire, due largely to ignorance. The Buddha thus described the gloom of transmigration and the feeling he had when he learned of the way to bring it to an end:

“Through birth and rebirths endless round,
Seeking in vain I hastened on,
To find who framed this edifice.
What misery!—birth incessantly!
O builders!—I’ve discovered thee!
This fabric thou shalt ne’er rebuild!
Thy rafters all are broken now,
And pointed roof demolished lies.
This mind has demolition reached,
And seen the last of all desires!”¹⁷

In the modern Western world the teaching of Buddhism has frequently been criticized as that of annihilation, inaction, and the suppression of all desire. Similar censure seems to have been known in very early times,

and the Buddha is himself said to have answered it. He admitted that there is one way in which such statements are correct, "I teach, Siha, the not doing of such actions as are unrighteous by deed, by word, by thought. I teach the not bringing about of the many states which are evil and not good. In this way, Siha, one could truly say of me: The Samāṇa Gautama teaches non-action."¹⁸ The same form of reply is made with reference to annihilation and to suppression of desires—all have the evil not the good in view.

It has often been maintained that Buddhism is fundamentally pessimistic.¹⁹ This view is far from being justified. Certainly the Buddha taught that complete satisfaction is not to be found in abandonment to the things of this world. He rejected that as one extreme, just as he rejected the opposite of extreme asceticism. The charge of pessimism seems false in view of the accounts given by his disciples who followed the Middle Way and the Noble Eightfold Path to Nirvāṇa. They attained to a blissful sense of freedom. This is charmingly expressed in a little simile in one of the Psalms of the Sisters:

One day, bathing my feet, I sit and watch
The water as it trickles down the slope,
Thereby I set my heart in steadfastness,
As one doth train a horse of noble breed.
Then, going to my cell, I take a lamp,
And seated on my couch I watch the flame.
Grasping the pin, I pull the wick right down
Into the oil. . . .
Lo! the Nibbāna of the little lamp.
Emancipation dawns! My heart is free!²⁰

Radical pessimism is inconsistent with the universality of love in Buddhism: "As the mother protects her only son with her life, let him cultivate an infinitely kindly mind toward all beings. Let him cultivate an infinitely kindly mind toward all the world, above, below, cross-

wise, without obstruction of wrath and enmity. Standing, walking, sitting, or lying down, so far as he is awake, let him abide in this mental mood. They call this the state of divine life in the world." And so in the *Dhammapada* men are exhorted: "Let us live happily then, not hating those who hate us! among men who hate let us dwell free from hatred! Let us live happily then, free from ailments among the ailing! Let us live happily then, free from greed among the greedy! among men who are greedy let us dwell free from greed! Let us live happily then, though we call nothing our own, we shall be like bright gods feeding on happiness."²¹

It must inevitably be asked what Nirvāṇa means for Buddhism, and to that question it may be replied that different interpretations have found varied acceptance in the history of Buddhism. The scholar cannot authoritatively say that any one was indubitably that taught by the Buddha or might alone be rightly taken as authentic. It is supreme sanctity attained by a saint in this life, implying a freedom from suffering, or the state of the saint after death. Not improbably Gautama himself avoided any attempt at the description of what might be regarded as indescribable in human terminology which is concerned with transient phenomena. Though the Hīnayāna schools may not have attempted the formation of a positive conception, the interpretation of Nirvāṇa as annihilation was not necessarily regarded as the correct one. After much study of the subject Dr. De la Vallée Poussin expressed the opinion: "that the most exact and the most authoritative definition of Nirvāṇa is not annihilation but 'unqualified deliverance,' a deliverance of which we have no right to predicate anything." Later, however, with further investigation he came to the conclusion that as implying ultimate attainment it signifies a positive state of undying ineffable bliss.²² The multitudes of the Far East could not be

converted and held to Buddhism by a nihilistic or merely agnostic teaching which might satisfy philosophical monks and nuns, and positive prospects have been promised in forms of Mahāyāna doctrine, such for example as life in the "Western Land of Bliss."

Though the Buddhist declares that he takes refuge in the Buddha, in the Dhamma, in the Sangha, according to early Buddhism it is ultimately on himself that he must depend. While it did not deny the existence of dieties, early Buddhism looked upon any such super-human beings as in need of redemption just as human beings are. One is not to look to the deities for release. The Buddha is represented as saying to his followers toward the close of his life: "Therefore, O Ananda, be ye a refuge to yourselves. Be ye a refuge to yourselves. Betake yourselves to no external refuge. Hold fast to the *dhamma* as a lamp. Hold fast as a refuge to the *dhamma*. Look not for refuge to anyone besides yourselves. And how, Ananda, is a brother to be a lamp unto himself, a refuge to himself, betaking himself to no external refuge, holding fast to the *dhamma* as a lamp, holding fast as a refuge to the *dhamma*, looking not for refuge to anyone besides himself? Herein, monks, a brother continues as to the body, so to look upon the body that he remains strenuous, self-possessed, and mindful, having overcome both the hankering and the dejection common in the world. (And in the same way as to feeling . . . moods . . . ideas, he continues so to look upon each that he remains strenuous, self-possessed, and mindful, having overcome both the hankering and the dejection common in the world.)" ²³ Insistence on self-redemption remained a prominent feature of the Theravāda, the way of the elders, or more generally the Hīnayāna. Notwithstanding tendencies apparently modifying this position, the principle often makes itself apparent in Mahāyāna schools also. This self-redemption was to be sought in following the

Noble Eightfold Path. To do that effectively membership of the Order is regarded as advisable ("heretically" believed as not absolutely necessary), with the implied extent of asceticism from worldly pleasures. Moral integrity in universal kindness to all beings is essential. By specific training the adept should realize conditions of trance, which though periodic leave an influence on the mind afterward, helping to free it from desires.

Nevertheless in the course of its history Buddhism especially in China and Japan has frequently and very widely included beliefs in higher beings who could and would give help. The developments suggest an inadequacy of early Buddhism. They do form in a sense a revolution, but there were aspects of early Buddhism which may have been a starting-point for the development. Legend described Gautama as resisting the temptation to rest satisfied with his own attainment, and resolving to preach the doctrine for the salvation of the many, and he is reported to have sent out monks as missionaries for the same purpose. The ideal of becoming a Bodhisatta, one devoted to the salvation of others, began to take precedence over that of seeking Nirvāṇa in self-redemption. Thus the goal of Buddhahood was presented as the final aim.

In the Pali tradition the predominant implication seems to have been that all the Buddha could do was to teach the doctrine and leave men to strive for their self-redemption by following it. Nevertheless, even in the Pali *Jātaka*, stories of Buddha's previous lives, the conception of transference of merit is sometimes implicated. In the Mahāyāna idea of the Bodhisatta that conception became emphasized. The significance of this elaboration for the consideration of Buddhism ought to be accorded its great importance, bringing Buddhism into closer conformity with religion in general. Mahāyāna conceptions often involve the accumulation of "a store of merit which might be transferred to

others." "My own self and my pleasures, all my righteousness, past, present, and future, I sacrifice without regard in order to achieve the welfare of all beings."²⁴ Dr. Keith says the Bodhisattas were encouraged "to endure sufferings for the sake of the salvation of mortals," but he raises the question whether their sufferings are real and answers "in some cases certainly not." Another conception of the Bodhisatta regarded him as taking "upon himself the sins of the world, content to bear the punishment for them because he has undertaken the vow to save all the creatures of the world." Yet after all "the whole is utterly ideal; there is no real acceptance by the Bodhisatta of punishment for the sins of others, no real taking upon himself of their sin as morally evil, and a crushing burden on the soul. Even for his own earlier sins the Bodhisatta pays merely a nominal penalty, and, having once entered upon the stages, his virtue is supreme and neither physical nor moral evil can assail him."²⁵

The philosophical developments of the Mahāyāna though sometimes they do not appear to have close relation with these more practical and popular religious conceptions nevertheless are in a measure parallel with them. Thus there was a tendency more definitely to admit a fundamental reality beyond the world of the impermanent: "We are witnesses that there is no one of the fleeting and unreal things of earth but is made to appear by something real. If there be no real ocean, how can there be the transient and unreal waves? If there be no real mirror how can there be images unreal and transient reflected in it? If the dream be unreal, does it not at least imply a dreamer?"²⁶ The mysterious being of the Buddha is "universally diffused," and "comprehends all things within itself." The Dhamma, the doctrine, the way of life, is looked on as the universal norm of existence; as that which gives salvation, that brings release, not the mere efforts of the individual

monk striving for his own release from rebirth. Even the important philosophical doctrine of the ultimate Void which suggests utter nihilism is not, according to Dr. Thomas, to be so interpreted, but to be regarded as implying that "all is relative to an absolute."²⁷

It was not a very difficult transition in thought for the universal principle thus implied to be given more personal characteristics, and for salvation to be represented as due to a universal being of unlimited compassion. That transition seems to have occurred in the rise of devotion to Amida-Buddha. It was only a short step to look upon the Buddha of history as a terrestrial manifestation of the universal principle, the universal Dhamma-body. Contrasted with this being of infinite compassion the ordinary individual felt his own unworthiness, his own insignificant power.

Remembering the stories of how the merit of the Buddha in his previous births had been effective in aiding other beings, many Buddhists began to look for salvation through the universal merit of Amida. "This conception of vicarious suffering and the transference of merit," says Professor Pratt, "is hardly in harmony with what I have called the intellectual aspect of the Founder's teaching and his emphasis on self help. On the other hand, it is the natural, perhaps even the necessary outcome of the heart element of Buddhism, of the Founder's devotion, and of the devotion of all living souls. If the great enlightenment was not merely an intellectual achievement but a new experience of sharing the Common life, we may perhaps say with Professor Suzuki that the possibility of sharing our merit with others is the 'logical outcome of enlightenment consciousness.'"²⁸

It was the all-embracing Bodhisatta ideal with its practical implications that first captured the hearts of the peoples of China, Korea, and Japan. It underwent a rich development in Japan through the teachings of a

series of eminent teachers and saints. Honen interpreted Buddhism as a religion of reliance on the infinite compassion of the Buddha, leading to a life of piety and gratitude. "Everything in the world suggested to him the presence of the all-embracing love of the savior, and his sentiment in perpetual devotion was often improvised in verses with touches of pious mysticism." The fundamental tenet of Honen's religion "was nothing but to put absolute faith in the redeeming power of the all-compassionate Buddha embodied in the person of Amida, the Lord of the Western Land of Purity. There . . . he will take any and every person who will trust in him."²⁹ "It is in fact owing to this belief in Amida," says Miyamoto,³⁰ "that Buddhism could develop the pure religious faith of Asiatic people, in addition to its metaphysical, ethical, and aesthetic influence." "What is required in this faith," writes Dr. Anesaki, "is nothing but childlike trust in Buddha's fatherly love and compassion. No sin, no weakness, on our part, can be an obstacle to our devotion to him, because his saving power is unconditional, his grace being extended freely to all believers."³¹ For Amida Buddhism, says Dr. Pratt, salvation by faith is fundamental: "Faith means complete trust in Amida and therefore utter renunciation of self-help."³²

Thus it appears that starting from an essentially ethical teaching of a way to personal deliverance from suffering, a teaching allied with simple reverence of the Buddha and with philosophic doubt (and early denial) of the existence of the soul, Buddhism became eventually in large areas of its influence a religion implicating a supreme reality, an ideal of universal eternal life for all creatures through the grace of innumerable Buddhas and Bodhisattas.

Undoubtedly these changes are to be regarded as in part due to the adoption of forms of presentation that would appeal to the less educated; nevertheless, it

would seem futile to deny that there has been also the development and elaboration of fundamental principles going beyond those of the early teaching. In spite of the popular modes of their presentation it may be contended that these principles have forced themselves into recognition through their intrinsic nature and worth. But modern scholarship seems to some extent to be suggesting that in fundamentals the earlier and the later presentations are closely akin. The individualistic aim of the early aspirants to redemption may have been unduly stressed and the altruistic sentiments and efforts not fully appreciated. On the other hand the work of the Bodhisattas may have been interpreted by those who understood its true nature as while involving their assistance even to reach "the Pure Land of Bliss" left it then for the individual himself to attain Nirvāṇa. It is not improbable that for those who fully understood, whether followers of Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna, the ultimate implications of the faith and the final goal were really the same.

For the Hīnayāna, suffering is in this stream of empirical life and there the problem is to be attacked. So in the Mahāyāna the phrase was used "Nirvāṇa is Saṃsāra"; that is, it is to be sought in and through this scheme of apparently transitory things. As the lotus grows up out of the watery mud so unchanging peace is to be experienced as aimed at out of this world of sin and passion. "In Mahāyāna Buddhism ultimate enlightenment as ideal, and suffering and misery of the world as reality, must not be two different facts of life, but one; that is, there is no other ultimate enlightenment than that of illuminating the suffering world. Hence, to attain one's own enlightenment is nothing but to deliver all creatures from their own suffering." And so Miyamoto presenting what he describes as a rationalistic view of Mahāyāna Buddhism writes: "Amida's will to save all beings, and his love to make us join him in his Pure

Land of Bliss, is no other than the will to make people attain their ultimate enlightenment. . . . His love and omnipotence is not like that of a God who plays with his creatures as a child with his toys but is utterly ethical and religious. He is the Lord of Infinite Light and Eternal Life, who, constantly showering his light upon all sentient beings and leading us ever onward to the awakening of faith, is the Fountain of Perpetual Revelation.”³³

Dr. Thomas, with good reason, thinks that it was unfortunate that early Occidental students of Buddhism on their acquaintance with the Pali tradition “took a pleasure in describing” Buddhism as agnostic atheism. After a long and comprehensive study of the subject he concludes that “Buddhism agrees with the other world-religions in recognizing an ultimate eternal reality, but it nowhere describes this reality in positive language. Mahāyāna Buddhism indeed came to describe the Tathagata in terms hardly to be distinguished from the monotheistic terminology of Hinduism, but this was only relative truth.”³⁴

Under the stress of Occidental influence reform and revivals are occurring among Buddhists in most Buddhist countries.³⁵ Within recent years there has been the development of a keen intellectual interest in Buddhism, the publication of a large number of new Buddhist periodicals and books, the establishment of university chairs for the study of Buddhism and its culture, and the formation of societies for social and religious advancement including missionary activities. It has been said of the movement in Ceylon: “This revival cannot be passed over as merely the result of the efforts of a handful of seekers after notoriety or the fictitious enthusiasm created by a few European students of Buddhist literature. It has all the characteristics of a widespread and indigenous movement.”³⁶ The Buddhadasana Samagana is a reform society the adherents

of which are mostly cultured people. They present Buddhism as a religion concerned fundamentally with the "inner" life. Among the leaders of the revival in Ceylon are wealthy Buddhists who help to finance the printing of Buddhist books. A desire for a modern form of education in Oriental studies has awakened among the monks. Manuals of devotion and instruction for the laity have been published, and the more definite instruction of the young taken up.

An anonymous writer, probably a Buddhist, tells us with reference to Burma: "Buddhism is gaining influence. There is a revival. Buddhists now organize themselves on the models of Christian societies. It is being modified to meet new felt needs. The monks are more reasonable now and are amenable to advice given by laymen." The Christian recorders of this view comment: "This would seem a fair statement but it needs considerable modification. . . ." There are those who write of the decay and disintegration of Buddhism under the forces of increasing material prosperity and secularism. Movements like that of the Young Men's Buddhist Association are said to be nationalist rather than religious. Yet the history of religion gives many examples of religious and political reforms going together. It is something that "the Buddhists have become self-conscious." "The chief changes are coming," says Mr. Cochrane who asserts that Buddhism in Burma is adopting new methods, "and will continue to come, not obviously but like leaven working in the dough. The whole educational system, the rise of intelligence, the leaven of new thought are all changing Buddhism inwardly. . . . The outer transformation will be longer coming." The Buddhism of Burma had been mainly of the Hīnayāna type, but it is interesting to note the opinion of Mr. Haschall that it has changed much during his forty years experience of the country. From the general non-recognition of deity, it now tends to

such recognition; from a quiescent or almost nihilistic idea of Nirvāṇa it now tends to a conception of it as a land of bliss; from the belief in mere self-redemption it now inclines to accept Buddha as a savior; and in contrast with the conviction that there is no escape from the penalty of sin, it inclines to faith in forgiveness by God.³⁷

Within recent years the rulers of Siam have sponsored the publication of editions of Buddhist scriptures. Siamese Buddhists while tolerant of other religions, and admiring the precepts of practical Christianity, consider the "illogicalities of its dogmas an offense to the subtle Oriental intellect." It is thought just as likely that Christians might become Buddhists as Buddhists Christians. Nevertheless, there is apparently in Siam a considerable amount of secularism and skepticism among the upper classes, to whom the idea of Nirvāṇa seems chiefly of academic interest. For others Nirvāṇa appears much too distant, and if religious their interest is on the attainment of a better next life on earth.³⁸

Frederick Starr who quotes Dr. Hulbert as writing in 1905 that Buddhism was dead in Korea, himself found in four visits between 1911 and 1917 that Buddhism was very much alive there. The monasteries were organized in groups under head monasteries, and had united to elect a president to promote the interests of a united Korean Buddhism. Organized in five groups the monasteries contribute annually toward their combined work, maintaining a head office in Seoul. From about 1914 a seminary for Buddhist learning had been established there and in 1917 its numbers were steadily growing. A magazine in the interests of Korean Buddhism was launched, being edited by a man, the "son of a Presbyterian Elder, trained in Catholic schools, speaking French, Korean, Chinese, and Japanese, professionally engaged in service at a foreign consulate." Buddhist books are being published in a script which can be

read by many of the common people. Among these Mr. Starr mentions the "Eight Scenes from the Life of Buddha." Though this gives a definite contact with early Buddhism, the Buddhism of Korea is predominantly of a Mahāyāna type. In place of the self-redemption of the teaching of Gautama, salvation is looked for especially from Amida Buddha, through faith in whom men might attain to the bliss of the Western Paradise. That there is much ignorance in the monasteries and considerable superstition among the people, Mr. Starr is willing to admit. Nevertheless he saw much that manifests living interest, including for example about fifteen thousand people gathered together for the celebration of Buddha's birthday. He believes that more and more the monks are awakening to the possibilities of aiding in social welfare and the general advancement of the country. But Dr. Pratt at a later date obtained an impression less favorable and less hopeful.⁸⁹

Notwithstanding tendencies to naturalism and secularism in China, that country also gives evidence of a revival of interest in and of scholarly interpretation of Buddhism. "Judging from the present activity of the Buddhists themselves, it seems more likely that what we are about to witness is not a collapse but at least a partial revival of Buddhism." It is showing itself able to adjust itself to modern conditions, not only in its forms of theoretical presentation and justification but also in its practical organization. Along with a closer coordination of the monasteries there has been an increase in Buddhist educational work, both in schools and in general propaganda by lecturing and the publication of Buddhist literature of all kinds. "Books have been issued for the sake of harmonizing Buddhism with Western science and philosophy." This literary activity reveals an interest among the reading classes of China. There is much activity in all sorts of Buddhist societies

for social purposes. Special schools have been established in order to provide more modern training for leaders of Buddhist thought. Dr. Hodous tells of the making of programs for the future development of Buddhism. The individual is to be encouraged to cultivate love, mercy, equality, freedom, progressiveness, an established faith, patience, and endurance. Efforts are to be made to provide for all (1) an education according to capacity; (2) a trade suited to ability; (3) opportunity to develop their powers; (4) a chance for enlightenment. The individual is urged to methods of cooperation, social service, sacrifice for the social weal. Patriotism, cooperation in international movements, aid toward universal progress, are advocated. Men are to strive for the attainment of harmony with spiritual realities, the enlightenment of all, and the realization of the spiritual universe.⁴⁰

It is in Japan that most progress has been made toward a modern presentation and modern development of Buddhism. For the last fifty years there has been an increasing critical study of Buddhist texts, and a definite endeavor to relate the teachings of Buddhism with the reflections of rational philosophy and empirical science. The elements of superstition are being pruned off or allowed to die. Though the position of Buddhist priests at first became lowered by modern developments they are gradually regaining their influence owing to their turning to forms of modern education. The different sects have organized modern schools and colleges. In the universities the general study of religions has been taken up.

Attempts to establish Buddhism in the Occident have met so far with very little success. Buddhist societies have been formed and a type of Buddhist propaganda meant especially for the West is carried on, chiefly in periodicals. It is maintained that Buddhism is especially appropriate in face of modern Occidental conditions of

life. A Western exponent of Buddhism says that Christianity has forever lost its influence over the great masses and the broadest circles of the intellectual. He maintains that a religion is needed dependent not on faith but on reason and that Buddhism provides this. He gives a rationalistic account of Buddhism chiefly with reference to the Four Noble Truths. Referring to the purely scientific character of the teaching of the Buddha he says, "It is precisely in the infallible certainty of his reflexion that he stands quite unique." Another writer thinks Buddhism is supplementary to science and should be taught in schools as an integral part of a general culture. "If it is permissible to speak of a world-religion at all," writes Dr. Paul Dahlke, "it is certainly Buddhism that must first be considered in that connection. For a religion which as the representation of the pure light of knowledge without admixture of the shadows of faith, stands in no sort of contradiction to the facts of the understanding and yet remains in its adherents the highest rational morality—that surely is entitled to be called the true world-religion."⁴¹

Some of the modern Oriental presentations of Buddhism have emphasized its moral side, but they have not failed to relate this with cosmic principles. They have, however, tended to give so little attention to its mystical aspects as almost to ignore them. But there are grounds to believe that in the course of the modern consideration of the religion these will again be insisted upon. The Eastern Buddhist Society in its manifesto says we have suffered too much from sordid industrialism and blatant militarism, and it looks to Buddhism to infuse a higher idealism into modern life. For this it is not necessary to study "the enormous paraphernalia of theology and metaphysics which is found in Buddhist literature." What is needed are the few fundamental truths which are thought to be best expressed in the ancient Pali canon. The call is made: Back to the

Master: "First of all get to the very words of the Master, and then interpret them by your innermost experience." The faith of Buddhism is held to be a necessary complement to the teaching of modern science. "Science furnishes power over nature and command over men, but the Path furnishes an aim to human life, and thus determines what to do with the power over nature and the control over man." It is evident that in the modern Chinese and Japanese presentations of Buddhism much is rightly included which has been the result of the historical development and elaboration of the earliest teaching. The Anagarika Dharmapala, the founder of the Mahābodhi Society "to begin a propaganda for the dissemination of the Dharma in non-Buddhist lands" writes: "Buddhism is not a nihilism; nor is it an agnosticism. It is not a religion of dogmas. It is a religion of truths based on analysis. Every idea is subjected to analysis. It is not a monotheism and acknowledges no creator. It is not a nihilism in that it posits the law of causes and effects, with an eternal future and an eternal past. It is not an egoism, nor is it a pantheism. It avoids speculation. It is founded on the Four Noble Truths."⁴²

Buddhism has often been represented in the Occident as a religion of ascetic practice and atheistic ideas. But "whatever the Western critics may say," writes Anesaki, "the influence Buddhism exerted everywhere lay in its practice of love and equality, which was an outcome of its fundamental teaching of the unity of all beings, and of its ideal of supreme enlightenment (*Bodhi*) to be attained by all. This *Bodhi* amounts to realizing in the spirit and in life, the basic unity of existence, the spiritual communion pervading the whole universe." The Buddha taught this not only in his doctrine of all-oneness but in his life of all-embracing charity. "In short, the principle of the Buddhist religion amounts to faith and life in the Three Jewels

(*Ratna-traya*), which means oneness of the Perfect Person (*Buddha*), the Truth (*Dhamma*), and the Community (*Sangha*).” Another Buddhist writer sums up the aims of new Buddhism as follows: “Formerly Buddhism desired to escape the sinful world. Today Buddhism not only desires to escape this world of sin but longs to transform this world of sin into a new world dominated by the ideals of Buddhism. Formerly Buddhism was occupied with erecting and perfecting its doctrines and polity as an organization. Today it not only hopes to perfect the doctrines and polity but desires to spread the doctrines and ideals abroad so as to help mankind to become truly cultured.” Buddhism is essentially universalistic, like all great religions transcending the barriers of race and nationality. “The central idea in Buddhist teaching is the gospel of universal salvation based on the idea of the fundamental oneness of all beings. . . .” Men with all other beings are in a vast process to which no limits can be assigned except the possible end of universal attainment of complete bliss, Nirvāṇa. Buddhism teaches us, says a modern Buddhist, that “æon after æon, in a million million worlds circling round a galaxy of suns uncountable . . . life is growing nobler, greater, more compassionate, more wise; until at last, in some time so remote we cannot even think of it, all that was life, conditioned as we know it, and in many another unknown mode, shall have come at last to that far distant goal, the State Beyond all life, the fruition of all its striving, the fulfilment of all life’s hope—that Utter Peace to which we give the name Nirvāṇa. That is our hope.”⁴³

CHAPTER IV

JAINISM AND SIKHISM

JAINISM

Jainism is a form of belief and practice of a small but influential community in India. It is probable that in earlier times the number of its adherents was much greater than at present. It is certain that they formerly possessed considerable political power and widespread organization in Bengal, in the south around Mysore, in central India, and in Kathiawar. Decline in the prestige of the Jain community was due to intense Hindu opposition and also to the devastation caused by the Moslem conquests. Most Occidental scholars and some Indians have persisted in describing Jainism as an offshoot or reform of Brahmanical Hinduism. But all the evidence that can be presented is compatible with the theory that the similarities are due to like thought on the same problems or to influences of one religion on the other. The Jains themselves strongly insist on their traditional belief that their religion is an independent one: and there seems no adequate ground for rejecting that belief. It is significant that Jains have never accepted the Hindu sacred books as authoritative for them, and have their own distinctive religious literature.¹

Modern Jain scholars maintain that their religion is of great antiquity, that it goes back to pre-Vedic times, was the earliest faith of India, and indeed the primeval religion of mankind. This last contention is sometimes supported by reference to its animistic character, in which it resembles the animism widely found among primitive peoples. Jainism is believed by its adherents to have had twenty-four teachers or Tīrthaṅkaras in this

age. Two of these are generally accepted as historical even by Western scholars: Pārsvanātha and Mahāvīra. Modern Jainism is based especially upon the teachings of the latter who is supposed to have restated the religion in its original purity.

There are differences of opinion as to the dates of Mahāvīra's birth and death, varying within the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. A widely accepted tradition puts them somewhere about 599 B.C. and 527 B.C.² He was born in the town now called Besarh near the modern Patna. Tradition makes him a member of an aristocratic and wealthy family. Though his actual historical existence has been challenged, there is sufficient of the normal in the records for them to be treated as referring to a real personage. Nevertheless legends grew up around him. Thus, before his birth his mother had a large number of dreams which were interpreted as foretelling the birth of an extraordinary individual.³ He was to be "a spiritual conqueror, lord of the three worlds, and universal emperor of the law." So again it is said on the one hand that while discoursing just before his death the hall became illumined with a supernatural glow; and on the other that though this did not happen all that was left of him was his hair and nails from which another body arose to be disposed of with the usual rites.

There are different traditions concerning his early life, some maintaining that for a time he lived the ordinary life of a layman during which he was married: others deny this. Eventually he turned to a life of ascetic preparation, giving away all his possessions, and wandering homeless. "Neglecting his body, the Venerable Ascetic Mahāvīra meditated on his Self, in blameless lodgings, in blameless wandering, in restraint, kindness, avoidance of sinful influence, chaste life, in patience, freedom from passion, contentment; control, circumspection, practicing religious postures and acts;

walking the path of Nirvāṇa and liberation, which is the fruit of good conduct. Living thus he with equanimity bore, endured, sustained, and suffered all calamities arising from divine powers, men, and animals, with undisturbed and unafflicted mind, careful of body, speech, and mind." He passed twelve years in this way of life, and during the thirteenth in deep meditation "he reached Nirvāṇa" "the complete and full, the unobstructed, unimpeded, infinite and supreme, best knowledge and intuition, called Kevala." "Like the earth he patiently bore everything; like a well-kindled fire he shone in his splendor."⁴ Mahāvīra thereafter spent a life of preaching and organization.

His attention was directed not merely to the ascetic orders of monks and nuns but also to the laymen and laywomen of the community, who thus became regarded as a definite part of it with particular rules for their type of life. "Lord Mahāvīra will always occupy a foremost place among the benefactors of humanity, and he was the chief thinker of his times to recognize the many-sidedness of truth and to lay stress upon the necessity of studying from all standpoints."⁵

During the course of its history Jainism has had two main sects, the *Svetāmbar* and the *Digambar*. There is an important reformed sect of the former, the *Sthānakavāsī*, the chief distinctive feature of which is its abandonment of the use of images. The Svetāmbar monks and nuns are clothed in white or yellow; the Digambar monks are naked, clothed, as the name implies, in air. The Digambars claim to carry the principles of the religion to their logical conclusion. In their view women as such cannot attain directly to salvation but must previously be reborn as men. For all forms of Jainism the ideal way of life is essentially that of the ascetic, and the life of the householder must be regarded as a lower stage which is to lead up eventually to the ascetic condition in this life or a future one.

Although Jain monks have used simple moral tales in the instruction of the laity, and there is a rich literature of this type, the expositions of Jain principles must appear to most students highly abstract. It is a fundamental contention of Jainism that the ideal life can only be lived in relation with right knowledge, and that involves truth concerning the ultimate nature of existence. Hence the only way to an appreciation of Jainism is by consideration of its metaphysics. It is maintained by Jain scholars that Jainism is free from the kinds of dogmas which are found in most other religions; but it certainly has its own form of dogmatism in the acceptance of a number of ultimate concepts the implications of which are expounded without adequate inquiry into the validity of those concepts. They seem to be accepted on the basis of tradition and of the authoritative texts connected with the teaching of Mahāvīra.

Although Jainism has no detailed creed, it holds to the *ratna traya* or three jewels of right faith, right knowledge, and right conduct. "Without right faith there is no right knowledge, without right knowledge there is no virtuous conduct, without virtues there is no deliverance; and without deliverance there is no perfection." ⁶ Right faith is variously interpreted. For most Jains it appears to be the general acceptance of Jainism. J. L. Jaini describes it as "reasoned knowledge," "belief in things as they are"; "it is a sort of sight of a thing." ⁷ The essential implication is rather a general attitude of mind. Right faith, says another Jain writer, "only opens the outlook of life to embrace the highest good." It has "its eye constantly fixed on the great ideal of perfection and bliss." ⁸

Though there is little in Jain writings to suggest that knowledge is to be pursued for its own sake, for any intrinsic worth of its own, omniscience is nevertheless included as an attribute of perfection. The purpose of its pursuit seems in the first place to be its necessity for

the attainment of redemption and self-realization. "Right knowledge is the detailed knowledge of the process of self-realization, without which nothing but confusion can be expected as a result of action." It is intended "to furnish an accurate description of the path to be traversed, of the obstacles to be encountered on the way, and of the means to be adopted to steer clear of them."⁹ Jain metaphysics and psychology are developed with this aim in view. Moral conduct is said to depend on correct knowledge. "First of all a person must have knowledge of substances existing in this universe, and then proceed to regulate his conduct accordingly."¹⁰ The knowledge of self is of first importance: "He who sees himself needs no instruction."¹¹

Jain writers have a fondness for making classifications and lists. This arose no doubt in part through their convenience for oral instruction of adepts and for facilitating memorization. The divisions are often not in conformity with the principles of Occidental logic, in that they frequently overlap and do not always imply the application of one fundamentum divisionis in each group of classes. The precise significance of some of the divisions is not clear. Thus, right knowledge is divided into five classes: (1) knowledge of the self and the non-self by means of the mind and the senses; (2) knowledge from the scriptures; (3) direct knowledge of matter; (4) direct knowledge of another's mental activity about matter; and (5) omniscience, being knowledge of all things in all their aspects at all times.¹² "In the state of perfect knowledge we have a clear idea of the real nature of everything, ego and non-ego."¹³

The fundamental principle of Jainism is that man is a spiritual being.¹⁴ Owing to certain hindrances he is not in complete enjoyment of his spirituality. Hence Jainism is concerned with indicating the nature of these hindrances and showing how they may be overcome. Its chief concepts are associated with this fundamental

principle, these hindrances, the way of redemption from them, and the state of perfection thereby attained. They are tabulated in different lists with slight variations. The most definite is their classification as the seven *tattvas* or principles: (1) *jīva*—the living; (2) *a-jīva*—the non-living; (3) *āsrava*—the influx of *ajīva* to *jīva*; (4) *bandha*—the bondage of *jīva* to the *ajīva* associated with it; (5) *saṃvara*—the cessation of the influx of *ajīva* to *jīva*; (6) *nirjarā*—the elimination of *ajīva* from *jīva*; (7) *moksha*—the state of complete liberation and bliss. Another list, under the name of the *padārtha* gives the above seven with the addition of (8) *pāpa*, vice; and (9) *puṇya*, virtue.

Jīva may be translated as soul. Thus Jainism insists on the ultimate reality of the soul as the essential factor of religion, with which it is fundamentally concerned. "Soul is pure consciousness and is not the product of matter in any sense."¹⁵ All souls are by nature eternal, unoriginated substances with no end to their existence. They are agents, being conscious and intelligent. They are *amūrta*, that is, they cannot be apprehended by the senses and they have no qualities which can be apprehended by the senses. The number of souls cannot be estimated; indeed it is sometimes said to be infinite. They may be divided into two classes: *saṃsāri jīva*, those entangled in the meshes of *saṃsāra*, or transmigration associated with physical bodies; and *mukta jīva*, those entirely emancipated. There are souls everywhere in the world we know, in plants, animals, mankind, and for the cosmology of popular fancy also in hell and the realm of the so-called gods.

Souls in transmigration are of varying grades viewed from the standpoint of perfection. Their existence consists of a series of finite life-courses until full consciousness of their perfection is reached and their appearance of finitude is overcome. The forms which souls assume during their lives are due to their own activity, yet "in

spite of the origin and decay of forms the soul maintains its nature and identity.”¹⁶ In fact, as in their essence the souls are eternally perfect, imperfection can be rightly attributed only to the combination of the soul and non-soul. Though the intelligence of the souls may be obscured, it can never be destroyed. Regarded as realistic, the Jain view of the soul was opposed to the nihilistic and *anatta* theory developed in early Buddhism. “That he is infinite in perfection and yet finite with reference to temporal life; that he is born into perfection and yet dead from *samsāra*; that he is the negation of all extrinsic qualities and still the affirmation of his own intrinsic nature; that he has knowledge perfect, and yet devoid of knowledge imperfect; these eight attributes will not be associated with him if Nirvāṇa is interpreted nihilistically.”¹⁷

While it is believed that certain individual souls, such as those of the twenty-four Tīrthaṅkaras, have become emancipated from their embodied state and have attained the perfect condition of pure spirituality, it is maintained that at present and as far back as one can go in the lives of other souls, they are and have been in a condition of embodiment. Thus “every soul to begin with is *karma-jīva*, and Nirvāṇa is a unique state to be acquired anew for the first time. The state of nature is not a state of freedom. It is a state of bondage. The soul finds itself in chains and by its own exertion secures its own freedom.”¹⁸ Those who have attained perfection are *jīna* or conquerors. All that these can do for others is to teach them the right knowledge and inspire them with faith. Attainment depends entirely on individual effort. “Man! Thou art thy own friend: why wishest thou for a friend beyond thyself?”¹⁹ “Jainism is the scientific Path to Perfection and its first principle is that no results are ever achieved except by one’s own exertion.”²⁰ Mrs. Stevenson quotes a Magadhi passage repeated by many devout Jains after evening reading

from their sacred books: "The soul is the maker and the non-maker, and itself makes happiness and misery, is its own friend and its own foe, decides its own condition good or evil, is its own river Veyarani. . . . The soul is the cow from which all desires can be milked, the soul is my heavenly garden." ²¹

In the scale of embodied souls the human are distinguished from those below by the possession of reason. The soul has three aspects, the cognitive, the emotional, and the active. The cognitive and feeling aspects being due predominantly to activity, activity is the most important. On the one hand it may lead to bondage: on the other it is activity which leads to liberation if the proper path is followed. Emotions are of two types: those, such as anger and pride, which defile the soul, and those, such as sorrow, which do not defile the soul but aid in its purification.

"There is no one," says a modern Jain, "who does not hanker after eternal life and blissfulness in some form or other. Religion claims to be the science which enables the soul to realize the immortality and bliss for which it is hankering." ²² Jainism teaches the path by which this is to be attained. True knowledge of the reality of the soul is to lead to right conduct, the third jewel of Jainism. Right conduct is "doing the right thing at the right moment"; it is the "force which actually propels the barge of being havenward." ²³ There can be talk of right conduct only with respect to embodied souls. For "perfect conduct consists in checking all kinds of activities which are opposed to the characteristics of the soul which is (in itself) devoid of all actions, eternal, consisting in pure knowledge." ²⁴

Seeing that according to Jainism the soul is already in its ultimate nature perfect, and the suffering in its embodied state is due to its associations with non-soul, it is not surprising to find that its ethical teachings give emphasis to the eradication of evils, and tend to be

definitely ascetic in character. "Happy are we, happy live we, who call nothing our own; when Mathila is on fire, nothing is burned that belongs to me." "Quitting your former connections place your affection on nothing: a monk who loves not even those who love him, will be freed from sin and hatred." A true monk "does not expect respectful treatment, nor hospitality, nor reverence, nor praises; he controls himself, keeps the vows, practices austerities, and does not betray any curiosity." "Impartiality toward all beings in the world, whether friends or enemies, and abstention from injury to living beings throughout the whole life: this is a difficult duty."²⁵ Further, as the soul can attain redemption only through its own effort, the religion seems at first sight to be radically egoistic. Though that may appear to be a logical inference from its theory, Jainism has developed altruistic sentiments. Its leading ethical idea is that of *ahimsā*, literally non-killing. This concept has, however, been also given the implication of positive kindness to be practiced toward all living beings. "Therefore a wise man who considers well the ways that lead to bondage and birth, should himself search for the truth, and be kind toward all creatures."²⁶ By the practice and contemplation of universal kindness one may become free from egoistic passions. On the basis of this central principle of *ahimsā*, non-killing, the Jains strenuously opposed the Hindu animal sacrifices.

Like Hinduism and Buddhism Jainism has a central doctrine of karma. The implication is the same for all so far as it insists that the individual enjoys or suffers the consequences of his own conduct, and enjoys or suffers nothing but the consequences of his own conduct. "As a man sows so shall he reap" is regarded as a fundamental principle of reality. Jainism has worked out its doctrine of *karma* in a distinctive fashion and in great detail, associating it with its concept of *ajīva*. Through

its conduct the soul attracts to itself karmic matter which thus obscures and limits it. "Karma is that finest matter which a living being attracts to itself by reason of certain impellant forces which are in the individual; not only attracted to but assimilated by the individual itself and it changes the individuality of the living being." "Karma is always a foreign matter, it is always an obscuring element, obscuring some quality of the soul."²⁷ "The Jains declare that Mahāvīra's great message to mankind was that birth is nothing and caste nothing, but karma everything and on the destruction of karma future happiness depends."²⁸

Jainism has sometimes been described as atheistic. Such description has been keenly resented by Jains. In affirming that souls are eternal, and that their salvation depends on themselves, Jainism would seem to dispense with the idea of a supreme being as creator and savior. "Jainism does not offer devotion to any being or beings in the hope of obtaining bliss, immortality, or perfection from them. These are already the natural properties of the soul and cannot possibly be had from the outside."²⁹

Nevertheless, Jains do sometimes use the term God with definite significance. "What is God? What is our relation to God?' The answer to the first question is: God is the highest ideal we can think of. To the second question: We stand to God as the actual does to the ideal, and it is our duty to try and rise as far as we can to that ideal."³⁰ The ideal is the perfect soul. It has already been seen that according to Jainism the soul is eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, with perfect freedom and infinite bliss. These qualities, it is rightly contended, are the qualities which constitute the significant nature of deity in the highest religions. It is the soul as such which is the object of Jain meditation and devotion. "Devotion to God in Jainism only means devotion to the attributes of divinity which the devotee wishes to

develop in his soul." "The conception of God is not that of a creator or manager of the world, nor of a being anxious to be worshiped by angels and men, nor yet of a powerful personage engaged in selfish sport and indifferent to the consequences of his acts, but of the perfection of all that is noblest and best in the constitution of Man." ³¹

Thus in its concept of the eternal soul of the individual there is in Jainism an idea which corresponds in many essentials with that of the deity of the highest theistic religions. But its forms of expression otherwise constitute important differences from the doctrines of these religions. The teachings of Jainism are not yet clear on certain fundamental problems, at least not to non-Jain students. It appears as though there is a multiplicity of souls, each of which is eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, and perfect, and it is difficult to see how there can be differentiation between them so that they can be a plurality. In discussion with me some Jain monks have maintained that in their ultimate essence all souls are one: but this may be an opinion due to an influence of Advaita Hinduism on the religion. A Jain writer says, "Even the multiplicity of souls Jainism admits only from a certain standpoint. From another standpoint Jainism would say that all souls are one." ³² But whatever be the answer to that question it is clear that Jainism admits a multiplicity of souls in the limited embodied condition. And religion for such embodied souls includes concentration on and devotion to the ideal soul.

If the embodied soul is to get free from its bondage it can only be through conformity with the ideal, and by the activity of the genuine soul. Redemption comes from the ideal soul, for truly that is the only real soul. There is an insistence here on the truth that spiritual advance is to be through spiritual effort. What Jainism does in theory which the definitely theistic religions do

not do, is to regard the soul of the individual as metaphysically one with, as ultimately identical with, the ideal soul. There is some form of relationship, and Jainism expresses it in this particular way. Theistic systems express the relationship as that of two realities not to be metaphysically identified. The forms of the expressions differ, but it may be doubted whether properly understood there is any other serious difference in practical implication for life except that the theistic conception conforms more with an experience of personal love and communion with the ideal being. Even in this direction Jainism as a practical religion includes reverence and worship of the Tīrthaṅkaras, the emancipated souls, the ideal achieved. It nevertheless appears a deficiency of Jainism that it does not consider the question of the ground of the order and beauty in nature and the significance of the external world other than its association with the bondage of *jīva*. It has no adequate philosophy of nature.

There is no question of any discussion of immortality for Jainism: it is implied by its description of the soul that it is eternal. The only question concerns the character of the soul's life. If it does not come to full recognition and enjoyment of its complete spirituality, if, in other words, it is still associated with karmic matter, it will wander from birth to birth in the wearisome series of embodied lives. If it attains redemption it enjoys perfect freedom, omniscience, and eternal bliss. Freedom and bliss are very closely related as will be seen by a consideration of the nature of bliss. Bliss is not pleasure. For pleasure and pain are experienced through the association of the soul with something other than itself. Pain may come through its association with its physical body. Pleasure may be obtained by means of the physical organs, as hearing a musical symphony or tasting nice foods. "Pleasures are the thorn that rankles, pleasures are poison, pleasures are like a venom-

ous snake; he who is desirous of pleasures will not get them, and will come to a bad end at last. He will sink through anger; he will go down through pride; through greed will he incur dangers in both worlds." "While a man walks about without abandoning pleasures and grieves night and day, while he is anxious about other people, and seeks for wealth, he comes to old age and death. I have this and I have not that; I must do this; and I should not do that! While he talks in this strain, the robbers (*viz.*, time) drag him away. What foolishness is this!" "What avail riches for the practice of religion, what a family, what pleasures?"³³ Pleasure and pain being simple accompaniments of particular transient experiences are temporary and impermanent. Depending on external conditions pleasures cannot be the ultimate good of a free spiritual being, the good of which to be entirely within its own power must be within itself. "Nirvāṇa implies complete freedom from all those impurities of sin which limit and curtail the natural attributes and properties of the soul."³⁴

Jain temples are chiefly places for meditation. In or near them the Jain monks instruct the laity or their younger monastic brethren in the principles of the faith. Where there are images, as usually, they are for contemplation in silent meditation. Except for differences of color of the stone the twenty-four Tīrthaṅkaras of the present age, the Jina or conquerors who have attained omniscience and bliss, are all alike, representing to the believer the identity of the pure spirituality which he, as they, is to achieve. There is, however, a certain amount of ritual in the Jain temples, resembling in many respects that of the Vaiṣṇavite temples of Hinduism. There is a singing of praises of the Tīrthaṅkaras. At times there is reading of the sacred books and the preaching of sermons. On special holy days fasts are observed, particularly on the last day of the year. At that time "at the close of the meeting everyone present

asks forgiveness from his neighbors for any offense he may even unwittingly have given, and they all write letters to distant friends asking for their forgiveness also. This determination to start the new year with love and charity with their neighbors they do not confine to their own community.”³⁵ In the practical endeavor to attain to his ideal the Jain is called upon to practice certain forms of daily examination. There is the daily inspection of his clothing to remove from it to some safe place any living thing which may have become lodged therein, so that such life shall not be accidentally destroyed. At the same time this is to bring forcibly to mind the sacredness of life and the duty of kindness to all living beings. At the dusk of each day the Jain should make an examination of his conduct during the day with the purpose of noting his failings and defects so that he may guard himself from repetition of such faults and apply to himself the discipline which they show he is in need of.

In this examination he has to take note of any wrong which others may have done to him, and to adopt and cultivate an attitude of forgiveness toward them. The monk may confess any wrongdoing to his teacher or superior in the monastery. Important as the moral efforts are, they need to be accompanied by meditation and yogic contemplation.³⁶ The Jain must meditate on the nature of the fundamental reality of the soul as spiritual. “As the lustre of a burning flame increases, so increases the austerity, wisdom, and glory of a steadfast sage who, with vanquished desires meditates on the supreme place of virtue, though suffering pain.”³⁷

As the attainment of the Jain ideal involves freedom from contact with or bondage to the material, it is evident that this involves ultimately a life of asceticism. Thus the life of the monk and the nun are most appropriate. But not all are ready for this. Many will only be so ready after one or several more lives on earth.

Hence there are different vows for the ascetic on the one hand and the householder on the other. The ascetic must naturally fulfil on the ascetic side the requirements also made of laymen, so we may enumerate these first. They have been listed by Mr. Jaini, following a writer of 1235 A.D. as follows: To have faith in Jainism, to abstain from intoxicants, flesh food, and fruits which contain or are likely to contain insects; to abstain from food at night; to take filtered water; to abstain from gambling; to follow the five lesser vows; to abstain from hunting, from adultery and lasciviousness; to perform some religious exercises daily; to abstain from making his living by (a) agriculture, (b) learning, (c) trade, (d) army, (e) crafts, (f) singing, and (g) music. The five vows of the ascetic, while presupposing all these, also in a manner cover them again, are regarded very strictly. (1) The first vow, never to destroy any living thing, is taken to cover everything which might lead even partially or wholly to killing. Thus he must, for example, always speak in gentle, kindly ways, which may never give rise to quarrels or murders. (2) The vow of truthfulness rules out speech without deliberation, or with anger, avarice, or fear, for these may lead to falsehood. Even jesting or repartee which suggest falsehood are deprecated. (3) The vow against stealing includes not simply taking what belongs to another but even using what belongs to another without his permission. (4) To observe the law of chastity the monk must not talk about woman, or look at her form, or recall any previous conjugal life previous to his initiation, further he should avoid drinking intoxicants or eating to excess, and should not take highly spiced dishes, nor live in a house with females. (5) Finally the monk should relinquish all greed and desire, and should not regard anything as his own.

Within the last twenty years there has been a definite awakening of interest in their religion among the Jains.

They have begun to take steps to get to know what manuscripts and books exist in the libraries of their old monasteries and to preserve them. Some of the more important of these have been printed and some have been translated. This has been not simply under the influence of Western scholars but out of a revival among leading Jain monks and educated members of the community. In addition, expositions of the fundamentals of Jainism have been published giving statements of the religion in modern terms. This has been supported by the holding of conferences and by the publishing of periodicals in the interests of all sides of the life of the community. They have also led to definite movements on behalf of social reform as one form of expression of the fundamental principle of Jain ethics. From a similar motive Jains have also been able to influence non-Jains against various obsolete forms of religious rituals such as animal sacrifices.

The modern revival of Jainism was inaugurated and carried forward more than any other person by Vijaya Dharma Suri,⁸⁸ who was initiated as a Jain monk in 1887. During the course of a long life he traveled through India, preaching, founding Jain libraries, and organizing institutions in which Jainism could be studied systematically, as well as others for philanthropic objects. He was an admirer and advocate of the Western critical method, and was in correspondence with Occidental students of Jainism. He had broad sympathies with persons of all creeds, castes, and nationalities. It has been said that the greatest monument he left to posterity was a series of Jaina texts which in 1917 numbered seventy volumes. In addition he wrote a number of expositions of Jainism in Hindi, and began the publication of a fortnightly paper for the revival of Jainism among the non-monastic laity, as well as a monthly journal for discussion of matters of more technical interest. Vijaya Dharmas Suri's work, which is now

continued by his disciples, is evidence not only that the modern movement in Jainism is based upon a definite attempt at scholarly study but also that its influence goes beyond that to a reinvigoration of the Jaina community, especially of its educated members. For a number of years before his early death Devendra Prasad Jain also did much for this scholarly revival by the publication of a series of Sacred Books of the Jainas, all of which were edited by men trained in methods of Western scholarship. Largely as a result of the influence of these leaders an association of Jaina students and a literary research society were formed, Jaina conferences held, and the Jaina Gazette established.

In 1913 some educated Jains founded "The Mahāvīra Brotherhood or Universal Fraternity." The minimum principles of faith of the movement are given as follows: God means perfect soul. Time, space, matter, and soul, and the principles of motion and stationariness are uncreated and eternal. Soul must and can become perfect. It calls on all to "Hurt nothing as far as possible"; to eschew all flesh food; to suppress anger, pride, deceit, and greed; to cultivate peace of mind, and to practice forgiveness, humility, sacrifice, love, and faith; to help all as much as possible not expecting any return for one's good acts. The object of the movement is to be "a nucleus of the Universal Brotherhood of all living beings"; to be a center of Jains and Jainism in the West; to promote the pursuit of Jainism in everyday life, by example, encouragement, and support; to practice systematically some deliberate self or spiritual development, as for example charity or "breathing." Modern exponents of Jainism present it as a definitely scientific religion. "Jainism is a science," based on facts and true to the actual processes of existence. "Jainism differs from all other so-called religions so far as it is a perfectly accurate, definite, and exact science, free from misty and mystic ritual, unholy superstition, and

fear-engendering devotion.”³⁹ “Jainism is the scientific Path to Perfection.”⁴⁰

SIKHISM

In spite of its strength through its insistence upon ultimate principles, Jainism cannot escape the charge of lacking emotional warmth. A much later Indian religion, Sikhism, is in this regard a direct contrast.¹ Like Jainism in being the faith of a comparatively small number of people, it is noteworthy for the loftiness of its moral teachings and the intensity of its religious devotion. Sikhism has been represented as an attempt to combine Hinduism and Islām. Whatever may have been the conscious purpose of its founder and first teachers, it is clearly indebted both to Hinduism and Islām, though on the other hand it is also in opposition to some of their ideas and practices. Almost the first recorded utterance of Guru Nānak on beginning his teaching is the statement that: “There is no Hindu and no Musselman.” A story tells of his proclaiming the call to prayer in Baghdad, and leaving from it the name of the prophet Muhammed, but saying: “I reject all sects and know only one God, whom I recognize in the earth, the heavens, and in all directions.”²

Guru Nānak, the founder of the Sikh religion, was born in A.D. 1469 at Talwandi about thirty miles from Lahore, in a family of very modest means, his father being a village accountant with some interest in agriculture. When still young he “courted the retirement of the forest and the society of the religious men who frequented it.” In this way he acquired a knowledge of the ideas and theories of Hindu thought, and had opportunities of forming opinions upon many Hindu practices. Though he learned much from the lips of religious masters he probably gained more from his own undisturbed communings with nature, his own soul, and

with his Creator. It appears that he also became a competent Persian scholar, being thereby able to become acquainted with Moslem religious compositions. His family thought him insane because he manifested so little interest in practical affairs, and was apparently so idle. Urged by his father to assist in the cultivation of the land, he is said to have replied: "Make thy body the field, good works the seed, irrigate with God's name; make thy heart the cultivator; God will germinate in thy heart and thou shalt thus obtain the dignity of Nirvāṇa."⁸ Attempts to get him to adopt different kinds of practical occupation proved futile. He was married and had two sons. After a life given over to religious meditation and teaching he died in A.D. 1538 at Kartarpur in the Panjab.

After the death of Guru Nānak, in turn nine other Gurus succeeded him as the head of the community, the last being Guru Gobind Singh who died in A.D. 1708. Following the instructions of this Guru no further successor was appointed, the place of the living teachers being taken by the sacred book, the Granth Saheb. This consists of the Adi (or original) Granth compiled toward the end of the sixteenth century by the fifth Guru by gathering together the sayings and compositions of Guru Nānak and his successors, as well as some poems and stories of Hindu and Moslem saints; and a supplementary Granth formed after the death of Guru Gobind Singh, containing chiefly the writings and utterances of the latter.

Legend has developed around the lives of the Sikh Gurus, more especially around that of Guru Nānak. At his birth he is said to have uttered a cry "as the laughing voice of a wise man joining a social gathering." His future eminence as a royal personage or as a great religious teacher was foretold. As a child he was a prodigy in his capacity to learn and understand, and manifested a precocious interest in religion. He is rep-

resented as having unusual gifts of reading people's inmost thoughts.

In the story—legendary or true, but probably legendary—of his pilgrimage to Mecca, it is told that the shrine of the Kaaba miraculously turned around in his presence. Withered trees began to shoot and become green when he rested beneath them. He was tempted in the wilderness, and rejected the offer of universal sovereignty and worldly pleasures. After his death his body mysteriously disappeared from beneath a sheet under which it had been placed.

Similarly, legend has it that while the Sikhs were mourning the death of Guru Gobind Singh, a hermit came and said that he had met the Guru who smiled and said he was going to the forest on a hunting excursion. "The Sikhs who heard this statement arrived at the conclusion that it was all the Guru's play, that he dwelt in uninterrupted bliss, and that he showed himself wherever he was remembered." "Therefore for such a Guru who had departed bodily to heaven there ought to be no mourning."⁴

Together with this development of legend there has been a parallel theological development. In the utterances of the Gurus there is frequent reference to the "true Guru." It is the "true Guru" who brings the saving divine knowledge. The manner of these statements and their context suggests that the "true Guru" means God Himself: it is from the self-revelation of God that man gets his real knowledge of God. And this is an inner knowledge, a knowledge of the heart. But Nānak himself is also in another sense the Guru whose teaching leads men to true religion, fundamentally to the attitude in which they learn from the "true Guru."

It was not a long or difficult step for Nānak, as the Guru, to be identified with the "true Guru," and this step was an almost natural one to the Indian mind.

Hence Nānak was eventually conceived theologically as though an incarnation of the spirit of deity. And in pursuance of this idea, it was held to be the same spirit which passed in turn into each of the other nine Gurus and eventually into the Granth Saheb which continues the line of the Gurus. These legendary and theological developments add nothing of great value to the religion of the Sikhs. The former show the impression which the personality of the teacher made on the disciples, and the latter suggest nothing essentially more than the idea that the Guru in his teaching is revealing something of the nature of the divine. In the modern study and revival of the religion, therefore, these doctrinal suggestions may be expected to fall into the background, even perchance to be definitely rejected.

The term Sikh means disciple, in this connection disciple of the true Guru or God. Recruited at first from the rural peoples of the Panjab, the Sikh community rapidly grew in numbers. They were subjected to much persecution by the Moghul Emperor Aurungzeb, a religious bigot who thought that they should definitely become Moslems. In the face of these persecutions the community became closely organized and especially under the leadership of Guru Gobind Singh, the Sikhs developed martial characteristics. This leader formed the Khalsā, admission to which was through a rite of initiation in which a sword was used, and membership of which was known through the title Singh or lion attached to the name of each person. Eventually, though themselves numbering little more than three millions, the Sikhs were able to establish an empire with sovereignty over twenty millions. Their political power was later disintegrated, but within recent years the Sikhs have begun to arouse themselves to the significance and value of their religion, which was the first motive of their organization as a community.

Though there is no formal creed for Sikhism, the

Japji refers to its central doctrines. It should be known by heart by every Sikh, and repeated silently early in the morning. It opens thus: "There is but one God whose name is true, the Creator, devoid of fear and enmity, immortal, unborn, self-existent: by the favor of the Guru repeat his name. The True One was in the beginning; the True One was in the primal age. The True One is, was, and shall be." The dominant feature of Sikhism is its devotional monotheism, which colors the whole of its outlook on life. This monotheism is not inseparably bound up with any particular human teacher or teachers, though naturally for the Sikhs their Gurus take precedence.

It is reported that to a Moslem who greeted him with the saying: "The first name is that of God, the second that of the Prophet (i.e. Mohammed)", Nānak replied: "The first name is that of God: how many prophets are at his gate!" Whatever the subject discussed in the Sikh scriptures sooner or later one is brought back to the idea of devotion to God as that which is most fundamental, setting a man's heart and mind right for everything else. Monotheism is unhesitatingly affirmed. "There is only one God in this house." The attitude of man to God is to be one of unbroken worship and obedience.⁵

"Repeat the name of the one God, magnify the one God,
Remember the one God, make him thy heart's desire,
Sing the excellences of the one God who is endless:
With soul and body repeat the name of the one God—
God himself is the only, only, only one:
The perfect God filleth every place;
There have been many conceptions of the one God.
Worship the one God and all thy sins shall depart."⁶

The Sikh descriptions of God are expressions of religious experience, tinged definitely with emotion, rather than the results of philosophical reflection. At times they approach the more definitely theistic character of

orthodox Moslem theology; more often they resemble the pantheistic expressions of Advaita Hinduism. Yet for Sikhism God is not so much a being to be described as a spirit to be loved and worshiped. Philosophical argumentation plays practically no role in its scriptures. "By thinking I cannot obtain a conception of Him, even though I think hundreds of thousands of times." God is the "Formless One," the all-seeing, the uncreated, the "though I think hundreds of thousands of times." "God is in thee; why thinkest thou not on Him, O ignorant man?" He alone gives wisdom. All are subject to His order. "The one Lord who created the world is Lord of all." "Thou, O God, art the friend; thou art wise; it is Thou who unitest men with thee."⁷

Man is to feel the need for divine forgiveness, and to experience its reality on confession and repentance and reparation for wrong. Forgiven by God, he is to pardon others. Man is to exert himself to the utmost limit of his powers: dependence upon God is no excuse for lack of effort on his own part. Nevertheless, at times his power will be insufficient, and he is to seek divine grace. "I will give thee one order if thou wilt comply with it: when thine own might availeth not, clasp thy hands and worship God." "All truth, all fervor, all goodness, the excellences of perfect men, cannot be obtained in their perfection without Thee; if Thy grace be obtained none can be excluded."⁸

For Sikhism, happiness is dependent upon an inward disposition the dominant character of which is this devotion to God. "Until one love the Lord all other love is unstable." "He in whom there is no devotion to God hath lost his life in vain." Genuine love of God involves emancipation from selfishness and inspires love of others. It implies a complete trust in Him and so a freedom from all anxieties. "I live on confidence in God." "Faith and resignation are the characteristics of the holy; patience is the viaticum of the angels." While there is

much condemnation of a merely secular life in the Sikh scriptures, Sikhism is essentially opposed to asceticism, especially as advocated and practiced by Jains and Hindus. With a proper attitude to God as central one is to enjoy the goods of mundane existence.⁹

In accord with the Hindu influences in its formation, Sikhism includes the doctrine of karma, that the soul reaps what it sows, apart (as the Sikhs have a right to contend from the words of their scriptures) from considerations of divine mercy and forgiveness. The sufferings of this life are to be accepted as due to one's own conduct and not put down to others. "Impute not blame to anyone but rather to thine own *karma*: 'I have suffered the consequences of my acts: I may blame no one else.' " If the wrong is not known as done in this life, it must have been done in a previous one: "Joy and misery are the result of actions in previous states of existence." But Sikhism does not appear to represent this, as Jainism does, as though a merely mechanical following of effect upon cause. It is due to the power and will of God that man receives the due consequences of his deeds. "The Master granteth his term of life according to his past acts." "Misery and happiness are according to Thy pleasure: to whom shall we cry?"¹⁰

The transient character of life was a recurring theme of the Sikh teachers, especially of Teg Bahadur. Again and again the scriptures tell us: "The world is like a nightly dream." "Know that the world is like a dream or a play. There is nothing real in it, Nānak, but God." The same idea is expressed in other favorite metaphors: "The world is like a mansion of smoke." "Empire, wealth, youth, are all shadows; so are carriages and imposing mansions." Viewed from the standpoint of the eternal it is said of our earthly existence: "We men live but for a moment. . . . Therefore in the midst of life be in death."

The Sikh scriptures are not clear as to the precise

nature of the future of the soul. Transmigration is held up as a threat to the wicked and the infidel, especially by Guru Amar Das. Release from rebirth is frequently suggested as the aim of the religious life, thus suggesting the acceptance of the belief in transmigration as the otherwise normal course. The faithful are promised that they shall not "again obtain a human body." Some passages suggest a life in another world; and there is mention of a paradise, called Sach Chand. "Caste and beauty shall not go with thee to the next world: there shalt thou fare according to thine acts." On the other hand the predominant view of the final state of the soul is that of absorption in God. The soul is in its essence immortal in that it is one with the reality of God. The state of ultimate achievement and redemption is when, with the eradication of all selfishness, the limitations of individuality as experienced in this life are transcended. "She who under the Guru's instruction abandoneth evil should be absorbed in the Perfect One." "It is a law of the body to be born and die, but the soul is different. It is ever the same essence. Holy men have deemed human life temporary, like the roosting of birds for a night on a tree, or a brief occupation of a ferryboat by passengers." ¹¹

The Sikh Gurus constantly warned their disciples against methods common among Hindus which not only do not lead to salvation but rather turn man from the true way of devotion and moral goodness. They were opposed to asceticism and self-mortification, maintaining that to torture the body was not a sign of virtue but was a sin. God is to be worshiped with a healthy body. Even though he practices all forms of asceticism a man may be as far as ever from the highest bliss of the soul. He may vow himself to silence, may roam naked, may practice all sorts of austerities, may offer all sorts of gifts in charity, may perform all sorts of rites of

worship, and may nevertheless be filled with pride and thus not know true religion.

On the other hand "even while men laugh and play, and dress and eat, salvation may be obtained." In opposition to the ways of pride, the Guru says: "O man, by striving and earning enjoy happiness; by meditating on God meet Him, and thine anxieties shall vanish." The Sikhs opposed the type of life of the beggar saint. "They who eat the fruit of their labor and bestow something (in alms) recognize the right way." If devotion to God is the central attitude for Sikhism, philanthropy is to be its principal expression in conduct. The mark of a saint is the doing of good to others. "The world returneth good for good, but the Guru is pleased with those who return good for evil."¹²

The Sikh Gurus made a very definite effort to break down the ideas and practices of caste among their disciples. Whoever came to join with them was required to partake of food in the common kitchen, thus as it were in almost a sacramental meal showing his community of spirit with the other members. The only true test of the differences between men is their love of God and the goodness to others which ensues therefrom.

The practice of going on pilgrimages was also taught to be of no religious worth, rather as deluding men with the idea that thus they would get something which they would not get. In contrast to such pilgrimages the Guru told in allegorical form of the pilgrimage of the human soul in search of bliss and salvation. "God's name is my place of pilgrimage. My places of pilgrimages are God's word, contemplation, and divine knowledge within me." "Religion consisteth not in mere words. He who looketh on all men as equal is religious. Religion consisteth not in wandering to tombs, or places of cremation, or sitting in attitudes of contemplation; religion

consisteth not in wandering to foreign countries or in bathing at places of pilgrimages. Abide pure amid the impurities of the world: thou shall find the way of religion."¹³

In considering what is so evidently an expression of personal and social religion of a distinctly devotional and mystical type, merely theoretical inconsistencies ought not to be regarded too seriously. Even more elaborately developed theologies have not been able to give a satisfactory expression of the unity of what has been described as the immanence of the divine in the world and in the heart of man, and its transcendence of the world and of man. It is not a matter of the first importance that the religion of the Sikhs gives no clear reconciliation of a type of mystical view of deity due to Hindu influences and of a kind of transcendental personalistic view due to Moslem teaching. Nor should one expect a definite doctrine as to the extent of human freedom and of divine determination. At one time human freedom seems to come more into view in the scriptures; at another the power of God seems to control all. Who shall say exactly how and where the line between these conceptions should be drawn in order to fit the facts of life and existence? Further, it is quite intelligible that the life of the redeemed soul should at one time be expressed as a mystical eternal life of bliss absorbed in God and at another time as a happy life in the future with characteristics similar to the best in this life. It is important and significant that these different ways of looking at these things have been acknowledged. This may be of greater value for religion as such than any attempt to gain a logical consistency by omitting particular sides of experience.

It is interesting to notice the very great differences between Jainism and Sikhism both of which have their own intrinsic merits. On the one hand Jainism places all of its emphasis on the nature and life of the soul: its

fundamental truth is the spiritual nature of man, and the ideal it sets is his innermost and highest spirituality. On the other hand Sikhism places its greatest emphasis—though not the whole—on the nature of God and the life of the soul in its devotion to God. There is about Jainism a distinct coldness of the metaphysical intellect, and a tendency in spite of its reference to the bliss of the liberated soul, to rule out the need and the value of devotion to an objective divinity. Sikhism may not unreasonably be regarded as providing what Jainism seriously lacks; but it might gain something in depth on its subjective side and something of precision by association with the analysis found in Jainism.¹⁴

CHAPTER V

CONFUCIANISM AND SHINTO

CONFUCIANISM

The culture of China which goes back for many centuries, of which there is a large amount of information, rests upon characteristics of life of still earlier ages. Within recent years attempts have been made to indicate some of the probable features of the earlier times on the basis of which later systems of thought have been built up. There is reason to believe that there was a widespread conviction of the essential harmony and order of existence "in which social and cosmic regularity are combined in a single complex."¹ Both Taoism and Confucianism have become associated with the thought of a number of outstanding teachers, especially of Lao-Tzŭ and Confucius. Of Taoism as a practical system today it is said that it consists in the main of superstitious rites: as such it does not fall within the present survey.

Lao-Tzŭ, to whom is accredited an exposition of the fundamental principles of Taoism as an ethical and philosophical view of existence, is an obscure figure, whose historicity has been challenged. His personality as represented in tradition and legend has little importance for the religion. The book ascribed to him, the *Tao-Teh-King* has the character of a collection of passages, rather than a continuous systematic work. It is of no real significance whether Lao-Tzŭ was or was not the originator of the thoughts or the compiler of the book: the essential thing is the character of its teachings. In giving an account for modern readers, Professor Parker has adopted the term "Providence" for

Tao. But it seems important that the personal implications of this term for Occidental thought shall be kept far in the background, or totally ignored. "Tao (Providence) without origin itself, is the origin of everything . . . invisible, imperceptible, spontaneous, and impalpable." It is this "eternal principle of pure being which determines the Universe." It cannot be defined, but it may be comprehended by faith, and happiness cannot be found except in relation with it. Transcending the power of reason, it is the enduring principle of right. Incorruptible, perfect, eternal, it is omnipresent, and its penalties are sharp and prompt. It "absorbs or takes unto itself those who regulate their conduct by faith in it." "A man who regulates his conduct by and has faith in Tao (Providence) avoids display and self-assertion; is humble, calm, ready for all emergencies, and fearless of death." "Do not trouble to have any fixed aim in life." "The greatest conquest is the conquest of self." "The joys of life consist in contemplation." "The man who has attained to a mental oneness with Tao is superior to the highest rulers." ² Parker maintains that the Chinese came to the only possible conclusion when after deliberate consideration they gave their adherence to Confucius rather than to Lao-Tzŭ. "Against Confucius' activity and zeal for decency, order, subordination, propriety, education, sociability, politeness, ancestral worship, good morals, centralization, duty, musical refinement, political sagacity, etc., Taoism can only offer contemplation, inaction, mysticism, liberty akin to that of wild animals, ignorance of the masses, exclusiveness and mystery in governing craft; contempt of music and learning, of effort, of refinement; a weak sense of family *pietas* and loyalty—in short something very like nihilism and anarchy." ³

On the other hand Mr. Dwight Goddard claims that Lao-Tzŭ's principles closely resemble the thoughts of today. "Although for two thousand years he has been

misunderstood and derided, today the very best of scientific and philosophic thought, which gathers about what is known as Vitalism, is in full accord with Lao-Tzŭ's idea of the Tao. Every reference that is made today to a Cosmic Urge, Vital Impulse, and Creative Principle can be said of the Tao. Everything that can be said of Plato's Ideas and Forms, of Cosmic Love as being the creative expression of God, can be said of the Tao.

"To Lao-Tzŭ, the Tao is the universal and eternal principle which forms and conditions everything; it is that intangible cosmic influence which harmonizes all things and brings them to fruition; it is the norm and standard of truth and morality. Lao-Tzŭ did more than entertain an intelligent opinion of Tao as a creative principle; he had a devout and religious sentiment toward it: 'He loved the Tao as a son cherishes and reveres his mother.' " ⁴

Confucius was born in the province of Shantung in about the year 551 B.C. Owing to the death of his father he had to work to help to support the family from an early age. At nineteen he married. He is alleged to have organized a school which attracted thousands of pupils. Eventually he attained to high official position and gave himself over to civil administration, maintaining the importance not so much of revenue as of each performing a definite function in the state. Through intrigue he was led to resign his position and he started out as an itinerant teacher. "He was not a prophet, anxious above all that the nation should stand in right relation with God. He was essentially an ethical teacher with a political aim. . . ." ⁵ His fundamental principle both as an administrator and as a teacher was that of order. He looked for order by reform as the basis of hope for social and for individual life. Mobbed and at times in danger of losing his life, often discouraged by hostility, he nevertheless continued

his propaganda, usually with confidence in his mission, though modest in the estimate of himself. "How dare I lay claim to holiness or love? A man of endless craving who never tires of teaching, I might be called; but nothing more."⁶ Toward the end of his life he compiled and edited the books since known as the Confucian Classics. At the time of his death he appears to have been depressed at his lack of success: "There is not one in the empire that will make me his master! My time has come to die."

In the following centuries there was a definite enhancement of the estimate of Confucius and his work. By the beginning of the second century B.C. the emperor of China offered an animal sacrifice at his tomb, and by the middle of the first century A.D. an imperial order required regular sacrifices to him. After two more centuries temples for the veneration of Confucius were erected in many parts of China. With the lapse of two more centuries his statue had taken its place along with those of the ancient kings of China. During this time he had also been given titles of increasing rank from that of "Duke" in about A.D. 1 to that of "Emperor" toward the end of the eleventh century A.D. Finally, so recently as December 31, 1906, almost at the beginning of this twentieth century, an Imperial Rescript recognized him as of the rank of "Co-assessor with the deities Heaven and Earth"; but this was probably a belated effort to ally more closely Confucian sympathies with the throne, rather than an expression of a dominant modern attitude to Confucius.

However, as a result of the revolution of 1911 a Republic was established in China, and since then "there has been much discussion as to what to do with Confucianism." Prostration before memorial tablets is replaced by bowing, and official statements describe ceremonies as not worship of a divine being but respect to national benefactors.⁷

It can hardly be denied that Confucius is China's most eminent son; and he has been highly revered. The historian Ssŭ-ma Ch'ien (second and first centuries B.C.) thus wrote of Confucius: "When reading the works of Confucius, I have always fancied I could see the man as he was in life; and when I went to Shantung I actually beheld his carriage, his robes, and the instrumental parts of his ceremonial usages. There were his descendants practising the old rites in their ancestral home; and I lingered long unable to tear myself away. Countless are the princes and prophets that the world has seen in its time, glorious in life, forgotten in death. But Confucius though only a humble member of the cotton clothed masses remains among us after many generations. He is the model for such as would be wise. By all, from the Son of Heaven down to the meanest student, the supremacy of his principles is fully and freely admitted. He may indeed be pronounced the divinest of men."⁸ Another Chinese writer says of Confucius: "All-embracing and vast, Confucius is like the sky. Deep-centered, he is like the abyss. He appears, and the people all revere him; he speaks, and the people believe him. Therefore his fame overspreads the Middle Kingdom, and extends to the barbarous tribes. Wherever ships and carriages reach; wherever the strength of man penetrates; wherever the sun and moon shine; wherever frosts and dews fall—all who have blood and breath unfeignedly love and honor him. Hence it is said: He is the peer of God."⁹

There is no short epitome or official creed of Confucianism. In modern times there has been considerable discussion as to whether it is or is not theistic; whether it can be called a religion. Notwithstanding some passages agnostic in tone, Professor Giles maintained that Confucius believed in the divine character of his mission, saying: "My studies lie low but they reach high; and there is God—He knows me. If my doctrines are

to prevail, it is so ordered of God." Giles examined the evidence showing Confucius' recognition of the existence of a Supreme Being, quoting among others of his sayings: "If I have done anything wrong, may God strike me dead, may God strike me dead!"; "There are three things of which the superior man stands in awe. He stands in awe of the will of God. He stands in awe of great sages, and of the inspired words which have been uttered by such men."¹⁰ For Confucius himself (as for Mencius) "Heaven has still the connotation of an overruling Providence" for he relied upon Heaven for protection. Yet although he "did not deny the existence of Heaven as a personalized Deity, in his practical attitude he was taking the first step to depersonalizing Heaven." "The belief in Heaven, which had become, especially to some of the more thoughtful Confucianists, a belief in an overruling Providence was personalized into almost the figure of the God of a monotheistic religion."¹¹

According to Giles there was an old religious belief in a personal God, which, though obscured, intermittently exercised considerable sway over the minds of the Chinese people up to the beginning of the twelfth century. He says that under the influence of Chu Hsi the idea of a personal God, the supreme ruler of the universe "disappeared forever" from Confucianism. But opinions differ widely as to Chu Hsi's teaching. Giles represented him as maintaining that God is an abstraction, the eternal principle of right. He "found Confucianism a religion and left it but for a vital spark, a mere system of ethics."

However, Giles himself asserts that the most rigid Confucianists have openly accepted Chu Hsi's "definition of God, but at the back of their minds there generally remains a bias in favor of a more personal Deity."¹² Another writer interprets Chu Hsi as the teacher of an ethical theism, being a thinker more than

a preacher and consequently emphasizing the spirituality rather than the personality of God. Though a theist his mode of expression was a reaction against popular anthropomorphism and transcendentalism. "The God of the Classics, then, whether under the title of Empyrean or Supreme Ruler, of Heaven or God, was accepted by Chu Hsi as a personal and righteous Being, ruling and judging in the affairs of men; and as identical with that Law which Chu Hsi himself regarded as the fundamental element in the universe." "Chu Hsi expresses this idea in a remarkable sentence: 'The Pilot of the Universe is the Mind of the Universe, in which Law is inherent.' " "The phrase 'The Mind of the Universe,' " says Bruce, "was used by Chu Hsi, not in the Buddhistic or pantheistic sense but in the sense of a personal ruler." "In other passages we find the God, or Heaven, presented to us as the Supreme Moral Ruler. Calamities are His righteous punishments, and prosperity is the sign of His approval."¹³

Whatever the characteristics of the ultimate, the personal form of expression has played a minor role in the Confucianism of the educated in modern times. "Unfortunately, ever since the days of Chu Hsi," says Giles, "the idea of a supreme ruler of the universe has been obscured for the people at large by the glorification of Confucius. It is true that the term is still familiar in such sayings as 'God's eye is upon you!' 'You can deceive man but not God!' 'Do your duty and leave the rest to God!' and many others of the kind; still, what the literati have urged for centuries upon the masses is the veneration of Confucius and not the fear and love of God."¹⁴

The tendencies away from forms of theistic expression in Chinese Confucianism should not be given undue significance. Far more important than this type of expression is the manner in which the fundamental character of reality is considered and the attitudes necessary in

human life if happiness and peace are to be attained. Viewed from the standpoint of intelligence, *Tao* as fundamental order in existence means that the universe is ultimately intelligent in principle, for it is impossible to separate the notion of order from intelligence.

Further, as according to the teachings of Confucianism *Tao* is also expressible as *jen*, love or fellowship, and as implying righteousness; these also are treated as fundamental qualities of the ultimate. Human happiness and peace are by conformity with these: and there is little difference between the practical attitude implied and that involved in the theistic expressions with their reference to the grace of God. The difference is not so great as may at first appear: for in conformity with the *Tao* the individual has the fundamental nature of existence on his side, and in opposition to it he has it against him.

The chief and really important difference involved in the non-theistic form of expression is its lack of encouragement of the attitude implied in the term "communion with God." Even with regard to this it may be maintained that there is an approach to the same type of experience in the attitude of reverence toward all the forms of expression of the *Tao*.

After a discussion of Hsüntze's non-theistic account of Confucianism as the logical outcome of the Confucian emphases, Dr. Dubs says, "We must not think that the Confucians were not religious. They had a faith in the power of ideals to realize themselves that transcended anything which ordinary human life offers, a belief in the power of goodness that their own experiences did not substantiate. This moral idealism was a powerful force in their lives and teachings, and has continued to be the greatest treasure of the great souls of China through all the ages."¹⁵

Though it is said that Confucius refused to attribute any efficacy to prayer,¹⁶ we are also told that when he

was very ill Tzŭ-lu asked leave to pray. "Is it done?" said the master. "It is," answered Tzŭ-lu. "The Memorials say, 'Pray to the spirits in heaven above and on earth below.'" The Master said: "Long lasting has my prayer been."¹⁷

Confucius was primarily concerned with the attitude of men and their conduct in their social environment, and for this he wished to direct their attention to attaining what they could by their own endeavor rather than by dependence on supernatural spirits. It is probable that he was opposed to dependence on the multifarious spirits of Chinese animism. "Respect spiritual beings, but keep aloof from them." In the history of Confucian thought this tendency to agnostic or skeptical expression with reference to religion was influenced by Hsüntse who in positivist fashion described Heaven as not a personal power but a natural physical and moral law. "Law is moral Law, a force which makes for righteousness, in the sense that it rewards virtue and punishes vice according to its own nature."¹⁸ "This Law is an all-comprehensive and ethical principle pervading the universe."¹⁹ "Heaven is really the most honorable and wise. Therefore, righteousness surely comes from Heaven." "Obedience to the will of Heaven is the standard of righteousness." "What is the will of Heaven that is to be obeyed? It is to love all the people in the world universally."²⁰

The Chinese have the reputation for being essentially practical and of not being especially metaphysical or devotional. Certainly it is the humanistic aspects of the ethics of Confucius which obtained and maintained a very strong hold on the Chinese. The central ethical principle is *jen*, which may be associated with that of Tao. *Jen* is a feeling of fellowship innate in every man, a sentiment regarded as more fundamental than egoistic instincts. On *jen* human society and all virtues are based; it is the root of a rational altruism: "A man who has *jen* wishing to establish himself will have others established;

wishing himself to succeed will have others succeed." *Jen*, the ultimate moral and religious sentiment, expresses itself in a variety of ways. It is the basis of true loyalty, especially in the specific form termed filial piety. It is *jen* which inspires courage and that persistence called faithfulness. *Jen* keeps men to standards of righteous conduct and leads them to benevolence. Five different shades of meaning have been found in the use of the term *jen* by Confucius: (1) prosperity, (2) kindheartedness, (3) charity, (4) sincerity and sympathy, and (5) unselfishness implying all forms of self-control. Translating the term as love, Mr. Lyall thus gives some of Confucius' sayings concerning it. Yen Yuan asked, "What is love?" The Master said: "Love is to conquer self and turn to courtesy. Could we conquer self and turn to courtesy for one day, all below heaven would turn to love. Does love well from within, or does it rise in others?" Yen Yuan said: "May I ask what are its signs?" The Master replied: "To be always courteous of eye and always courteous of ear; to be always courteous in word and always courteous in deed." At another time Chung-kung asked, "What is love?" and the Master replied: "Without the door to behave as though a great guest were come; to treat the people as though we tendered the high sacrifice; not to do unto others what we would not they should do unto us; to breed no wrongs in the state and breed no wrongs in the home." "A heart set on love will do no wrong."²¹ "Love is the vital impulse," says Chu Hsi. "It is after we have received this vital impulse, and thereby are in possession of life, that we have Righteousness, Reverence, Wisdom, and Sincerity. From the point of view of priority Love is first; from the point of view of greatness Love is greatest."²²

Though the sentiment of *jen*, love, or fellow-feeling, is innate in all men, it is not necessarily actually present in its pure and ideal form. That is a condition which can only be attained by definite cultivation. With *jen* in

its ideal form the individual acts rightly with perfect freedom, naturally and without hesitation. His conduct may then be said to be that of the middle way, according with the doctrine of the mean. In Confucianism that doctrine is not to be understood as a middle course between extremes. The unsatisfactory implications of such a view for ethics are obvious. The doctrine of the mean is a doctrine of equilibrium and of harmony.

Confucianism is concerned not simply with the practical external expression of this moral attitude, though that in all its social forms is fundamental. It also involves something of a religious character in its insistence on reverence. This reverence implies self-respect and a respect for the selves of others as persons. In its continuance toward those who have died, that is, in so-called ancestor worship, it assumes another form. This feeling of reverence is also felt toward that ultimate nature of things expressed more impersonally as Tao, and more theistically as T'ien and as Shang-Ti. It attains a specific form of expression in the veneration of Confucius himself, who as the teacher and practicer of *jen*, of the fundamental principle of Tao, is regarded as though an embodiment of what may be called the divine.

It has been maintained that the moral life for Confucianism, despite all appearances to the contrary, has theistic implications. The cultivation of a right attitude, says Giles, according to the real teachings of Confucianism, is to be based upon the "will of God." He quotes Mencius: "He who brings all his intellect to bear on the subject will come to understand his own nature; he who understands his own nature will understand God. To waste no thoughts upon the length of life, but to cultivate rectitude—that is to do the will of God."²³

During the long history of China the main principles of Confucius have rarely failed to impress, and evidence of the increasing recognition of their worth is seen in his progressive idealization as a teacher and a personality.

Nevertheless, while on the one hand they have been elaborated, on the other they have met with definite opposition. His most famous supporter, Mencius (372-289 B.C.) defended the doctrine of the essential goodness of human nature: a doctrine accepted by many Confucians as though axiomatic. "Man's impulse is to do good, for his nature is good. That he does not do good is not the fault of his natural faculty."

But the doctrine of man's inherent goodness was not unchallenged. Mutze contended that the ideal state of things which should exist if Mencius's view were correct did not exist, the reason being that "everybody esteems his own self above others." Hsüntze went still further in opposition, teaching that human nature is essentially bad. While Mutze referred men to a religious source for their ethics, to the will of heaven, Hsüntze looked to the artificial conditions of the environment to mold men to decency of life and conduct.

Religious worship in China has been directed in the main to the multiplicity of spirits associated with natural objects; to this may be added the worship of Heaven and Earth at their central altars; and the veneration of certain idealized human beings. Though among the educated there has been a general tendency to become emancipated from at least the first of these, especially in recent times, such worship has evidently been the expression of a felt religious need. As Dr. Maclagan puts it, it has kept alive "a certain sense of dependence and of surrounding mystery, a religious temper. . . ." ²⁴ The most enduring feature of Chinese religion appears to be the veneration of ancestors. This is so firmly established in the people's sentiment and practice that modern thinkers must find some way of associating it with modern thought. "Our most ancient religion is ancestor worship. This was developed and rationalized by the Confucian school, becoming a positive cult without any alloy of superstition. It is based wholly on respect for the memory

of one's ancestors, and in its positive aspect resembles closely the humanist religion of Auguste Comte."²⁵

From the ethical point of view the veneration of ancestors seems to be productive of both good and bad results. On the one hand it expresses and helps to cultivate filial piety, on the other it has encouraged an excessive conservatism. It has been objected that from the religious point of view the "Spirits of the dead have for the worshiper the value of God,"²⁶ and that the practice thus takes the place of the devotion which should be shown to a Supreme Being. Though Confucius observed the rites connected with the remembrance of deceased ancestors, on one occasion he expressed himself as though critical of them. "Chi-lu asked what was due to the ghosts of the dead. The Master replied: 'We fail in our duty to the living; can we do our duty to the dead?' He ventured to ask about death. 'We know not life,' said the master, 'how can we know death?'"²⁷ Confucianism has not concerned itself with the question of a future life of the soul. Though it may be maintained that the idea is axiomatic in the cult of the ancestors, Confucianism directs the attention of the living to the cultivation of the ideal in this life. The lack of adequate attention to the nature of a future existence by Confucianism may have been one reason why Buddhism has been so widely accepted in China alongside of it, adherence being given to both.

Confucianism was introduced into Japan, and for more than a thousand years has exerted a great influence on social ethics, supplementing Shinto ritualism and Buddhist mysticism. There a close connection was made with Buddhism. This is illustrated by the statement of a high official who died in 781 A.D. In dedicating his mansion to Buddhist worship and establishing in the precinct a library of Confucian books, he said: "The two gateways (of spiritual life), the Inner and Outer (Buddhism and Confucianism), are one in the ultimate essen-

tials. Superficial thought would regard them as two different teachings, but there is indeed no gap between them. Long since have I embraced the (Buddhist) faith, and now dedicate my whole mansion to the pious cause, and store the books of the Outer Way in order to supplement the Inner Way. Since the precinct is a Buddhist sanctuary, Buddhist commandments should be strictly observed within it. . . . Let those who enter this place be finally released from the sorrows and worries of present life and attain the highest perfection of Supreme Enlightenment."²⁸ This attitude was typical not only of this period but of all the following ages, the results of the compromise being that Confucianism has been regarded as the teaching for the present life and Buddhism the way to spiritual bliss in the future life.

In recent times, especially in China, there have been keen conflicts concerning Confucianism, especially with reference to its value for modern life. These have contributed with the influence of Western scholarship to a more scientific study of its writings and implications. But it is not with reference to Confucianism as a religion so much as a form of social and political theory that the recent discussions have arisen. One writer says: "People are seeking to get rid of the teachings of Confucius and Mencius and the old morality."²⁹ "While I hold that Confucius was a great man in his time," wrote Wu Ni to Mr. Chen, "yet there are those who want to insist upon his teachings to arrest development of thought in this modern time. . . . It is natural that we should have to attack them."³⁰ "Had China no contact with modern culture, she would have nothing to criticize in Confucianism, but since she is a republic, she must follow the trend of the world's civilization. She cannot hold fast to an inequality and injustice in contradiction with modern civilization."³¹ Confucianism is charged with maintaining a system of feudal ideas which are incongruous with the modern spirit. There have been attacks on Confu-

cianism on the ground that it is a feudalistic philosophy. It has been maintained that Confucius took as his standard of morality the political views among the ruling classes of the feudal period, which he sought to perfect and perpetuate. Such attacks on Confucianism provoked a counter-attack on the Western system. Ku Hung-Ming contended that Chinese civilization long ago reached its maturity, "whereas the West is still in a primitive stage. The West, not possessed of a true philosophy of life, corresponding to the Chinese Tao, is not a true civilization." However, the Chinese civilization which Ku Hung-Ming regarded as worthy of being taken as a model for the whole world, appears to be that prevailing during the T'ang Dynasty.³²

It has also been urged that these modern attacks on Confucianism do not touch its fundamentals, but only apply to the form of social organization with which since Confucius they have been allied. Hence attempts have been made to revive its essential spirit and to express it in modern terms and with relation to modern conditions.³³

It is asked whether the modern study and criticism of Confucianism may not lead to a synthesis which "will make that old culture once again the bond of union which present-day China so evidently needs."³⁴ Giles, from the standpoint of his view of the history of Confucianism as a religion, urged that the Chinese should recover the more theistic expressions and forms of earlier times. "Let the Chinese people be encouraged, by the erection of temples and by forms of prayer, to join in the old unitarian worship of four thousand years ago. . . . Their stirring battle cry would then be: There is no God but God, and Confucius is His Prophet."³⁵

A characteristic feature of Chinese mentality being a conviction of the essential harmony of the good, a number of attempts have been made in recent years definitely to unite the different religions found in China.

At least six societies have been formed with this end in view. Thus, in 1921, a movement was originated under the name of *Tao Yuan*, being meant to unite Taoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Islām, and Christianity. According to it, all religions come from the same source, but each contains only part of the truth. Its fundamental teaching is that one must cultivate one's character, endeavor to attain self-perfection in order to contribute to the perfection of others. Emphasis is placed on meditation. The *Wu Shan She*, organized in 1918, also has the object of collecting the truths from each religion and combining them. Both of these movements emphasize philanthropy as an expression of religion in conduct. "There is a sense of the insufficiency of any one of the old religions, an unwillingness to surrender any and hence an attempt to cling to all."⁸⁶

SHINTO

To the sophisticated Occidental observer who has not made a close study of the history of religions, Shinto must appear to be little more than obsolete mythology, superstition, and ritual. But anyone who has seriously studied the earlier stages of religious history will recognize that even the most cultured religions of today had stages in their development which contained elements similar to those of Shinto. It might be thought that a nation so enthusiastically receptive of Western science as Japan would have abandoned this ancient cult. The fact remains that it has not; and it is still possible that Shinto may go through a course of transition to a form similar to those of the later stages of the higher religions.¹ There is sufficient authoritative testimony that Shinto, though it contains much that is obsolete, is still alive. "The part that Shinto still plays in the ideas and the life of the nation," says Anesaki, "must be fully reckoned with." "The beliefs and practices pertaining to those deities and spirits remain even in these days of the twentieth cen-

tury a living force among the people, out of which new offshoots of religion or quasi-religion may and do arise.”²

“Its votaries still throng its shrines . . . and whether so-called or not Shinto will still be classed as a religion in the hearts of the people.”³ Professor Kato contends that Shinto is “very vitally active in the ethico-religious consciousness and national life of the patriotic Japanese to-day” when “it stands stronger than perhaps ever before, inseparably interwoven in the national life of the Japanese race.”⁴ Shinto “in a true sense embodies the religion of the people” in spite of its cosmology and the mythological character of its ideas about the deities. “Its power is not in dogmas, not in forms of worship: it is a spirit, the spirit of old Japan.”⁵ “Shinto is so Japanese it will not down. It is the faith of these people’s birth-right, not of their adoption.”⁶

It has become customary within recent times to distinguish between Shinto as a nationalistic official ritual which, with some artificiality, is interpreted as non-religious, and Shinto as a religion to be found in a number of different unofficial sects. Of the thirteen chief sects Anesaki says most are of little wholesome influence though a few exceptional ones are manifesting a fresh vitality. Shinto has no creed. Each adherent is free to form his own in relation with his knowledge and religious practices, and to accept whatever interpretation he can find for the latter. It is a complex of ideas and rites associated with strong traditional sentiments related with the sense of spiritual presence, with national and communal life, with family tradition, valor, and inner sincerity and fidelity.

Though the earliest records of Shinto, in the ancient chronicles, the *Nihongi* and the *Kojiki*, do not come from a very early date, Shinto has all the characteristics of a nature religion of almost primitive times. It has been described as the “most polytheistic of polytheisms.” “Its popular pantheon is filled with Gods that dwell in or

preside over every object and phenomenon of which you can think, and is further replenished by additions of apotheosized men."⁷

Nevertheless, in spite of this pluralistic animism a number of influences led to greater importance being ascribed to particular spirits, especially to Ame-terasu, the Sun Goddess. Through the idea that the ruling house is descended from this goddess her cult became a basis of national unity. "National unity as embodied in the worship of the Sun Goddess represented the peace-loving disposition of the people and their submission to the sovereign."⁸ The Sun Goddess in instituting the dynasty is represented as saying: "Do thou, my august grandchild, proceed thither and govern it. Go! and may prosperity attend thy dynasty and may it, like heaven and earth, endure forever."⁹

Throughout the greater part of the known history of the Japanese as a people, Shinto has had a political influence. Most of its revivals have been associated with some political crises or change involving patriotic motives. Ashton says that the deification of the living Mikados has been titular rather than real: in other words, such descriptions are to be taken as rhetoric and poetry rather than as statements of supposed facts. Even the deceased Mikados were for long regarded simply as any ordinary dead, but later they attained a position such that people thought they could profitably pray to them for rain. With the restoration of 1868 the religious reverence of the deceased Mikados was definitely organized.

Although animistic and polytheistic ideas have remained throughout the history of Shinto, and although the religion has not been markedly influenced by philosophical reflection, there have nevertheless been definite tendencies to monotheism. The changes in religious ideas have tended "alternately to unity and plurality, to monotheism and polytheism."¹⁰ These two phases are

expressed in the tenacious persistence of the tribal and local cults alongside of the national cult of the Sun Goddess, while yet the simple pure faith of the people often led them to a monotheistic worship of the supreme deity.

A number of passages might be quoted indicating that Shinto has included something more than a naturalistic animism. There was an advance in thought in the attempts at systematization in the fifteenth century chiefly under the influence of Kanera. "Shinto," according to Kanera, "teaches the existence of many deities, but metaphysically speaking they are one, because each deity is but a manifestation of the universal soul in a particular aspect of its activity, and all gods are one in spirit and entity."¹¹ Later in a work published in 1670 it was asked: "What is the Deity?"; and the answer given: "The Deity is the Absolute. It transcends human words which are of a relative nature. It is incomprehensible, and yet It permeates all things; It is everywhere." One factor making for a spiritualistic development has been the general absence of images of the deities. So Ise-Teijo (1715-1784) said, "Never make an image to represent the Deity. To worship a deity is directly to establish a felt relation of our heart to the living divinity through sincerity or truthfulness on our part."¹² Through allegorical interpretation of the myths and through ethical advance the early animism has often in the course of Shinto history led on to forms of pantheism and theism. The ethical influence is well illustrated from a reputed oracle of the deity of Sumi-yoshi: "I have no corporeal existence, but Universal Benevolence is my divine body. I have no physical power, but Uprightness is my strength. I have no religious clairvoyance beyond what is bestowed by Wisdom, I have no power of miracle other than the attainment of quiet happiness, I have no tact except the exercise of gentleness."¹³ In their attempts to give more philosophical depth to their teaching, the Shintoists of the sixteenth and sev-

enteenth centuries imported cosmological ideas from Confucianism. Ansai (1619-1682) considered Confucianism and Shinto to have a common principle of training of the self in accordance with the way of heaven and the practice of social virtues, as expressed in the saying "rectify the inner (soul) by devotion (to the cosmic reason) and thereby regulate the outer (order) by righteousness."¹⁴

The meaning of the term Shinto has been given as "the Way of the Gods." The religious way of life is conformity to the way of the Gods. Yet Shinto has been singularly free of formal moral and religious codes such as are found in most religions at comparable levels, as for example, Zoroastrianism, Hinduism, and the religion of the ancient Hebrews. This fact has been emphasized by Shinto thinkers as a sign of excellence of Shinto. For it is maintained that Shinto insists simply and solely on a right attitude from which all rightness of conduct must inevitably follow.

Sectarians maintain that "the new age will dawn if only men will abandon doctrinal subtleties and establish a religion of the pure and simple in heart."¹⁵ Nevertheless, in the course of its history the religion has tended toward an increasing emphasis on the moral. Thus Ashton quotes what was put forward as a pronouncement of the Gods of Kasuga: "Though they hang up offerings of the seven precious things, and with anxious hearts pray to us for hundreds of days, yet will we refuse to enter the house of the depraved and miserly. But we will surely visit the dwellings of those in deep mourning without an invitation if loving-kindness is always there. The reason is that we make loving-kindness our symbol." "Hear all men! If you desire to obtain help from the Gods, put away pride."

From another shrine comes the exhortation: "All ye who come before me hoping to attain the accomplishment of your desires, pray with hearts free from false-

hood, clean within and without, reflecting the truth like a mirror." And to these and others of similar tenor may be added the sentiments ascribed to the God of Fujiyama: "Ye men of mine: shun desire. If you shun desire you will ascend to the level with the Gods. Every little yielding to anxiety is a step away from the natural heart of man. If one leaves the natural heart of man he becomes a beast. That men should be made so is to me intolerable pain and unending sorrow." The following definitely ethical teachings are supposed to have been learned in dreams: "The Gods have their abode in the heart. Among the various ordinances none is more excellent than that of religious meditation." "It is the upright heart of all men which is identical with the highest of the high, and therefore the God of Gods. There is no room in Heaven-and-Earth for the false and crooked person."¹⁶

If Shinto, as is maintained by both Japanese adherents and Western observers, enshrines a continuous religious expression of the Japanese it may well be that in continuity with its past history there may develop a more modern presentation. Advance in religion has rarely, if ever, been through the entire rejection of tradition in idea and practice, but by progressive modification at times more gradual, at times more revolutionary. That Shinto may undergo significant development is suggested by the movements of reform and revival which have arisen in the past, and the interest which thinkers in Japan have shown in it in more recent times. The question whether the religious sentiments and ideals of Shinto are capable of being emancipated from early mythological ideas and superstitious rites may well be answered in the affirmative on the ground that a similar emancipation has been a normal historical process in most other religions.

The simplicity of the moral and religious attitude at the center of Shinto is allied with a simplicity in its ex-

ternal forms. There is an intentional austerity in its sanctuaries and shrines. Their sequestered solemnity is characterized as godlike or divinely serene. The deity is often symbolically represented by a mirror. Shinto has forms of periodical purification. But the reformers stressed the inner purification of the heart in contrast with external ablutions. "What is ablution? It is not merely the cleansing of one's body solely with lustral water, it means one's following the Right and Moral Way. Pollution means moral evil or vice. Though a man wash off his bodily filth, he will yet fail to please the Deity if he restrain not his evil desires."¹⁷ Nevertheless both body and mind are to be cared for. "As to the individual, the sum and substance of moral injunctions amount to this: 'Be pure in heart and body.'"¹⁸

The cult of the Sun Goddess as the progenitor of the sovereign tended to a strong national spirit, just as the cult of the local spirits expressed and supported the corporate unity of the local communities. The former has been aided by the worship at the great central shrine at Ise described as "the holy of holies" of Shinto. The importance of valor in defence of the community has been expressed by the use of sword and spears, bows and arrows, as symbols in the religion. The communal spirit has also been cultivated by hero and ancestor worship—though it has been suggested that the latter was an importation from China. Ancestor worship emphasizes the historic continuity of the Japanese people. It does not appear to have been generally associated with any but a vague idea of a future life of the soul. But modern thinkers might find in the strong sentiments associated with the reverence for ancestors a basis with relation to which they might develop a modern doctrine of immortality.

For a long period Shinto was so affected by Confucian and Buddhist influences from China as to lose much of its independent character. A hybrid of Buddhism and

Shinto, called Ryobu Shinto was for upward of ten centuries the dominant faith of the nation. This lost its power at the time of the restoration of 1868, with the rise of distinctively Japanese patriotism, influenced by a revival of Shinto inaugurated in the late seventeenth and developed in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. That revival was associated with noteworthy though incipient attempts at a scholarly consideration of its nature and significance.

Whatever later scholarship has to say of these attempts they mark a definite stage in the evolution toward a modern Shinto. Keichu in the seventeenth and Ma-buchi in the eighteenth century endeavored to distinguish Shinto from the Buddhist and Confucian ideas which had become associated with it. Moto-ori (1730-1801) and Hirata (1776-1843) carried on a propaganda for a "Pure Shinto" freed from alien accretions and based upon a study of the ancient writings. Though their contentions may be rejected in many specific details, they endeavored to present what they understood to be central and fundamental in pure Shinto. For them this was an inner spirit or attitude to life, which they considered also to be the primitive attitude of mankind in its original purity. The teachings of metaphysics and the formulation of systems of moral rules they looked upon as signs of degeneracy, as merely artificial restrictions of religious and moral spontaneity. Nevertheless Moto-ori "attributed all the phenomena of the world to the will of God, and said that the duty of man consisted in carrying out the divine will. As for guidance in ascertaining that divine will, he pointed to the sincere heart of man given to him by God."¹⁹ Hirata proposed the following as part of a daily prayer: "Reverently adoring the great god of the two palaces of Ise in the first place—the eight hundred myriads of celestial gods, etc. . . . —I pray with awe they will deign to correct the unwilling faults which, heard and seen by them, I have com-

mitted, and that, blessing and favoring me according to the powers which they severally wield, they will cause me to follow the divine example, and to perform good works in the Way.”²⁰ Miki in the nineteenth century in a theistic view closely associated with Shinto, maintained as the Shinto principle: “Get rid of every stain of the soul, restore its original purity, and everything will follow and end in happiness—in union with the divine spirit.” The movements which then arose, in large measure Shinto, indicate, says Anesaki, “An ideal aspiration for a better world, a human world, saturated with the divine spirit.” The religion of the “simple pure heart” was advocated in contrast with the consideration of doctrinal subtleties. Kurozumi Munetada’s teaching assumed a Shinto form tending toward a definite monotheism in the description of the Sun Goddess “the great august Deity” as “the source of light and life with whom we should be in perpetual spiritual communion through prayer and devotion.”²¹ The essential in human life comes through its intrinsic connection with “cosmic causality.” The attainment of divine grace depends in the first instance upon living a pure, honest, and diligent life.

Certain popular movements arose in Japan which drew so much from traditional sentiment that they may justly be considered as pre-eminently Shinto, notwithstanding their more definitely theistic character which may seem to differentiate them from it. Thus Tenri-Kyo which developed in the latter part of the nineteenth century represents a simple faith in God as creator and ruler of the world. This faith is a saving power purging the human soul from its impurities. “The Creator has made the world for the benefit of all men, a world where men can live by mutual help and in the all-embracing grace of the divinity.”²² Another movement, Konko-Kyo, taught the direct spiritual community with the deity as the essence of religion, and this as dependent on purity

of heart. This "sudden rise of popular Shinto," says Anesaki, "disclosed one lack in the current religion, the direct appeal to the heart of the people, especially the lower classes."²³ It is a question how far, in relation with a religion as thus felt, Japanese thinkers of our day allying themselves with historical Shinto will work out forms of intellectual expression acceptable to educated modern minds. That Shinto as a religious attitude has much of permanent value may reasonably be believed. It is a living force in opposition to mere secularism. "Shinto will survive—not in its dates, not in its genealogies, nor its theory of the descent of its sovereign from Ame-terasu-no-Mikoto, not in its legends and cosmology but in the affections of the people, their trust in the national powers and destiny, and their confidence that there is a something more than their present strength and wisdom which directs and aids, and on which they may rely."²⁴ Another sect, claiming to be a reformed Shinto, is Remmonkyo. Its idea of deity is a personalization of the law or order of existence. The foundress soon became regarded as an incarnation of this. The moral teaching is essentially that of Confucianism. Ashton has compared Tenrikyo and Remmonkyo as popular movements with the Salvation Army or the Plymouth Brethren as found in England: they make little if any appeal to Japanese affected by Occidental education.

Within recent times Shinto with its historical and nationalistic associations has been made by some the chief means for the cultivation of Japanese patriotism, and this is especially important in the claim of the Japanese to the position of a world power. This attitude has been described as one for which the Japanese Emperor is the special manifestation of deity and the Japanese a specially chosen people of God.²⁵

Shinto, it has been urged, is eventually to become the religion of the world, and the Japanese have the duty of spreading their religion and culture, and as associated

with this the temporal and spiritual power of the Mikado. The more vigorous champions of this attitude seemed to maintain that if this cannot be achieved by peaceful means appeal must be made to the power of might. While it is not difficult to associate such a view with the mythological account of the isles of Japan having been first created with the emperor as the descendant of the gods come to earth to govern mankind, Shinto has certainly not yet developed those characteristics which would make it acceptable as the universal religion of mankind. There is, however, report of a movement which would endeavor "to expand Shinto into a great all-inclusive world-religion, embracing within itself Buddhism, Confucianism, the thirteen Shinto sects, Christianity, Taoism, and Muhammedanism. Shinto is the faith at the basis of all religion. It is the religion of religions."²⁶

By the scholarly Japanese student interested in Shinto its claims are often expressed otherwise. Professor Kato maintains that Shinto has become more and more idealistic, and has evolved an ethico-religious principle of sincerity or uprightness unsurpassed by Christian love or Buddhist benevolence. Though he finds the reverence of the emperor as divine to be of the essence of Shinto and so the expression of patriotism, he admits a "tinge of universalism" and an approach to universalism in the teachings of the sects, especially in the principle of sincerity. Mr. A. C. Underwood thinks that "Shinto deserves credit for its insistence on the truth that nature is a manifestation of the Divine."²⁷ Nitobe in summing up its characteristics indicates some of its present weaknesses, saying that it is in some respects naturalistic, glorifying the real: deifying mortals, it excuses their frailties. "As to the reverence it inculcates for whatever is above ourselves—the love of the land where our gods abide and our forefathers repose, the veneration of whatever is old, and respect and affection for nature and all its single

objects—no religion surpasses ours. Its animism has endowed the very stones with sentient life, drawing from us a feeling of affection. Its pantheism and polytheism have peopled the air, land, and water with beings that call forth our respect. This attitude toward nature instills into our mind the love of the land, the instinct of patriotism. Thus from being a worship of nature, Shinto becomes an ethnic religion. It is national in its concepts and precepts. Its patriotism, therefore, may easily fall into Chauvinism. Its loyalty can degenerate into servile obedience. It can readily be made a political engine in the hands of the unscrupulous—as such it can indeed be made a powerful one; but, as I have intimated, as a moral or a religious factor, it is and has been but a feeble motive force.” “It seems to me that the weakness of Shinto as a religion lies in the non-recognition of human frailty, of sin.”²⁸

But perhaps the essential spirit of Shinto as regards the individual in his own attitude to life has been more sympathetically expressed by a Western writer. “Never mind the praise or blame of fellow-men, but act so that you need not be ashamed before the gods of the Unseen. If you desire to practice true virtue, learn to stand in awe of the Unseen, and that will prevent you from doing wrong. Make a vow to the God who rules over the Unseen, and cultivate the conscience (*ma-go-koro*) implanted in you, and then you will never wander from the way. You cannot hope to live more than a hundred years under the most favorable circumstances, but as you will go to the Unseen Realm of *Oho-kuni-nishi* after death and be subject to His rule, learn betimes to bow down before Him.”²⁹

CHAPTER VI

ZOROASTRIANISM

The worth of a religion cannot be estimated according to the number of adherents it has or has had. That formerly Zoroastrianism was much more widely professed than it is today cannot be doubted, but there is no adequate evidence of the extent to which it spread before it lost its prestige in the face of the advance of Islām. Though now the faith of a meager remnant in Persia and a comparatively small community in India, its intrinsic values give it an honorable place among living religions. Nevertheless, it may be surmised that its decline and its failure to regain wide influence have been due at least in part to inherent defects.

Zoroastrianism is one of the oldest religions of the world. It traces its rise to the reforms inaugurated by the prophet Zarathustra. Attempts have been made to show that Zarathustra never existed as a historical person but is a figure of mythology. There can be no demonstrative proof one way or the other in this dispute, but Dr. James Hope Moulton seems justified in maintaining that the names of Zarathustra and of his relatives and friends, and the simple conditions of their environment as depicted in the earliest writings suggest plain facts rather than mythological fantasy.

Though Zarathustra may reasonably be believed to have been a historical person, very little can be safely asserted about him and his life. There is wide difference of opinion as to when he lived. The traditional dates, generally accepted by Zoroastrians are from about 660 to 583 B.C. These are adopted by Professor Williams Jackson and Dr. Casartelli. Reasons have been given by Dr. Moulton for thinking that Zarathustra

lived long before that.¹ The area of his activities is not known precisely. Dr. Jackson thinks he may have been born somewhere in Western Iran, to have had little if any success there and afterward moved eastward to Bactria or Balkh, or even as Moulton suggests to Seistan, where he converted a king, Vistaspa. Definite trace of the religion is lost for a number of centuries, and this is thought to be due to its having been adopted in a region remote from the areas of the main currents of history.

Zarathustra was a prophet of the same type as Moses and Muhammed.² He preached a monotheistic view of religion which he represented as the true religion of earlier times. He exhorted his hearers to live a strenuous moral life and to exert themselves in the work of agriculture. Evidently he met with much opposition and not infrequently felt keen despair. Nevertheless he had some success and apparently expected triumph of the good to come very soon. "In the Gathas," says Dr. Moulton, "Zarathustra is evidently penetrated with the powerful conviction that the Renovation, to preach which was his divine call, would come within his lifetime, and he himself with his faithful helpers have the privilege of bringing it in."

The teaching of Zarathustra is enshrined in some ancient hymns, or *Gathas*. Tradition has it that the greater part of the earlier literature of Zoroastrianism was destroyed by the Greeks at the time when Alexander conquered Persia. There is some doubt whether Darius, the great king of Persia was a Zoroastrian. Very little is known of the history of the religion until as late as the third quarter of the first century A.D. when there was a revival accompanied by reform. Ardashir, the founder of the Sassanian dynasty established it as the religion of the state. It attained its greatest power in the reign of Shapur III (A.D. 309-79). During these last periods collections of material were embodied in definite form. The later books contain much that is very

different in spirit from the teaching of Zarathustra as learned from the *Gathas*. They also give a different picture of Zarathustra himself from that obtained from the *Gathas*.

The Zarathustra of the *Gathas*, which alone have any claim to be contemporary with him and possibly embody some of his own utterances "differs *toto caelo* from the Zarathustra of the younger Avesta. He is the exact opposite of the miraculous personage of later legend—a mere man standing always on the solid ground of reality, whose only arms are trust in God and the protection of his powerful allies. At times his position is precarious enough. He whom we hear in the *Gathas* has had to face not merely all forms of outward opposition and the unbelief and lukewarmness of adherents but also the inward misgivings of his own heart as to the truth and final victory of his cause. At one time hope, at another despondency; now assured confidence, now doubt and despair; here a firm faith in the speedy coming of the kingdom of heaven, there the thought of taking refuge by flight—such is the range of the emotions which find their immediate expression in these hymns. And the whole breathes such a genuine originality, all is psychologically so accurate and just, the earliest beginnings of the new religious movement, the childhood of a new community of faith are reflected so naturally in them all, that it is impossible for a moment to think of a later period of composition by a priesthood whom we know to have been devoid of any historical sense and incapable of reconstructing the spiritual conditions under which Zarathustra lived." ⁸ Thus though comparatively little is known of the life and personality of Zarathustra, Occidental scholars who have occupied themselves with investigations into all the relevant material have without exception accorded him one of the highest places among religious leaders.

In the most ancient literature that has come down to

us there are few instances of the ascription of super-human powers to Zarathustra. There is one tradition of his healing a blind man. Though there were the seeds for such a development, Zarathustra has never been conceived as an incarnation of deity. In general he has been regarded as the revered prophet through whom the good religion was revealed; and as such has been idealized as the wisest, holiest, strongest, and most influential of men.

Legends did grow around the life and personality of Zarathustra as around the other great early founders of religions, but they do not show such a wealth of fantasy nor so definite a theological development as most of the others do. The "Glory" came down from the presence of Ahuramazda into the home of Zarathustra's mother, and into her until she was fifteen years old and brought forth her first-born son. Zarathustra has thus been accredited with birth through a miraculous conception. Like Nānak, the founder of the Sikh religion, he is said to have laughed loudly at his birth. All nature rejoiced at his birth: a divine light shone about the house. Attempts were made to kill him while a small child, especially by a Turanian prince similar to the Herod who was alleged to have tried to bring about the death of the baby Jesus. But Zarathustra was saved.

While a youth and young man he showed independence and interest in religion. He retired to the mountains for solitude and meditation. Eventually, in a vision he was led by an archangel into the presence of God, and received the first revelation. Later he had other visions and conferences with the archangels. He was tempted by demons, especially by their chief, Angra Mainyu. In the words of the *Vendidad*: "Thereupon to him howled back Angra Mainyu, the Lord of Evil Creation: 'Do not destroy my creatures, O righteous Zarathustra! . . . Renounce the good religion of the worshipers of Mazda, so as to obtain a boon such as

Vadhaghans obtained, the ruler of a nation.' " But Zarathustra answered him: "No! I shall not renounce the good religion of the worshipers of Mazda, not though life and limb, and soul should part asunder." ⁴

It is not of primary importance from what period illustrations of such developments are taken. A learned Dastur (or high priest) of India of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries thus describes Zarathustra.⁵ God created the soul of Zarathustra before he created both worlds, and by the virtue of the good fortune of Zarathustra's soul, space and time were created. God gave wisdom and all-knowledge to him, and seeing the books of the Avesta before God he learned them. Then Zarathustra "descended from heaven to earth sitting on a splendid throne," bringing Fire and the Avesta. "His throne immediately disappeared in the light of day." The fire burned without wood and gave no smoke. In spite of such legends and idealizations of Zarathustra, it is important to note that the sacred fire has remained the symbol around which worship centers. Though idealized pictures of the prophet are looked on with reverence there have been no images of him around which a cult developed. He has been as free of this as Moses and Muhammed. According to tradition he was killed at the age of seventy-seven during an invasion of marauding Turanians.

Eventually the religion became widely accepted, and this probably through the adoption of Zarathustra's teachings by a class of priests, the Magi, who still, however, retained much of their pre-Zarathustrian cult and doctrine. Some centuries after the Zoroastrian revival under the Sassanian dynasty, their country was conquered by Moslems. With the decline of the social status and well-being of adherents to the faith, and with discontent at the conditions of their life under Moslem rule, a considerable number migrated from

Persia and settled in India from about the ninth century A.D. Though at the present time the Zoroastrian community in Persia is poor, in India the Zoroastrians flourish and maintain a firm hold of their religion which is being viewed in an increasingly enlightened manner. During the past century some of them have attained to great wealth which they have devoted to philanthropic purposes. Others have achieved considerable eminence as scholars in the study of their scriptures. The work of these has been a main factor in the enlightened modern presentation of the religion.

Though Zoroastrianism cannot be limited merely to the teaching of Zarathustra, for the modern view of the religion his teaching is regarded as expressing the central principles. It is of no vital importance whence the elements of the later forms of the religion came which are not referred to in the *Gathas*. Some may have come down from his time, even from his own practice, though unrecorded in the earliest literature. Movements of reform in recent times tend to reject what seems opposed to the spirit of his teachings as found in the *Gathas*.

A few quotations from the *Gathas* will give a general impression of Zarathustra's attitude and main ideas. Central for him is a devotion to God, Ahura Mazda. "With verses that are recognized as those of pious zeal I will come before you with outstretched hands, O Mazda, before you, O Right, with the worship of the faithful man, before you with all the capacity of Good Thought." He asks that he might come before Mazda "joyfully, with worship and praise." "Your praiser, Mazda, will I declare myself, and be, so long, O Right, as I have strength and power." But the praise he would bring is preeminently that of moral life. "With these prayers I would come and praise you, O Mazda and thou the Right, with actions of Good Thought." For he has perceived that God is a moral being and

judges mankind ethically. "I conceived of thee, O Mazda, in my thought, that thou the First, art (also) the Last—that thou art the Father of Good Thought, for thus I apprehended thee with mine eye—that thou didst truly create Right, and art the Lord to judge the actions of life." Moral action and the glories of nature are alike for the praise of God. "Those actions that I shall achieve and those done aforetime, and those, O Good Thought, that are precious in the sight: the rays of the sun, the bright uprisings of the days, all is for your praise, O thou the Right and Ahura Mazda." He cries to Ahura for support "as friend gives to friend."

Zarathustra's prayers show that he regarded the good as not simply in a future life but in this as well: "I who would serve you, O Ahura Mazda and Good Thought—do ye give through the Right the blessings of both worlds, the bodily and that of Thought, which set the faithful in felicity." "All the pleasures of life which thou holdest, those that were, that are, and that shall be, O Mazda, according to thy good-will apportion them. Through Good Thought advance thou the body, through Dominion and Right at will. . . ." Yet he realizes that man has some freedom to choose or to reject the good and the right, and that he will obtain happiness or suffer pain according to his choice. "If I be master of my own destiny as I will, then will I take thought for the portion of the wise in the same." "Thou madest actions and words to have their meed, evil for evil, a good destiny for the good—through thy wisdom when creation shall reach its goal."⁶

Zoroastrianism has a short profession of faith: "I am a worshiper of Mazda. I am a Zoroastrian worshiper of Mazda." The name Mazda for deity goes much farther back than Zarathustra himself. Zarathustra seems to have preached a definite monotheism as opposed to the prevailing polytheism. More important than that, he taught a very lofty conception of God,

allying it fundamentally with ethical ideas. He was not a philosophical thinker who arrived at his beliefs after a period of rational reflection but a prophet in the religious sense that his knowledge of God seemed to come as the result of a communing with God. In the *Gathas* he is represented as asking questions of God and receiving answers from Him. Whatever may be thought of this mode of expression, one thing seems quite clear, that he had an unshakable conviction of the truth and vital importance of his beliefs. The attitude of the prophets and saints of the great theistic religions has always been similar: their true knowledge of God arose in their communion with God; they have not communed simply with an idea of God accepted as a philosophical hypothesis on the basis of reasoning on nature and human life.

The sublime idea of God in Zoroastrianism may be seen best by considering the attributes ascribed to Him. God is Ahura Mazda, the wise Lord: the essence of His nature is wisdom. This quality, like the other qualities, is of the nature of the attributes of a personal spiritual being. Ahura Mazda is a personal God. He is the creator and sustainer of the universe. He created men for their happiness. He is the self-existent, the infinite one, immutable, the mighty, the omniscient, the most worthy of invocation. His knowledge is unfailing, and He is the fountain of holiness. Though in poetic terms reference is made to His eyes and hands, there is very little physical anthropomorphism in His usual description.

Zarathustra's conception of Ahura Mazda is not that of an undifferentiated unity. He is Spenta Mainyu, the holy spirit. The "Good Thought" of God is called Vohū Manah, which brings wisdom and ennoblement to men. His nature also includes Asha, moral righteousness and order as found in His creation. He has majesty and kingly power, expressed by the term Khshathra.

His love is implied in the term Aramaiti. Haurvatāt and Ameretāt are His perfection and immortality. In the *Gathas* these are all treated as "qualities" within Ahura Mazda. But later thought personalized these individual "attributes," giving them the status of ministering angels or archangels of Ahura Mazda. There is no justification for this personalization in Zarathustra's utterances, and some have maintained that the definiteness of the monotheism was compromised by this later development.

The pure monotheism of Zarathustra also came otherwise very near to being seriously jeopardized. Moulton maintained that a clan, the Magi, after an unsuccessful bid for temporal sovereignty, turned themselves to control of religion. These Magi adopted the religion of Zarathustra, became its priests, and allied with the teaching of Zarathustra some of their former beliefs and practices. Thus, for example, the ancient deity Mithra is sometimes spoken of as though at least equal with Ahura Mazda: Mithra is described as a "god invoked in his own name." "Mithra and Ahura" are referred to as "the two great imperishable holy Gods." Yet though Ahura sacrifices to Mithra, he says: "Verily when I created Mithra."⁷ Apparently the coming of the Magi into the Zoroastrian community led to such confusion, but in the course of time the pure monotheism prevailed. It was in the ritualistic practices that the influence and additions of the Magi remained and among the orthodox remain largely to this day.

It has been a much debated question whether Zoroastrianism is ultimately dualistic in such a manner as to be in contradiction with a genuine monotheism. Even in the earliest sources, there is opposed in direct antagonism to Spenta Mainyu, the Holy Spirit of God, the Evil Spirit, Angra Mainyu. In the *Gathas*, these are called "twin spirits." Existence includes an age-long conflict between the spirit of good and the spirit of evil.

The recognition of this conflict gives the fundamental tone to Zoroastrianism. There is an insistence on the reality of evil, as not simply the absence of good or as good in the making.

To Zarathustra evil is "just evil," "existing in the realm of reality," and he nurtures a militant attitude of conflict with it. In the later literature the evil spirit is aided by an infernal crew of daevas or demons and with them fights against the good in all its forms. They tempt men to all kinds of evil, to disloyalty to God, and non-cooperation with the good spirits. In the later developments of thought an evil spirit is conceived as matched against every good archangel or angel. In the *Gathas* the arch-demon is Evil Mind, opposed to the Good Mind, and from it the daevas have come. *Druj*, the spirit of deceit and wickedness is the personified opponent of *Asha* or righteousness. *Aēshma* is the producer of disturbance and chaos, disorder, and anarchy on the earth.

The later thought of Zoroastrianism seems definitely to include the idea of a real personal evil spirit, called in the Vendidad, *Ahriman*. It may be doubted whether this personalization is true to the original teaching of Zarathustra. Some scholars, and among them leading Zoroastrians, maintain that it is not. But whatever may be correct with regard to Zarathustra's own thought many modern Zoroastrians maintain that today there must be a different presentation of the fundamental idea involved. According to them, good mind and evil mind are possible or actual states of the individual. The terms good or holy spirit and evil spirit are to be taken in the sense in which the word spirit means "disposition," as for example: "He showed a good (or a bad), spirit." The conflict then is mainly within the individual in the exercise of the moral freedom with the capacity for which he has been endowed by the creator. "In his crusade against the Kingdom of Druj, Zarathustra

is unsparing and even unforgiving." "We do not see in the words handed down from his lips, the gentler side of virtue, of returning good for evil. Here we have the ethics of retaliation. Once the antithesis between the Kingdoms of Righteousness and Wickedness is sharply defined, the latter is to be relentlessly opposed." "Zarathustra is the friend of the righteous, but a veritable foe to the wicked." "Succoring the wicked is tantamount to practicing wickedness. It is expressly said that the one who is good to the wicked is himself wicked." "Zoroastrianism is active, practical, militant."⁸

The conflict between good and evil will eventually end in the complete triumph of the good. At different times saviors will come to aid mankind, and the final of these, represented as an individual in later thought, is Saoshyant, the agent in the resurrection of the dead and leader in the final conflict. Ahura Mazda will judge all souls in his "blazing fire," and thereafter all evil beings will be impotent. The whole of life is a struggle toward ultimate perfection. "Progress is the Zoroastrian watchword. . . . Each individual has to join hands with the rest of his fellows in this great and noble undertaking: he must work to the extent of his powers and lend his aid, no matter how insignificant, to the attainment of that ideal end." The "great message of hope" of Zoroastrianism is that those who so cooperate for the attainment of the kingdom of righteousness "will enter into the everlasting joy of Ahura Mazda."

Man is both body and soul. The soul is created at birth by Ahura Mazda. Zoroastrianism teaches that after their separation at death, the soul continues to live: it is immortal. It promises justice in the next world and a rectification of the injustices of this world. In that lies much of the hope of the religion. Zoroastrian thinkers maintain that the doctrine of reward

and punishment, prominent in the *Gathas*, is suitable for the great majority of mankind. At the outset of its life the soul of man is pure and innocent. It is free and is responsible for its thoughts, words, and deeds. Its own attitude determines its future destiny of Heaven or Hell. Zoroastrianism teaches the doctrine of a future judgment. This is symbolized as a bridge, *Chinvat*, which the pious are able to cross; but from which the impious "led by their own conscience," fall to perdition. Heaven is the "Abode of the Good Mind," the dwelling of God, the "Abode of Song." It is a life of everlasting bliss, of reward for goodness. There is evidence of a belief of an intermediate condition for those souls whose goodness is not enough to take them to heaven, nor their wickedness heavy enough to bring them down to hell. Hell is the "Abode of the Evil Mind," the land of darkness, the "Abode of Wickedness." Souls remain in hell, at least according to the later books, until the final consummation of the conflict. "Heaven and hell," says a modern Zoroastrian, "are conditions rather than localities. Heaven is a condition of self-balance, harmony, and happiness, and it is attained now through obedience to natural laws. Heaven is within the good and pure-minded; Hell is within the impure, the angry, and the depraved. Its principal meaning is sorrow, trouble, regret, and bitter galling remorse. Zoroastrianism teaches that compensation is certain. Ahura Mazda has created no hells. Man is the architect of his own hell as of his own heaven."⁹

In connection with the final things later Zoroastrianism developed a doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. All mankind, from the first to the one last dead, will be given bodies. According to the Pahlavi texts, Zarathustra asked Ahura Mazda "regarding the forming again the bodies of the dead, inasmuch as the material frames of the dead have perished and been reduced

to dust." And Ahura Mazda "tells the prophet that even as it was possible for him to have created something from nothing, when nothing existed, and as he was able to create the sky and the earth, the sun and the moon and the stars, fire and water, clouds and winds, grain and mankind, in fact everything which formerly had no existence, it would not be difficult for him at the resurrection to form anew something that had already existed."¹⁰

With the whole creation assembled there is to be a final judgment. Though the wicked will be doomed to pass some time in hell with their bodies, Ahura Mazda will finally take back to himself the entire creation purified with perfected bodies for an everlasting life of heavenly bliss.

It may perhaps be said that no adequate account of Zoroastrianism can be given without reference to the curious conception of the Fravashis. Certainly it has played a part in later Zoroastrianism, though it seems highly probable that it was introduced by the Magi. Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to obtain a clear idea of the Fravashis. The Fravashi seems to be a kind of spiritual double, or counter-part of every man; it is his highest part, the divine and immortal in him. It exists whether he is yet unborn, is living, or is dead. The notion has been associated with that of ancestral spirits, because the Zoroastrians have a number of days set apart when the Fravashis of the departed are remembered and various rituals are performed. On the other hand the application of the conception of Fravashis to animals suggests a continuance of the ideas of early animism. The soul unites at death with its Fravashi. It does not appear that the idea occupies any place of significance in the minds of scholarly modern Zoroastrians.¹¹

Zoroastrian ceremonies and religious rites have been grouped in five classes by the veteran Zoroastrian

scholar Dr. J. J. Modi.¹² They are (1) the socio-religious ceremonies connected with birth, marriage, and death; (2) the purification ceremonies; (3) the initiation rites of admission of the child into religious membership of the community, and of admission to the two grades of priesthood; (4) the ceremonies of consecration of the fire-temples, the towers of silence, and of ritual utensils; and (5) liturgical rites. Many of these are elaborate and are associated with primitive ideas. They may be a survival of customs and superstitions having no essential connection with the teachings of Zarathustra and the spirit of the religion.

Whatever the source of these ceremonies interpretations have been placed on them in order to make them appear in harmony with the religion of Ahura Mazda. Reformers at the present time complain that some priests have little more than "a mechanical acquaintance with religious ritual as their only qualification." One aim of the Iranian Association formed not many years ago is to remove excrescences from the religion. Liberal believers wish to learn from the leaders of religion what "are the non-essential customs and observances which may have had their *raison d'être* in the past, but which have ceased to have any meaning in the present." As something of the tone of the religion, as especially concerned with this life, may be learned from the ceremonies, brief reference is made to them here.

The ceremonies connected with the birth of a child are associated with the deeply rooted conviction that it is good to have children. The scriptures represent Ahura Mazda as saying: "I prefer a person with children to one without children." Childlessness is a curse; to be the father of good children a blessing. Children are the choicest gifts of God. The first word to be taught the child when it begins to speak is the name of God, and the second that of Zarathustra. Marriage is highly praised by Zoroastrianism: it almost has the character

of a religious duty. To bring about marriage between a maiden and a good man is a meritorious act. On the morning of the day of marriage the parties take "a sacred bath of consecrated water"; the strictly religious part of the ceremony consists of prayers for blessings on those marrying, a statement of sincerity of purpose, and of the aim of righteousness; and an exhortation to the practice of the virtues and the avoidance of vices. The ritual used is mainly symbolical of the joining of the lives of the bride and bridegroom.

Zoroastrianism regards it as of religious importance that the dead shall be disposed of in such a way as to be "least harmful and least injurious to the living." Its regulations arose chiefly for sanitary reasons, to avoid the spread of disease. The placing of the corpse in the Tower of Silence to be eaten by vultures is regarded as one of the quickest ways to dispose of it. Fire being used as a sacred symbol, Zoroastrians have not adopted cremation which would bring fire into contact with the polluted body. Their present mode of disposing of the dead is not without its critics among modern Zoroastrians. G. K. Nariman says the verdict of history is not unanimous that "we as a community religiously adhered to the practice in all parts of Iran under the national rulers."

In the picturesque language of the scriptures, the soul of a man remains after death within the precincts of this world for three days, the good soul directing itself to paradise with the three steps of good thought, good words, and good deeds; the bad soul to hell with the three steps of evil thoughts, evil words, and evil deeds. The *Gathas* refer to one heaven and one hell; the later texts mention four heavens and four hells. On the third day after death the Oothamna ceremony is performed in which prayers are recited, and gifts to charity announced. "According to the Zoroastrian belief the relation between a pious deceased and his sur-

viving relations does not altogether cease after death. His holy spirit continues to take some interest in his living sons. If the surviving relations cherish his memory, remember him with gratefulness, try to please him with pious thoughts, pious words, and pious deeds, it is likely that these invisible departed spirits will take an interest in their welfare, and assist them with an invisible helping hand.”¹³

Researches in the sacred writings with the aid of philology, seems to point to a misunderstanding with regard to the teaching concerning the soul after death.¹⁴ Some reformers have maintained that Zoroastrianism teaches that a man goes “to the abode of weal or woe according to his deserts, and that no amount of ceremonies performed by the living can either mitigate his sufferings or improve his condition in the spiritual world.”¹⁵ Anniversary ceremonies, it is suggested, are for the benefit of those who remain more than for that of the dead. Zoroastrianism is held not to admit of the idea of expiation or vicarious salvation in any form. In consequence, modifications of the expensive ceremonies performed for the honor of the departed are advocated.

“Purity is for man,” says Ahura Mazda according to the *Vendidad*, “next to life the greatest good; that purity, O Zarathustra, that is in the religion of Mazda for him who cleanses his own self with good thoughts, words, and deeds.”¹⁶ Yet it is evident that the orthodox Zoroastrian purificatory ceremonies are dependent upon early ideas of purity, referring largely to the physical. Some modern Zoroastrians endeavor to maintain that the significance of their purificatory rites is to be found in their care for a healthy body for its own sake and for its relation to a healthy mind. But judged by modern knowledge of sanitation, it is impossible to see that the ceremonies of purification have this effect.

The Naojote or initiation ceremony of a child into

the Zoroastrian faith is a picturesque and significant rite. It is performed not later than at the age of fifteen, but may be arranged at any time after about seven when the child is able to understand its meaning. After a purificatory bath in consecrated water the child is invested with the sacred shirt and the sacred thread. The shirt is white, symbolic of innocence and purity. It should always be worn to remind one of a life of purity and righteousness. The sacred thread, with its seventy-two strands, has a wealth of ethical implication for the properly trained believer. At various times in the day he is to untie and tie this thread as a symbolic act, usually with a prayer formula. This is that he may always remind himself of his continuous and unremitting part in the conflict of good against evil; and of his adherence to Zoroastrianism in this conflict. He should remind himself: "I am the servant of God," and of the implication of this with reference to his thoughts, words, and deeds.

After investiture in the Naojote ceremony the child is expected to declare his confession of faith: "O Almighty! Come to my help. I am a worshiper of God. I am a Zoroastrian worshiper of God. I agree to praise the Zoroastrian religion, and to believe in that religion. I praise good thoughts, good words, good deeds. I praise the good Mazda Yacnan religion which curtails discussions and quarrels, which brings about kinship or brotherhood, which is holy, and which, of all the religions that have yet flourished and are likely to flourish in the future, is the greatest, the best, and the most excellent, and which is the religion given by God to Zoroaster. I believe that all good things proceed from God. May the Mazda Yacnan religion be thus praised." ¹⁷ The child is to be impressed with the importance of recognizing the efficacy of his thoughts, words, and deeds, upon which his own salvation must depend.

The ceremonies of initiation into the priesthood, and of consecration of fire-temples and objects used in religious worship are of no general interest. The formation of the sacred fire—the central symbol in Zoroastrianism, the symbol of “the splendor and glory of the Creator”—has significant references. The sacred fire of the temple is formed from a number of fires used for different human activities, that of a baker, a brewer or distiller, a potter, a king, a Zoroastrian household, and so on. This formation may be symbolically interpreted. There is little if any harm, and there may be some value in the retention of the fire as a central symbol. Nevertheless, in recent times some Zoroastrians have urged that “concrete objects” have ceased to symbolize their ideas in things religious. At a Zoroastrian Conference a lady “criticized the practice of bowing before the sacred fires.” The reverence for fire goes back to the earliest times of the Aryans, and though it may not be strictly correct to say that it is “worshipped” by Zoroastrians, the restrictions as to approach to the sacred fire in the fire temples suggest that it is actually treated with something of the same attitude as images in other religions.

Zoroastrianism “teaches belief in prayer and in the power of prayer. It teaches that true prayer is aspiration, an out-going, an uplifting of the soul’s emotions to all that is just, good, and divine.” So writes a liberal Zoroastrian and he goes on to criticize the priests who pray to “an unchangeable God” to send rain in a season of drought, “while the philosopher prays by irrigating the fields.” But as from the subjective side “man grows to be like what he thinks about, aspirational prayers transform us into the moral likeness of those to whom we pray.”¹⁸

Reform movements among the Zoroastrians of India, which began in the forties and fifties of the nineteenth century, have been chiefly the result of their

taking up Occidental forms of education, and from the fact that under this influence their scholars embarked on the critical investigation of their sacred scriptures. They made use of the researches of Occidental authorities such as Spiegel and Haug, Darmesteter and Tiele, Mills and Casartelli, Williams Jackson and Moulton. As Malabari and Dadabhoi Naoroji gave themselves to the reform of social and political evils, Ervad Sheriaji Bharucha, K. R. Cama, J. J. Modi, and M. N. Dhalla devoted themselves to researches into the sacred scriptures, into the nature and meaning of the religious ritual, and into Zoroastrian history. Sheriaji's "crusade for reform was the result of his sound scholarship."¹⁹

The "Rahnoomai Mazda Yacni Sabha" was organized for the improvement of social conditions among the Parsis and the restoration of the religion "to its pristine purity." A weekly periodical *Rast Gaftar* was published in the interests of reform. Later the "Iranian Association" was established to maintain the purity of the religion and to free it from useless or harmful additions. It established a journal to promote its work. In 1910 a Zoroastrian Conference was begun, its organizers wishing to "inaugurate a liberal movement" among Zoroastrians. The cause of reform was for some time hindered by the influence of theosophists who endeavored to find occult meaning in obsolete practices and thereby to justify their continuance, although they are obviously capable of natural explanation. The Iranian Association has done much for genuine reform against this insidious influence.

Careful researches by Zoroastrian and other scholars all tend to the confirmation of the view that there are "hardly any genuine texts extant, except the *Gathas*, embodying the original teachings of the founder of" the faith. But while this gives something of positive value in the position it secures to the *Gathas*, it does not aid much in deciding what authority or value is to be

placed on the conceptions and observances included in the later Avesta and Pahlavi texts.

It is not surprising therefore to be told of a "loss of the authority of the scriptures." Ervad Sheriaji in 1886 made the burden of his lectures: "Back to the *Gathas*." In the *Gathas* Zarathustra is represented as asking questions of God, and obtaining the answers. In that manner the *Gathas* have been regarded by the orthodox as a revelation in the usual traditional sense. But notwithstanding the claim to be a revelation which is made in some of their scriptures, some modern Zoroastrians have rejected the view. "The religion of Zarathustra is not a revelation in the sense in which that term is used in Theology." By revelation this writer means "the instilling of knowledge or wisdom in a mysterious manner from an external source to some chosen human being." He contends that such revelation is not compatible with the immutable laws under which God placed the world when he created it. Zarathustra's teaching is to be considered as part of normal human religious and intellectual activity. "According to the teaching of Zarathustra it is given to man and perfectly within his competence to understand fully the laws governing the universe, and to work out the salvation of man by mutual help and division of labor. The part Zarathustra played in the world was this—that he, having understood the philosophy and system of the world, was prepared wholeheartedly to devote himself to promulgate the same in the world."²⁰ Revelation was through the ordinary processes of Zarathustra's mind.

The modern liberal Zoroastrian therefore turns to reason and conscience for his tests as to the truth of religion. He wants to know "the value and intrinsic rationality" of the contents of his religion. The second Annual Report of the Iranian Association states: "We stand above all for truth and reason." While an en-

deavor is made to get back to the primitive purity of Zarathustra's teaching, the principles of religion also need to be formulated in intelligible modern terms, such as may arouse reverence in young and old. "The expansion of the old fundamental doctrines and the formation of a superstructure suited to modern times are what are wanted now." "More stress is to be placed on the spirit than on the letter" of the scriptures.

The language used by the orthodox priests in their religious ceremonies is that of the sacred texts. In orthodox practice prayers have been mainly parts of the scriptures, whether understood or not by those who pray. The reformers deprecate the superstitious continuance of the actual languages of the scriptures in modern religion. "A prayer that has no subjective value is no prayer. It fails to awaken any ethical fervor, for a truly devout prayer should spur the spirit within to a higher life. This is not possible so long as the priest perfunctorily drones prayers, not a word of which is understood."²¹ The reformers therefore introduced prayer meetings with sermons, both prayers and sermons being in the vernacular. Although the *Gathas*, their most ancient scriptures, are hymns, attempts to introduce the singing of vernacular hymns to the accompaniment of music had only a limited success.

There can be little doubt that the orthodox religion lives very much in the continuance of the traditional rites and ceremonies, and not much from a living grasp of its spiritual principles. "The Parsi religion of the day is anything but the pure religion promulgated by Zoroaster. Its purity and its true essence have been soiled and muddled by centuries of intolerant priestcraft."²²

Much has been due to the lack of proper training of the priests, and in modern times efforts have been made by the reformers to remedy the defect. A definite step in this direction was made some years ago in Bombay in

the founding of two Madressas where the members of the hereditary families of priests might study the sacred books and ceremonies of the religion. But they are said not to have kept pace with modern thought: "There is not at present in the Madressas the faintest attempt at a historical or comparative treatment of the Mazda Yacnan religion taken as a whole; much less an appreciation of the fundamental principles of the religion on a philosophical and cultural basis."²³ Nevertheless, there are some eminent Zoroastrian scholars who are presenting the religion in a modern form, and their influence is likely to permeate wide sections of the community. For it is still maintained that the religion of Ahura Mazda is the "greatest, best, and the most excellent of all that exist, and that shall in the future exist."²⁴

The spirit of the religion and some of its leading doctrines, as they present themselves to the mind of a liberal adherent, may be illustrated by a few quotations from an article by Byramjee Hormusjee, entitled "The Creed of Zarathustra": "Zoroastrianism teaches belief in one God, Ahura Mazda, just, merciful, eternal, and infinite in wisdom, unchangeable in purpose, and adorable in majesty; ineffable in perfection, forever blessing and forever blessed. . . . It teaches belief in a reign of law which is the reign of love. It teaches that man is created by Ahura Mazda: that by Him man is thoroughly known, righteously judged, and graciously loved. . . . It teaches that the whole world is moving toward the fulness of God's glory, and that He is ever reconciling the whole world to Himself."²⁵

The modern ideal of Zoroastrianism has been briefly summarized by Dr. M. N. Dhalla, probably its most enlightened modern representative: "Zoroastrianism will live by its eternal verities of the belief in the personality of Ahura Mazda (the Wise Lord, God); an abiding faith in the triad of good thoughts, good works, and good deeds; the inexorable law of righteousness;

the reward and retribution in the life hereafter; the progress of the world toward perfection; and the ultimate triumph of the good over evil through the coming of the Kingdom of Ahura Mazda with the cooperation of man. These are the truest and greatest realities in life. They are valid for all times. They constitute the lasting element of Zoroastrianism. . . . Man may fall away from dogmas and rituals and yet he may remain religious. . . . Let the Zoroastrian individually and his community collectively, abide steadfast in the path of righteousness, and they will be practicing true Zoroastrianism. In the fret and fever of modern civilization, which renders man exceedingly sensitive to suffering, and lets loose on him the demons of restlessness and discontent, Zarathustra's religion is the best sedative for him today." ²⁶

That is a great claim to make, and it may be seriously asked whether this religion of conflict is calculated to bring peace of mind amid the distractions of this modern world. Would the Zoroastrian community have suffered such depletion at the hands of Islām if it were adequate to the demands of the human spirit? Most Zoroastrians in India still believe that about a thousand years ago their ancestors fled to that country to escape from oppression by Moslems; and that the decay of their faith in Persia was due to Moslem oppression. History is far from establishing this belief as true. There are Zoroastrians today who maintain that it was probably trade which led to the early settlement of Zoroastrians in India. Muhammed said, "Let there be no compulsion in religion." The Moslems insisted on acceptance of Islām or the payment of a certain tax. Now it is quite possible that some Zoroastrians would do neither. If the sword was indeed used against them it is possible that it was not to compel them to accept Islām but to encourage them to pay the tax.

The decay of Zoroastrianism more probably depended on marked defects in its own nature. It lacks the warmth of personal devotion, the softer and more emotional sides of religion. It has been and is almost entirely wanting in the mystical element. Its sacred books are devoid of mysticism, and its history gives little evidence of the recognition of this side of religious experience. It is, however, interesting that it was especially in Persia that Sūfī mysticism of Islām chiefly developed. And it is remarkable that in spite of the mysticism in the religions surrounding its adherents for a thousand years in India, modern Zoroastrianism is still so free from such traits. Another notable feature is the absence of any form of asceticism, even the recognition that some degree of asceticism may be called for in the pursuit of higher values. It shows little if any comprehension of the deeper aspects of the problem of suffering and its place in human life.

At its outset Zoroastrianism must undoubtedly have had something of the character of a missionary religion. But recent discussion shows that the Indian community is rigidly exclusive. Proselytes are not sought and generally would not be welcomed. The attitude of the liberals is only a little less rigid than that of the conservatives. Perhaps the life for about a thousand years in India with its rigid caste groups has been the cause of this exclusiveness. But even if the Parsi will not definitely accept into the community persons not born Parsis, the duty is nevertheless clear from their scriptures that they must do all in their power to promote the good in every possible way, joining with all others in progressive efforts.

Surveying the leading aspects of modern life from the standpoint of an enlightened modern Zoroastrianism, Dr. Dhalla indicates the fundamental attitudes of Zarathustra: "The imperfect world is man's oppor-

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tunity. The perfect world is in the making. God has planned it and entrusted man with the duty of completing it. The world is certainly not hell, but neither is it paradise; it is merely purgatory, we may say, with God-given guarantee of its ultimate conversion into paradise by human endeavor.”²⁷

CHAPTER VII

JUDAISM

Judaism is the living result of the long development of the religion of Israel. Essentially Semitic in origin it has retained distinctive traits through the course of its history. Though in its early stages the religion of Israel was in large measure animistic, it passed through monolatry to a definite monotheism. This transition was effected not so much through the influence of critical reflection as by the leadership of a series of preachers and teachers, filled with enthusiasm of an intense religious and moral experience. Whatever may have been contributed toward its systematization by philosophical thinkers, Judaism remains essentially the expression of the religion of the Hebrew prophets.¹

For the Jews the foremost figure in their religious history was Moses, to whom is accredited not merely their most effective early organization as a people but also the basal formulation of their religious and ethical code of life. The work of the later teachers has been looked upon as the bringing back of the people to an awareness of and a practical conformity with the spiritual implications of what he taught. Actually it represented a spiritual advance, and scholarship gives sufficient evidence that the Hebrew scriptures as they now exist embody among the reputed teachings of Moses much which was due to the experiences of later times. It is probable that led by Moses the Hebrews came to regard themselves as a theocratic community: their God was also their King. In spite of their earthly kings in later centuries, it may be said that they never entirely lost the sense of being "the people of God."

What may be more distinctively given the name of

JUDAISM

Judaism resulted from a reorganization of the religion after the Babylonian exile, in the fifth century B.C., as further consolidated in the early centuries of the Christian era. Though Jewish thinkers came for a time under the influence of Greek thought, resulting in spiritual and intellectual advance, the characteristic features and tone of their religion remained fundamentally unchanged. The overthrow of Jerusalem by the Romans and the great dispersion of the Jews had an effect of freeing spiritual Judaism from much of the formal ritualistic practice of the temple. With the cessation of the sacrificial rites, the significance of the teachings of the prophets came to be more clearly recognized: righteousness and prayer, penitence, and praise of God were seen to be the essentials of religion. As had been actually taught in earlier times: "What doth the Lord require of thee but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?" "I desired mercy and not sacrifice; and the knowledge of God more than burnt offerings."

Through centuries during which they have been subjected to many civil disabilities in Christian countries,² their religion has been the main unifying power among the Jews. Though the conditions under which they have so often been forced to exist have led them frequently to modes of living which have given rise to much opposition, Judaism has embodied for them an ethical and religious ideal. In spite of periods of suffering and depression, it has been the basis of their almost unvarying optimism. Though even today in some countries Jews are still persecuted and suffer disabilities, they have now in general a freedom such as they have not had for centuries, and they are using many of the opportunities which have thus arisen for pursuing scholarly investigations into their religion and improving its practical organization.

Judaism has no formal and authoritative creed, but

the thirteen principles of Maimonides composed in the twelfth century A.D. have been so widely accepted as almost to take the place of one.³ Consequently, Judaism may be conveniently considered with reference to these principles which may be said to represent the traditional orthodox position. Four of the principles refer to the source of religious truth; the sixth says: "I believe with perfect faith that all the words of the prophets are true"; the seventh: "I believe with perfect faith that the prophecy of Moses our teacher was true, and that he was chief of the prophets both of those that preceded and of those that followed him"; the eighth: "I believe with perfect faith that the whole law, now in our possession, is the same that was given to Moses our teacher"; the ninth: "I believe with perfect faith that this law will not be changed and that there never will be any other law from the Creator." Thus the claim of any religion to be an advance upon Judaism is rejected: neither Jesus nor Muhammed is the equal of Moses, and their teaching contains nothing good which may not be found in Judaism. It is evident from a mere reading of these four principles that they are capable of a rigid application and interpretation, and it appears to be thus that traditional Judaism has considered them.

For answer to the inquiry: Who are the prophets, all the words of whom are true, and where this prophecy of Moses, "the whole Law," is to be found? reference is made to authoritative writings. First and foremost, the books of the Pentateuch. The long-held tradition that Moses himself wrote these books cannot be maintained for them in their present form, and it cannot now be regarded as an essential tenet that they should as such be attributed to him. It is sufficient that they are accepted as containing the fundamentals of what Moses did and taught the people. The books of the Pentateuch contain the ordinances of Jewish ethics and

law, and much material of a historical nature. The other books, the Hagiographa, the books of the prophets, and the chronicles of the kings of Israel, together with historical narratives and legend contain many sublime outbursts of religious expression in song, in prayer, and in prophetic admonition and exhortation. They are written almost entirely with a religious motive, embodying thoughts on God and on men, and their relations one to the other. These Hebrew scriptures are among the greatest of the religious treasures of the human race. Besides the revelation of God regarded as enshrined in these authoritative books, there are other traditions which for centuries were transmitted orally. At a later date, these, with various comments, interpretations, and sayings of the Jewish rabbis, were written down and form the *Talmud*, of which there are two recensions, the Babylonian and the Jerusalem. The attempt to adhere to the letter of these books and the methods employed in their application to the needs of ordinary life have with some justification been the basis of the charge of legalism made earlier against Judaism.

S. R. Hirsch in his *Nineteen Letters of Ben Uziel* (1826) following an age-long tradition maintained that the whole law, written and oral, is eternally valid, and Titkin in a pamphlet in 1838 declared the plenary inspiration of the *Talmud* a dogma of Judaism. But since then the influences of modern thought have led to much discussion of the authority of the sacred scriptures, and in the course of time the whole attitude has radically altered among thoughtful Jews. The change has placed all the writings including the *Talmud* on a much stronger basis. For they are now regarded as stages in the literary expression of religion in the historical life of the Jews.

The divinity, perfection, immutability of any particular literary expression of the law, and the Mosaic origin of the Pentateuch are challenged. The modern

liberal Jew feels compelled by the whole trend of modern thought to believe in a progressive revelation as opposed to any and every idea of a fixed, final, and complete revelation, whether enshrined in tradition, in a book, or in the life and personality of an individual. All human knowledge is seen to be acquired gradually—religious and moral knowledge no less than that of the special sciences of nature. Universal precepts of religion need to be distinguished from the practical forms and ideas arising from the circumstances and the conditions of particular times and places. It is not the purpose of the Bible to be a repository of scientific ideas or of accurate historical statements. So, in 1885, a conference of Jews at Pittsburgh declared: "We hold that the modern discoveries of scientific researches in the domain of nature and history are not antagonistic to the doctrines of Judaism, the Bible reflecting the primitive ideas of its own age, and at times clothing the conception of divine Providence and Justice in dealing with man in miraculous narratives."⁴

To the liberal modern Jew, therefore, with his belief in progressive revelation "a vital religion is never fully made; it is always in the making." He cannot say, as is implied in the ninth principle of Maimonides: There and then revelation was closed. "Revelation to us is not an isolated event in the past but a continuous process."⁵ "In various bygone times God has revealed, and even in our own day continues to reveal to us, something of His nature and will by inspiring the best and wisest minds with noble thoughts and new ideas, to be conveyed to us in words, so that this world may constantly improve and grow happier and better. . . . Long ago some of our forefathers were thus inspired and they handed down to us and through us to the world at large—the principles of religion and morality now recorded in our Bible."⁶ Viewed thus each book has its place according to its intrinsic value, and the ordi-

nances of the Pentateuch merely as such have no greater claim to bind Jewish practice than have those of the *Talmud*.

Revelation is through conscience and reason, conceived not as merely individual but as social and historical in character. But though conscience and reason are human functions, it is through the active relation of God to them that knowledge of the truth concerning Him and the good is possible. Some races and individuals are more receptive of the divine influence than others are, and these He chooses to be the chief channels of His revelation to men in the realms of religion and morals. These individuals are the religious and moral teachers, the prophets and the saints of all ages. Some of their teachings have become enshrined in sacred books: eminently so in the Hebrew scriptures.

But though these books are an aid to reason and the conscience they are not to be set up as possessing an external authority: their claim still depends on their appeal to and response from the reason and the conscience of their readers. The more closely the individual is bound by ties of race, social influence, and education to a particular community, in general the more intensely its religious scriptures will appeal to him. This belief in progressive revelation says a Jewish scholar "is not to make one see less of God within the Bible but to make us perchance see more of God outside the Bible."

Central for Judaism is its conception of God. "The doctrine of God is the largest and most important part of Judaism."⁷ It is the "fool" who says in his heart: there is no God. Jewish Theism is a very simple Theism. "Jewish lore has rather discouraged the study of ontological problems. The existence of God was taken as an absolute truth which admitted no argument or investigation."⁸ "Herein lies the Jew's greatest contribution in the field of religion: God to him was not

the result of reasoning, but the essence of life, which he felt even as he felt all the needs of life.”⁹ Its God is both near and far, without and within. Judaism clings to two aspects of God, summed up in the two-fold metaphor, “Our Father, our King.” Like Islām it stresses the idea of the divine unity.

The second principle of Maimonides runs: “I believe with perfect faith that the Creator, blessed be His Name, is a unity, and that there is no other unity in any manner like unto His, and that He alone is our God, who was, is, and will be.” This unity implies no confusion of God with the world. Jewish theology, growing up in close relation with felt religion has always maintained the idea of deity as a personal spirit. In spite of much anthropomorphic imagery in language, the spiritual notion of personality predominates. By saying that God is spiritual, the Jew refers to the attributes of intelligence, feeling, and will in His nature. The dangers of anthropomorphism have been largely averted and the spirituality of the religion protected by the commandment against making or worshiping any image of God. The definite rejection of the physical idea of God is given in Maimonides’ third principle: “I believe with perfect faith that the Creator, blessed be His name, is not a body, and that He is free from all accidents (*i.e.*, qualities) of matter, and that he has not any form whatever.”

God is the creator and preserver of the Universe. He is “the author and guide of everything that has been created and He alone has made, does make, and will make all things.” He is perfect and holy. He is “The first and the last,” that is, He is eternal: in Him all things have their origin and in Him their perfection finds its meaning. The real miracle of the Hebrew Bible “is to be found in the strong sense of divine presence in the world and divine guidance in the affairs of the universe, in the records of spiritual experience and

aspiration in the great phenomena of prophetism and in the development of a spiritual religion which is the basis of our modern faith.”¹⁰

Throughout history Judaism has consistently emphasized the divine righteousness, though there have been different levels of attainment of insight as to its detailed implications. Dr. Montefiore thinks that this has been deliberately put in the foreground in contrast with the Christian emphasis on love.

The idea of God accepted by modern liberal Jews agrees in essentials with the conception indicated. They frequently insist on the notion of divine immanence, and this is understood with reference to the fundamental conception of order in nature as taught by modern science. Consequently belief in the historicity of the stories of miracles narrated in the Hebrew scriptures is often rejected, not on any superficial ground of impossibility but for lack of adequate evidence that they actually occurred, and because the kind of interference in the course of nature which these miracles imply does not accord with the modern notion of God working through consistent and uniform modes of action. God works in the world by means of development and evolution.¹¹ “We mean here by religion simply the realization of the presence of a Supreme Mind which saturates all reality, from which all beings, all life, emanate; we mean the realization of a Mind which is the source of all phenomena in Nature, the origin of all the laws by which the world moves and by which its order is maintained; a Mind which is eternally creative and whose aim is to conserve that which He calls into existence.”¹² “He reneweth in his goodness every day continuously the work of creation.”¹³ The question of the validity of the idea of the creation of the world *ex nihilo* is a matter of indifference as compared with the importance to be accorded to His government of it. Yet, though attention is given to the notion of

the divine immanence, the dangers of that conception are seen, and in consequence the ideas of the transcendence and personality of God as definite Jewish doctrines are reiterated. For the relation which men feel toward God in religion, as Judaism knows it, is a personal one: men can love Him and feel His love for them.

In recent times much has been said and written to the effect that our philosophy and our religion must be developed on a basis of natural science. In its early development Judaism did not look so much to the world of Nature as to the realm of human history. From its point of view God in definite relations with mankind in history is of more significance for religion than any relation of God to the non-human physical world.

It is interesting in this connection to observe how the early composers of the Hebrew scriptures treated ideas which they shared in common with other peoples. It is now clearly established that the early Hebrews shared a common fund of folklore, part of which is enshrined in the Gilgames epic of Babylonia as in the creation story of Genesis. Yet here at the outset is a notable difference. As found in the epic, creation is the result of a conflict of two orders of deities; in Genesis creation is the work of one intelligent supreme being. Once more, the story of the primeval flood is a common one in the Orient: it is found not merely in Babylon but also in India. But in the Hebrew records it is interpreted in terms of God's dealings with men; the flood is looked on as a punishment for sinfulness and a means of purgation, allowing mankind a comparatively new start. And so throughout the Hebrew narratives: God is regarded as in constant relation with mankind, leading men, chastening them, forgiving, and helping them.

For Judaism it might be said that God, however else he is to be conceived of, is the dominant factor in determining the course of human history. It is essentially

this conviction which scholarly Jews still regard as necessary for a proper attitude to life. "To the modern mind Judaism says very simply—as long as man suffers from the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune caused by man's inhumanity to man, as long as the human heart craves for enlargement and suffers from thwarted purposes and unfulfilled ideals, as long as there is a craving for beauty and truth and goodness, man will seek to find appropriate ways of thought and action to compass these cherished ends, and in doing so he will always want to feel that there is something in the universe that will support him in his efforts and sustain him in his difficulties as he marches to the goal. The self-discipline needed for the task and the faith and confidence in the support that lies within and behind the universe, these together spell religion, and I believe always will."¹⁴

It is possible to form a view of Judaism on the basis of legal and ritualistic formalism, but as a religion it is in the *Psalms* that its fundamental tone is most forcefully expressed. In no theistic literature are the intimate relations of man with God in his joys and his sorrows more vividly portrayed. God for religion is no mere theoretical belief. "As the hart panteth after the water-brooks so panteth my soul after thee, O God." "My soul thirsteth for God, for the living God." In his communion with God man finds the one secure source of confidence in life. "I will lay me down in peace and sleep; for thou, Lord, alone makest me dwell in safety." Such confidence gives rise to joy and to worship. "Let all those that put their trust in thee rejoice; let them ever shout for joy because thou defendest them; let them also that love thy name be joyful in thee." "I will praise thee, O Lord, with my whole heart; I will show forth thy marvelous works. I will be glad and rejoice in thee; I will sing praises to thy name, O thou most High." Nature and man may

both lead man to thoughts of divine majesty. "O Lord, our Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth! who has set thy glory above the heavens. . . . When I consider thy heavens, the work of thy fingers, the moon and the stars, which thou hast ordained; What is man, that thou art mindful of him? and the son of man, that thou visitest him? For thou hast made him a little lower than the angels and hast crowned him with glory and honor. . . ."

True religion for Judaism is essentially a condition of happiness; and though man's life includes sin and suffering, through his relation to God he may triumph over them. "Sing unto the Lord, O ye saints of his, and give thanks at the remembrance of his holiness. For his anger endureth but a moment; in his favor is life; weeping may endure for a night, but joy cometh in the morning." "Why art thou so cast down, O my soul? and why art thou disquieted within me? Hope thou in God, for I shall yet praise him, the health of my countenance and my God."

Judaism apprehending God as a "God of righteousness" has expressed in unforgettable terms the contrition of the human soul for its sin, and its conviction of a divine forgiveness which restores it to peace. The suffering of the righteous lead them to Him. "The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit; a broken and a contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise." "The Lord is nigh unto them that are of a broken heart; and saveth such as are of a contrite spirit; many are the afflictions of the righteous, but the Lord delivereth him out of them all."

Judaism is essentially an ethical religion. The relation of God to man is ethical. "The essence of the Jewish religion lies in the immense stress which it lays upon the moral life on earth, as the truest exemplification of our belief in and love of God. . . ." ¹⁵ He has given man freedom to choose good or evil. If man chooses evil, is guilty of sin, disobeys the commandments of

God, he must expect to suffer. Maimonides has expressed the Jewish conception in his eleventh principle: The Creator "rewards those that keep His commandments and punishes those that transgress them." This is the constant teaching of the "law and the prophets." Man has to acknowledge an "ought" with regard to fitting himself into a divine purpose wider than himself. He is to find happiness in communion with God and in obedience to the law of God—not necessarily the written or traditional law of orthodox Judaism—but that gradually revealed through reason and conscience.

Nevertheless, in the written and traditional law there is much that is fundamental and of permanent significance. It constitutes the ethical ideal sustained by Judaism and largely sustaining Judaism. "The Jews did not develop their ethics as a branch of philosophy, a science of conduct and character. . . . To the Jew, ethics was the central theme of his God idea."¹⁶ "Judaism still holds that whatever the human history and development of morality may be, morality has not arisen and developed by chance, nor are righteousness and love merely human creations. They have come to be in man because, before man was, they were in God. God is their Author and Source, God is their condition and guarantee."¹⁷ God, as the source of the moral law, is always ready to help man to achieve his good intentions; and to forgive his faults if he truly repents of them.

The moral law of Judaism has to do with the relation of men to God and to their fellow men, whole-hearted love of God, and love of one's neighbor as oneself. It has been epitomized through many centuries in the code of the Ten Commandments. The moral ideal has been expressed in many other impressive ways, especially by the prophets of Israel. Dr. Levinthal perhaps under the influence of modern social problems and a desire to suggest a contrast with Christianity maintains that justice is the leading conception. "What doth the Lord require

of thee, asks the prophet and he wisely answers: 'To do justly and to love mercy.' Justice must come first, and only afterward love and mercy."¹⁸ Yet, perhaps after all the fundamental attitude is better revealed in the prayer: "Create in me a pure heart, O God, and renew a steadfast spirit within me. Cast me not away from thy presence and take not thy holy spirit from me." As Dr. Levinthal himself says earlier in his book: "The most distinctive note of Judaism from its earliest beginnings down through the ages is the ideal of Holiness. . . . Judaism is essentially the Jew's path to the Holiness of life."¹⁹

There is very little evidence of ascetic practices in the history of the Jews. In fact, Judaism may be said to be in principle opposed to asceticism as it has been and still is manifested in some Oriental religions. "The most important safeguard Judaism had against the danger of exaggerated idealization of poverty and deprivation, and which preserved it at the same time from the excesses of asceticism so rampant in other religions, was the prohibition of celibacy. This prohibition, or to speak in a positive way, the institution of marriage or the divine command of the propagation of the race gave both Jewish thought and Jewish institutions a complexion of their own. . . . Judaism has scholars, or *talmide hekamin*, it has pious men and pious women, it has saints and martyrs, but there is no room in it for the religious community, or religious order, as contrasted with the rest of the people among whom the former dwell."²⁰ "Hereafter, say the Rabbins, men will have to render an account for every legitimate pleasure they have rejected."²¹ Judaism is "an eternal going out in search for completeness and wholeness of life."²² "Faith in the progress of man, creating through his progress the kingdom of God: this is the faith of Israel."²³ Dr. Levinthal says there has been a conflict through the ages of Jews emphasizing life in this world against such a

notion as that of Jesus' "my Kingdom is not of this world." "Judaism is distinguished by its emphasis upon *this world*, in contradistinction to all other religions, which emphasize *the other world*."²⁴ But Mr. Kaplan takes a different view: "To prove that for traditional Judaism the center of gravity of human existence lay not in this life but in the hereafter is both as simple and as difficult as proving that to the ancients the earth was the center of the universe. The entire rabbinic literature is based on an other-worldly orientation."²⁵ He talks, however, of "the passing belief in other-worldly salvation" and would probably agree with Dr. Levinthal as to the dominant attitude in the present.

The Hebrew scriptures contain a mythical account of the origin of evil in the world of man, regarding it as due primarily to human disobedience. But this is also associated with the idea of an evil spirit, represented as appearing in the form of a serpent. Yet the idea of the devil or Satan occurs only a very few times in the Hebrew scriptures. The principles of Maimonides contain no reference to a leading evil spirit. And, in spite of the vivid belief which some Jews seem to have held at the time of Jesus, Mr. Friedländer, an orthodox modern Jew, in his well known *Textbook of the Jewish Religion* maintains that "belief in evil spirits, demons, devils, and the like, and fear of them," is forbidden by the second of the ten commandments authoritative among the Jews. Though this conclusion does not necessarily follow from that commandment, the conception of evil spirits cannot be regarded as an essential constituent of the religion. Modern Liberal Judaism usually rejects the idea of the reality of "the devil."

Judaism must confess its inability to give any solution to the theoretical problem of evil. But it insists that human sin is made possible by human freedom. Man possesses a measure of real freedom and so may retard or help forward the fulfilment of the purposes of God.

This belief is fundamental. Though evil is an enigma, in many respects it is a palliative to believe that through suffering God often draws men into closer relationship with Himself. The Jew has seen, and has been encouraged by many of the prophets of his race to see, in the suffering of his people, the tragedy of their history, their complete loss of nationality, their dispersion through the world, and their continuous persecution, the punishment for the sins not merely of individuals but of the entire people.

These evils he has regarded—and many still regard—as due to their failure to be loyal to God and His laws. In his sacred book he is told in the beginning “God saw all that He had made and behold it was very good.” He has accepted a picturesque description of a state of pure happiness as a paradise in the past—a condition ruined by the sin of man. Notwithstanding all the sufferings of the Jewish people, Jewish faith in God has remained, even though at times dimly, and on this basis the Jews have been and are at heart inveterate optimists. They have looked forward incessantly to restoration, and to a paradise or golden age of the future.

In the Hebrew Bible there is so little concerning a future life of the individual after death, that its almost virtual absence is conspicuous to the modern reader. There is the idea of Sheol as of a dismal region of the departed, similar to the Hades of ancient Greek thought. The one redeeming feature of Sheol is expressed by the psalmist, who says that God is also there. The ancient Hebrew thought of death in relation with his doctrine of God. Though death is a source of sorrow for those who remain, it is accepted as not in itself an evil. The attitude of past and present Judaism is that this world and the next are both God’s worlds. “The Jewish soul loved life so abundantly that it could even dare to predict a time when God would annihilate death forever.”²⁸

JUDAISM

But since before the time of Jesus, orthodox Judaism has contained a belief in the resurrection of the body. The instigation to this belief may have come from non-Hebrew sources. It attained wide acceptance through the prevalence of the idea of a future Messianic kingdom. As the hope of that became vivid men began to ask what part in it those could have who had died before its advent. From this hope grew the conviction that at the time of the inauguration of the Messianic kingdom, at the "last day," the dead would rise again with their bodies. The belief is formally expressed in the thirteenth principle of Maimonides: "I believe with perfect faith that there will be a resurrection of the dead, at the time when it shall please the Creator."

In modern times liberal Jews have rejected the belief in the resurrection of the body, and insisted on a doctrine of spiritual immortality. The Conference at Philadelphia in 1869 declared that: "The belief in bodily resurrection has no religious foundation, and the doctrine of immortality refers to the after existence of the soul only."²⁷ The seventh principle enunciated at the Pittsburgh Conference of 1885 says: "We re-assert the doctrine of Judaism, that the soul is immortal, grounding this belief on the divine nature of the human spirit, which forever finds bliss in righteousness. We reject, as ideas not rooted in Judaism, and beliefs both in bodily resurrection and in Gehenna and Eden, (Hell and Heaven), as abodes of everlasting punishment and reward."²⁸ The belief in bodily resurrection is thus rejected not simply on scientific grounds but also because it has no adequate justification in the tradition in the religion. There is no authoritative doctrine of hell and heaven.

The idea of a future Messianic kingdom appears to have arisen in part from the reaction of the Jews to the conditions of their life as a repeatedly conquered and subjugated people, reflecting on an idealized view of

their own independence under David and Solomon. Some influence toward the development of the hope and belief may have come from the Zoroastrian belief in a triumphal age in the future. However it arose, the expectation of the coming of a savior, who would be a majestic king and set up a glorious kingdom, for long exercised a powerful influence upon the Jews, and a number of people claimed to be the Messiah. The faith in the advent of the Messiah and the establishment of the Messianic kingdom was not rooted in merely nationalistic hopes: it was also based on a religious conviction that the Jews were to bring blessings to all mankind through the setting up of this kingdom.

The Jews have a number of interesting festivals. Some of these have a long history, being associated with real or alleged events and with features of social life. They are occasions for special thankfulness to God, of joy, and religious praise, arousing the adherents to experiences of social religious emotion hardly possible in the life of every day, nevertheless having effects flowing over into that life. With the outer forms and occasions retained it is possible to associate with them new ideas and modern spiritual aspiration. Liberal Judaism sees more reason to retain than to abandon these festivals. "The historic observances," says Morris Joseph, a moderate, "are the great unifying influence in Israel; while the Passover endures, Judaism will live."²⁹ "It is the business of Liberal Judaism on the one hand to preserve the historic character of the outward embodiment of the religious doctrine, and on the other hand to divest it of its purely national character in the sense of being a worship for a single nation."³⁰ On the other hand another liberal Jew asks the pertinent question "Why each race should not preserve its own national ceremonial?" There is no reason why such a policy should be associated with interracial or international animosity.

The reformers have insisted that old forms of observance may and should sometimes be changed and new ones added to them. If the traditional practices could be kept free from mere formalism, there might be some reason to continue them; but no liberal thinker could consider them as in any sense obligatory. Judaism perpetuated for long certain customs with regard to diet, giving them a religious sanction. From the nature of these customs, considered in relation with the conditions in which they originated, it is evident that they arose with reference to sanitary and economic requirements. The attitude of modern liberal Jews toward these problems is generally one of neutrality or neglect. When they are observed, it is not on the ground that they have any intrinsic religious significance. Their observance may possibly have a disciplinary value. Liberals keenly oppose the view that such dietary laws are parts of the divine law. Samuel Holdheim contended that they should be definitely abrogated because they constitute a disturbing feature in the civil and social life of the Jews, being prone to emphasize unnecessarily and without good purpose a difference between Jews and non-Jews.

The opposition of Jesus to many of his Jewish contemporaries with reference to the observance of the Sabbath has brought that observance into prominence in consideration of Judaism. It is not necessary to inquire here into the remote origins of the ideas concerning the Sabbath. Apparently from early times it acquired a religious sanction among the Hebrews, being considered, like circumcision, to be a sign of the covenant with God: "an everlasting covenant," "a sign it is between God and the children of Israel forever." The observance of the Sabbath is insisted on in the code of commandments traditionally ascribed to Moses as a revelation from God. "Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy. Six days shalt thou labor and do all thy work, but the seventh day

is a Sabbath unto the Lord thy God: in it thou shall do no manner of work, thou nor thy son nor thy daughter, thy man-servant nor thy maid-servant, nor thy cattle, nor the stranger that is within thy gates: for in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea and all that is therein, and rested on the seventh day: wherefore the Lord blessed the Sabbath day and hallowed it." A narrative recording the manner in which Jews of all ages have endeavored to carry out the letter of this commandment would be a remarkable revelation of human nature. An estimate of the value which has accrued to mankind through the influence of the practice of one day of rest and religious devotion in each week—continued as it has been in the Christian Sunday—would undoubtedly be highly impressive. The Sabbath remains for all religious Jews an institution of fundamental importance. Yet the exigencies of modern life in the Occident have compelled modifications in the actual carrying out of the letter of the commandment. Liberals reject formal rules, but exhort Jews to do all in their power to keep the Sabbath "holy" and to enable others to do so—"holy" as implying not merely external conduct but spiritual feeling. Attempts by some reformers, to accommodate themselves to Occidental conditions by transferring the services of the synagogue from the Sabbath (Saturday) to Sunday, or inaugurating extra services on Sunday have only been partially successful.

Early social organization led to the formation of particular groups for specific functions. In the course of time the privilege of performing particular functions came to be regarded as a right of the members of a group or particular groups and their descendants to the exclusion of others. Among the Jews sacerdotal functions came to be thus restricted. But such limitation did not prevent religious teachers or prophets arising from other groups. Social conditions are now quite different from those of early Hebrew times, and the restriction is prob-

ably a disadvantage. In modern times any person fitted by education and religious aspiration should, if he so desires, be admitted to perform the functions of religious leadership. Reform Jews have challenged the exclusive claims of the Aaronic priesthood.

The Conference at Philadelphia adopted the view that: "The Aaronic priesthood and the Mosaic sacrificial cult were preparatory steps to the real priesthood of the whole people, which began with the dispersion of the Jews, and to the sacrifice of sincere devotion and moral sanctification, which alone are pleasing and acceptable to the Most Holy."³¹ Liberal Judaism claims to be a "priestless religion," in the sense that no particular person either through hereditary descent or through ordination, is needed as a mediator between God and man. It is also urged that "Judaism is a world religion, not a tribal or racial religion. Its teachings are intended for all mankind."³² It may, of course, be asked whether Jewish teachers are presenting it as such.

Within recent years there have been many attempts to improve the relations between Jews and Christians. "Let us dispose once for all of any 'religious issue' in the whole matter," says Frank Gavin. "True Judaism is no more anti-Christian than true Christianity is anti-Jewish. No more warrant can be found in Hillel's than in Jesus' teaching for antagonism or hatred. Any Jew who falls back on his religion to vindicate his prejudice against Christians is as disloyal and unfaithful a Jew as the Christian who does likewise is a disloyal and unfaithful Christian." . . . "There is no religious ground for anti-Jewish or anti-Christian prejudices."³³ There is much in the volume from which this is quoted which breathes the spirit underlying this passage, yet in the main it tends to ignore differences which the majority of Jews on one side and of Christians on the other regard of significance and importance. Mr. Karpeles quotes Professor Berner, a Protestant, as follows:

"Judaism in its religious separateness has done humanity the greatest service. The religion of the future will be a Christianity from which all dogmatic padding and polytheistic alloy will have been removed, and which will be refined into pure monotheism by the renewed intervention of Judaism."⁸⁴

Certain liberal Jewish scholars have endeavored to recognize the value and worth of Jesus and his teaching. Nevertheless, even if Jews could come to regard him as the most eminent personality in Jewish history, it would seem to be in opposition with the tradition of Judaism to give him the central place in its world view.

Jews and Christians might unite on the basis of their acceptance of ideas of spiritual deity, of human freedom and moral responsibility, and of immortality. The Jew has his own places of religious assembly and his own forms of ritual and of religious ceremonies: these tend to weld Jews into a distinctive group. But similar conditions constitute important factors in the separation of Christians into different denominations. It is nevertheless true that the Jew has always been accredited with social exclusiveness. Intermarriage with non-Jews in Biblical times was opposed as tending to lead Jews to the worship of "false gods," in other words to contamination of their religion. In certain notable instances of Jewish kings this is definitely alleged to have happened. Today while such exclusiveness is made a matter of criticism by some Jewish leaders, others urge that intermarriage between Jews and non-Jews are far too many.

The movement in Judaism referred to in this chapter as Liberal Judaism developed during the nineteenth century under the influence of the modern intellectual advance. It has aimed at a re-statement of Judaism, emancipating it from obsolete ideas and superstitious practices. Its motive has been essentially religious and it has endeavored to fight against modern tendencies to naturalism and pantheism, secularism and agnosticism.

"Although the Jewish reform movement had its inception in Germany and that country will always be looked upon as its birthplace, yet this movement found its full, free, and logical development in the United States."³⁵ It has been said that Judaism is experiencing a rebirth in America.

In essence Judaism is essentially an ethical and personal Theism. Some modern Jews have raised the question why they should not simply describe their religion as such and abandon the specific name of Judaism. In answer they point to their continuation of a long religious tradition, the literature, and many of the practices of which they still adhere to. Living religion is not simply an experience or set of experiences corresponding with a particular form of philosophical or theological theory of life and existence. It is itself part of a continuous historical life. The religion of modern liberal Jews is still predominantly a continuance of the historical religion of their forefathers. In the Jewish community the emotional attitudes and feelings are transmitted as always by a kind of personal contagion. By the force of tradition as well as by the manner of their religious reaction they are wedded, and surely not irrationally, to their ancient religious literature and to forms of traditional ceremonies which have come to be for them definite means of expression hallowed by their associations.

Further, some of their leaders still hold to the belief that Jews have a religious mission to mankind. "Till the main religious and moral principles of Judaism have been accepted by the world at large, the maintenance by the Jews of a separate corporate existence is a religious duty incumbent upon them." The mission seems none the less imperative since a large portion of mankind has been converted to monotheism by Christianity and Islām.³⁶ Liberal Jews believe that they have tasks to fulfill even with relation to these two religions. The

belief in a special mission has traditionally been associated in the minds of orthodox Jews with the establishment of the Messianic kingdom. Within the last few decades that idea has been brought into relation with a movement for setting up again a definite national Jewish home in their ancient country of Palestine. Differences on this aim have been said to constitute the real pivot of the opposition of conservative and liberal Jews.

Zionism, the movement for establishing a national home for the Jews in Palestine, has been advocated as giving a center and means for the unification of Jewry. It has political and cultural aims, and it is maintained that it should also be beneficial to the continuance and expression of Judaism as a religion. "The Jewish religion," says Dr. Gottheil, "must be reconstituted upon modern lines. Embodied in a physical center, and that center illumined by a rekindled light, it will serve as a point toward which the thoughts, aspirations, and longings of the Diaspora Jews will converge, and from which they will draw, each in his own measure, that sufficiency of moral and religious strength that will better enable them to resist the encroachments of their surroundings. . . . The Reform Jew, with his ideal of a mission, could carry forward that mission in the future as he has in the past." He criticizes Reform Jews for their luke-warmness and frequent opposition to Zionism. "If the Jews are really to follow the ideal traced out for them by the greatest of their teachers, and become a peculiar people in the sense of 'exemplars of righteousness,' they must be enabled to live unfettered and to 'develop along their own lines; as one of the social units of humanity.' " "From whatever point of view we regard the situation, the unity of Israel must be restored."⁸⁷

Liberal Judaism rejects the nationalistic conception. It regards the Jews primarily not as a nation or race but as a religious community. There is no ground for regarding the ideas of a coming Messiah and the Messianic

kingdom as other than poetic fantasies born of the longings of the people. There is no adequate reason for the view that these ideas must correspond to an eventual reality. The Messianic hope is just one form in which Jews have pictured a triumph of good over evil, especially the evil of their political subjugation in earlier times and in some countries today. Liberal Judaism looks upon the loss of nationality and the dispersion of the Jews throughout the world as not a calamity but as a providential means by which they may be witnesses to God and carry out a religious mission to mankind in all parts of the world.

Instead of a Messianic state in Palestine modern liberal Jews look forward to a Messianic *age* in which truth and justice, peace and goodwill shall be established among all men, when "the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord." "It is this Messianic vision, the creation of the Jewish Soul, that influences also the thinking men and women of our modern age. 'For,' again to quote the words of the sainted Israel Friedländer, 'however insistently cold scientific speculation may remind us of the blind brutal laws of nature; however emphatically modern philosophic thought may repudiate a world view which is based upon the pursuit of human happiness, at the very bottom of our souls there still persists the saving belief in a Messianic future when the earth will no more be full of injustice and when humanity will be governed by the ideals of justice and righteousness.' " ⁸⁸

Liberal Judaism, the expression of the religion of Israel arrived at through the work of modern Jewish scholars, is simple and dignified. It arose from the intellectualistic tendency in Judaism, coming into being with the dawning consciousness that religion is subject to the law of adaptation to life, that while some of its manifestations are primary, essential, and vital, others are secondary and non-essential; and that

"the dead branches must be pruned in order to promote the growth of the tree of Judaism. The consequent revaluation of the ancestral faith affected not only its creedal foundations but also its practices, ritual, and ceremonies."

✓ In its essence, viewed in the light of modern thought, Judaism, says Dr. Cohon, "sums up the profoundest truths of the world's religions and philosophies on life's deepest problems, and stamps with its genius the conceptions of God, the soul, duty, and faith. Thus Judaism is an ever-growing body of spiritual values, centering around the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, held together as a historical entity by its close contact with the Jewish people. As an unbroken chain of tradition, Judaism links all the generations of Israel. Entering into every phase of their thought and conduct, it has earned for itself the title of the 'Religion of Life.' Planning for the future, it does not overlook the present; dreaming of heaven, it does not forget the earth. Striving after social welfare, it seeks the establishment of the Kingdom of God."⁸⁹ Though Liberal Judaism arose in association with modern rationalistic tendencies, it is not divorced from ethical fervor or mystical emotion.

Liberal Judaism has its critics, not so much perhaps on the side of its intellectual expression as of its practical effects. "Perhaps the most serious objection that can be raised to some of the later developments of the Reform movement is that they are destroying the unity that has hitherto prevailed in the corporate expression of Jewish practice and Jewish hope. Violent changes have been made in the ritual, and the Jewish perspective has been remodeled in such a manner as to make the remodeling a renunciation."⁴⁰ It is contended that it has lost its character as an insurgent force; that it has become itself dogmatic, and fails to arouse response in modern youth. Though it is admitted that it champions the religion of the spirit as distinct from that of "the

letter of the Law," it is accused of giving too much attention to the past. "Assuming the validity of the ethical and spiritual teachings of the past, it invokes them as the answer to the questions of the present." It stands for ethical uniformity whereas the present age calls for the recognition of ethical diversity. Objection is made to its "ultra-positive assertion of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul." Its very attitude of certainty is described as repellent.

The doctrine of the special mission of Israel is criticized. "The conception of a religious mission for Israel in the sense of bringing the peoples of the world to admit the unity of God is untenable."⁴¹ Jews are to fit themselves for cooperation with others, and not to assume the right to be their guides.

Detailed criticism of Reformed or Liberal Judaism has been made more recently by Mr. Kaplan in the course of an elaborate exposition of Judaism as not simply a religion but a civilization, a specific culture. Apparently its chief fault is that it has "repudiated Jewish nationhood." But further he charges it with spiritual poverty and sterility, with having no more than a colorless, uninspiring ethics, with not having stimulated any intellectual or moral activity of a high order. The Reformers' idea of Israel's religious mission he regards as based on a fanciful idealization of the Jewish people. It appears to him an objection to the conservative Reformism as typified by Morris Joseph that its idea of God is one "to which any Theist might subscribe."

But Mr. Kaplan's main objection to conservative Reformism may be said again to be that it, also, does not emphasize Jewish nationhood. "The Judaism to which Conservative Reformism asks the Jew to be loyal is nothing more than the memory of a people that once had a body but is now a mere haunting ghost." The Liberal, the Conservative Reformers, and the Orthodox "hold in common the assumption that Jews differ from

non-Jews essentially in the matter of religion." "There is little to choose between the Conservatism which is a timid Reformism and the Conservatism which is a tepid orthodoxy."

The serious charge is made that none of these has anything to contribute to the most vital issues confronting the Jews today. To meet those issues it is necessary to conceive of Judaism in detail as a social heritage with characteristic usages, ideas, standards, and codes differentiating and individualizing the character of Jews as distinct from other peoples; and along with this to restore the national status of the Jews with a localized center in a Jewish national home in Palestine. "This individuality the Jew knows from within. It is an immediate and untransferable experience." But we come back finally to religion. Mr. Kaplan insists that it is but one element in a civilization, but he admits that "it is the most self-conscious one and therefore the truest index of its character." In view of the need of revitalizing Jewish tradition, "religion must continue to be the central identifying characteristic of Jewish civilization."⁴²

It would not be unreasonable to expect Jewish thinkers to raise the question whether Mr. Kaplan's conception of God as the central idea of Jewish religion is actually in conformity with religion in the historic development of Jewish culture which he so ably champions. It sounds more like contemporary attempts to give religious expression to modern naturalism. With the question whether there is a specific Jewish culture and whether the development of Jewish nationhood would help to overcome the social difficulties of the Diaspora Jews we are not here concerned, but in spite of all Mr. Kaplan urges we may expect the future of Judaism as a religion for enlightened Jews to be a development along the lines of scholarship as practiced by the leaders of the Reform movement.

JUDAISM

The principles of Reformed Judaism have been formulated in the following terms. "The world and humanity are under the guidance of God, who reveals Himself to men in history as the supreme power unto righteousness, as the educator and father of His children, the whole human family. God has appointed Israel to be His witness on earth . . . by its life to lead the world to the recognition of the truth that love and justice and righteousness are the only principles which can establish peace among men and fill man's life with blissful harmony . . . Every human being is God's child called to lead and capable of leading a righteous life. The Israelite has no greater privilege but greater obligation. The goal of Israel's history is the rise of a more perfect humanity in which Jewish love for God and man shall be universalized."⁴³ "Judaism is rational, for its fundamental doctrines are in accord with human intelligence. These are the unity of God and the unity of mankind, which forms a common brotherhood even as the Deity is the Father of all races and creeds. Its ideal is universal peace and righteousness, to be brought about by the gradual diffusion of justice, kindness, and humility. Its aim is the attainment of the perfect life among its adherents whom its rites and ceremonies have in view and to which they are subordinated. . . . It seeks no proselytes: all who lead pious lives, whatever their creed or race, inherit eternal bliss, is its traditional saying."⁴⁴

In the Psalms, in the book of Job, and in their history the Jews have been intimately concerned with the problem of suffering. Nevertheless, it seems true to say that Liberal Judaism has failed in no small measure to appreciate the problem. As a consequence it does not impress one as profound or adapted to the more poignant experiences of life. It appears to have been originally developed, as it is still maintained, by Jews in good pecuniary circumstances and of rationalistic

education. It has too much of the character of the eighteenth century insistence predominantly on the ideas of God, immortality, and moral freedom, and has not sufficiently emphasized the side of devotion. In general, Liberal Judaism needs to fill out its scheme of ideas with some of these elements of traditional Jewish religion which it has neglected. "The resuscitation of devotional Judaism would also give the Jew of today, as it did to the Jew of past generations, a spiritual bulwark against the exigencies of life." ⁴⁵

CHAPTER VIII

ISLĀM AND BAHĀISM

No religion has aroused a fiercer opposition on the part of Christendom than that of the Moslems. After having largely overthrown the Christianity of northern Africa, their conquests led Moslems right into Europe. If they had succeeded in dominating Europe politically, the relative history of Christianity and Islām, as religions, might have been very different. The Moslem advance was held in check in France and to the east of Austria. Eventually driven from Spain, they still retain their hold in Turkey. The conflict now is of a different kind. There is a simplicity about this religion, and when Moslems have allied themselves definitely with modern culture, Islām may make a bid for the allegiance of the modern world. It has much of the character of Occidental Unitarianism, and is in the main free from the kinds of dogmas which are being neglected or definitely discarded by the Christian world.

Formerly there was a tendency among Occidental writers to say that Islām could not adapt itself to modern conditions: the course of events is belying them. Dr. Stanley Lane-Poole speaking of reform in 1903 said: "I hope it may be possible, but I feel little confidence in it."¹ Lord Cromer dogmatically asserted: "Islām cannot be reformed: reformed Islām is Islām no longer."² Nevertheless, as the more sympathetic W. S. Blunt had maintained in 1885: "The fact is, Islām does move."³ M. E. Montet looks upon the single fact of the development of the Moslem press as evidence that Moslems have entered the stream of modern civilization. Dr. Zwemer, an ardent Christian missionary to Moslems, reported in 1911: "Intellectu-

ally also a revival on modern lines has taken place among the Moslems of China.”⁴

Similarly the World Missionary Conference Report of 1910 admitted that: “The remarkable though widely divergent reform movements in Indian Muhammedanism are evidence that beneath the seeming lifeless surface of Islām, there are yet processes of fermentation going on.”⁵ An Indian Moslem, Dr. Iqbal, asserts that: “The most remarkable phenomenon of modern history, is the enormous rapidity with which the world of Islām is spiritually moving toward the West.”⁶ “The Moslem peoples,” writes Dr. Gibb, after a wide survey, “remain deeply attached to the religion of Islām and intensely convinced of its superiority. . . . The vital forces of Islām as a creed, as a rule of life, and as an ethical system remain unimpaired.”⁷ The more liberal tendencies of modern Islām may be traced to one or more of three influences: the Wahhābī movement⁸ (though this itself had little sympathy with Occidental civilization); movements associated with the idea of the Imāmat; and to the influences of modern scholarship.

Moslems do not approve of calling their religion Muhammedanism. Highly as they revere their Prophet, they do not give his name to the religion, which they call Islām. Islām is peace: the religion of that peace, confidence, and goodness, which comes in and through submission to the will of God. A recent Moslem writer says: “A Moslem, according to the Qurān is he who has made his peace with God and man.”⁹

Islām is the latest great religion to be founded in the world. That it owed much in its inception to Judaism and Christianity cannot reasonably be doubted. Both are recognized as “religions of a book,” that is, as divine revelations. As such they are in line with Islām which is regarded as the culmination of such

religions. The prophets of Israel and the founder of Christianity are looked on as forerunners leading up to Muhammed. He was the "Seal of the Prophets." The revelation through him being considered a complete and perfect revelation, from the Moslem point of view there is no ground for expecting a greater than he.

No religion has arisen simply from the teaching and influence of one dominant personality. All great religions have in part grown out of and made use of much in the contemporary conditions and from historic tradition. Nevertheless, the importance of the founders can scarcely be over-estimated. So far no one has seriously contended that Muhammed was not historically real, although comparatively little is known about him. He is supposed to have been born in Mecca in 570-1 A.D. Left an orphan at an early age, he was brought up by his uncle Abū Tālib. Tradition says that he received very little education and has given him the description of the "Unlearned Prophet." This is meant to support the belief that the content of the Qurān could not have been his own composition. While young he learned much by practical experience in his journeys with his uncle's caravans. He was influenced by and came to share the impressive austerity of the Arab nomads.

At the age of thirty-five, Muhammed became the servant of a woman of wealth, Khadijah, taking charge of her caravan. The character of "the Trusty" which tradition gives to him conforms well with her decision to be married to him. Thereafter he spent much time in meditation on Mt. Hirā not far from Mecca. There, in or about the fortieth year of his life, he believed a voice came to him calling to him to receive the revelation. Afraid that he might be suffering from self-delusion, he sought the advice of Khadijah who exhorted him to faith. When later he was again called, he

gained confidence and went forth to spread the message he thought he was charged with. His immediate disciples were from among his friends. He succeeded in gaining converts in Yathrib, and when the opposition to him at Mecca became so fierce that he was in danger of losing his life, he fled to Yathrib with Abū Bakr. Eventually he became the chief magistrate of that city, which later became known as Medina.

The flight to Medina represented a turning point in his life and in the fortunes of Islām. It occurred in 622 A.D. from which year the Moslem era is counted. He set himself to teach and to organize his followers. After eight or nine years of exile from Mecca, he attained sufficient support to capture it. Moslems maintain that he took up the sword to defend himself and his disciples from attacks by the Meccans and other tribes. Established in Mecca he continued to preach the religion and to recite the revelations. Little by little the pilgrims who came to the Kaabah and the merchants who came to Mecca with their caravans were won over. They carried the religion back to their tribes and the movement spread widely. Muhammed purged Mecca of idolatry. Gradually his teaching and organization brought harmony among the conflicting Arab tribes, and he became virtually the ruler of a vast country. As such he sent letters to rulers of neighboring kingdoms calling on them to embrace Islām. The treatment alleged to have been accorded to some of his emissaries is accepted by Moslems as one reason for the earliest Moslem wars of conquest; another being the marauding incursions of surrounding peoples into Moslem territory. His death is supposed to have occurred in about 633 A.D. at the age of sixty-three.

Descriptions of the character of Muhammed have

differed widely according as they have come from his followers or from his opponents. For an understanding of Islām in our day and in most of its past ages, it is chiefly important to know how his adherents have regarded and still regard him. That there has been much idealization—as with all the great founders of religions—can hardly be doubted. Thus in the *Mish-kāt*, it is recorded that when at the height of his power, the virtual ruler of Arabia, “he visited the sick, followed any bier he met, accepted the invitation of the lowliest, mended his own clothes, milked his goats, and waited upon himself. He never first withdrew his hand out of another’s clasp and turned not before the other had turned. His hand was the most generous, his breast the most courageous, his tongue the most truthful; those who saw him were filled with reverence, those who came near him loved him. Modesty and kindness, patience, self-denial, and generosity pervaded his conduct and riveted the affections of all around him. With the bereaved and afflicted he sympathized tenderly . . . he would stop in the streets listening to the sorrows of the humblest. He would go to the houses of the lowliest to console the stricken and comfort the heartbroken.”¹⁰

Moslems in our own day write: “Well may we claim for Muhammed the perfection of a perfect model for human guidance.” The varied experiences of the Prophet are said to furnish the best rules of conduct in all the different phases of human life. “One who follows Muhammed can become a perfect image of God, because Muhammed follows completely all the laws of God.” “Muhammed is the only glorious illustration of true spirituality” in daily life. “We recognize in him the most perfect figure in the history of man.” Whatever the truth of history may be, it cannot be doubted that some such conception of Muhammed and a love for him have been and still

are regarded as vital for the religion of most Moslems.¹¹

There have been other developments of thought about the person of Muhammed. Among the Sūfis his personality was sometimes described in the manner of the Christ of the Logos doctrine. The conception of Muhammed as the perfect man was taken as meaning much more than the term immediately suggests, being given a distinctly metaphysical implication. In the words of Goldzieher, the Perfect Man is a "microcosm of a higher order (who) reflects not only the powers of nature but also the divine powers 'as in a mirror.'" "God and man," says Dr. Nicholson, "become one in the Perfect Man—the enraptured prophet or saint—whose religious function as a mediator between God and man corresponds with his metaphysical function as the unifying principle by means of which the opposed terms of reality and appearance are harmonized." But though at supreme moments "a man may lose himself in God, he can never be identified with God absolutely."¹²

Islām more than any other religion is a religion of a sacred book. To orthodox believers the Qurān is literally a revelation from God, and indeed His final and perfect revelation. A recent writer has said of it: "Time and space do not govern the Qurān, it is the one thing independent of their universal sway." It is alleged to contain no contradictions, and that from its first writing till now it has suffered no textual corruption—Allāh guarding it from any such acquired defect. Arabic, in which it is written is said to be the most eloquent of languages. It is thought to be a sign of the nature of the Qurān as a revelation that Arabic is still a living tongue, unlike the original languages of most other important sacred books.

The possession of such a revelation does not settle all the difficulties of the problem of a secure source of religious knowledge. There is still the possibility of

error through wrong interpretation. To help in part to guard against this, orthodox Moslems have turned to the *Sunnat* or customs of the Prophet and to the *Hadīth*, or traditions. The life of the Prophet is looked upon as the best commentary on the Qurān. For the traditions two great authorities are generally accepted, Moslem and Bukhārī, and for the life of the Prophet, Ibn Isham and Ibn Ishāq. Four great orthodox schools of interpretation arose, those of Abū Hanīfah, Mālik, Shāfiī, and Hanbal. Besides these helps to interpretation appeal may be made to the collective opinion of leading moulvis, or Moslem theologians. As existing political and other conditions make it practically impossible to obtain any universal moulvi opinion, the decision or *fatwā* of any body of moulvis carries weight chiefly in their own sects and geographical areas.

It is difficult, even today, to find Moslem thinkers who have abandoned the orthodox view of the Qurān.¹³ There are few signs among Moslems of the study of the Qurān with modern scientific and literary methods such as have been applied by Jewish and Christian scholars to the Bible. An attempt with such methods to analyze the contents of the Qurān and to investigate its construction and growth is urgently needed among Moslems: but that would involve a definite change of view with reference to the nature of the book as a revelation. The present position differs little, if at all, from that described in 1885 by W. S. Blunt: "The great difficulty which, as things now stand, besets reform is this: the Shariat or written code of law still stands in orthodox Islām as an unimpeachable authority."¹⁴ Syed Ameer Ali was prepared to admit that the teachings of the Prophet show a development. "A careful study of the Qurān makes it evident that the mind of Muhammed went through the same process of development which marked the religious

consciousness of Jesus.”¹⁵ And he maintained that much in the particular forms of the beliefs and practices taught in the Qurān is relative to the time in which they were promulgated. Syed Ahmed Khān, the Indian reformer, who probably still retained belief in the finality of the Qurān, tended nevertheless to admit a human element in it. Yet writing of modern Egypt, Dr. Adams says: “The character of the Qurān as divine revelation, infallibly inspired in every particular is always insisted on.”¹⁶ That appears to be the almost universal attitude throughout the Moslem world.

In spite of this prevailing dogmatic attitude with reference to the Qurān, it must not be supposed that the possibility of reform and of expression of Islām in terms of modern thought are thereby ruled out. Results in these directions have been obtained through interpretation. The individual may claim the right and the responsibility of judging the meaning of the Qurān for himself.

There is a general call among modernists: Back to the Qurān. It alone is to be regarded as authoritative: acceptance of the systems of Al Shāfiī, Mālik, Abū Hanīfah, or Hanbal is a purely voluntary matter and is not essential. The recognition of the right of individual interpretation, as distinct from acquiescence in the traditional orthodox schools, is a definite mark of liberal tendencies of thought. Another method of modern liberal Moslems may be seen in the pages of the *Islamic Review*, which aids the movement toward progress by the well-known and obvious method of putting attention on what is of value for modern thought and life, and attempting to present the “spirit” of Islām rather than the mere letter of the Qurān. This has been in large measure a simplification. The Egyptian reformer Muhammed Abduh sought the simplest and most essential form of Islām and from its inauguration the periodical, *Al Manār*, has main-

tained that Islām degenerated because it departed from its early simplicity.¹⁷ Yet some modern Ahmadīs still assert: "We are unable to account for the Holy Quran being so far above comparison with any system of philosophy or well reasoned thesis of a theologian, unless we acknowledge that its author is the All-intelligent Being."¹⁸ And Muhammed Abduh who taught a view of revelation as progressive still maintained that Muhammed was the last, the greatest, the Seal of the prophets, and with him revelation came to an end.

The fundamental conception of Islām is that of God as one. The first of the five pillars of Islām is the *kalimah*, the creed: There is no God but Allāh, and Muhammed is the messenger of God. This should be the first thing whispered into the ear of a newborn child and the last thing said to the dying. Every Moslem should say it at least once in his lifetime. The worst of all sins is that of *Shirk*, or associating others with God. The insistence on divine unity is not simply a matter of intellect: it rests on the conviction that religious loyalty should not be divided, that God demands the entire service of man. For man is thought of, not under terms of kinship with God as son but as called to be a loving and obedient servant to a merciful and beneficent, though austere Master.

The attributes ascribed to Allāh show him to be conceived as personal. The language used in the Qurān is not unduly anthropomorphic—no more so than is found in many other religious literatures. The commandment against making images of God, and the intense opposition to idolatry, have done something to guard against a physical anthropomorphism. They have also tended to keep the mind on the spiritual attributes as the content of the idea of God. The chief of these attributes are expressed in the *Bismillah*, which opens every chapter of the Qurān, and is frequently on the lips of Moslems: "In the name of Allāh, the Com-

passionate, the Merciful." Sometimes the greatness and the power of Allāh have tended to overshadow the attributes of compassion and mercy, and an overwhelming dread of divine retribution has been engendered. Nevertheless, an enumeration of the names applied to Allāh is sufficient to show that in spite of the contentions of Christian critics of Islām such implied harshness is not the dominant character of the presentation. Among them are: the Great, the Almighty, the All just, the Creator, the Wise, the True, the Swift-in-reckoning, the Holy, the Peaceful, the Guardian over his servants, the Shelterer of the orphan, the Guide of the erring, the Deliverer from every affliction, the Friend, the Consoler, the Compassionate, the Very-forgiving.

The Moslem conception of God has not undergone any radical change among modern Moslem thinkers. There is a change of emphasis away from some exaggeration of the divine power which had become common among Moslems. It is now insisted that "mercy is His chief attribute." "A belief in the unity, power, mercy, and supreme love of the Creator is the cardinal principle of Islām." All such terms have significance only with reference to a personal spirit. In orthodox Islām there has been comparatively little confusion of God and the world, though in Sūfī literature there are some tendencies in that direction. The unity of God was interpreted by some Sūfīs in such a manner as to exclude the reality of all else. But even in Sūfī forms of religious expression personal elements remain in the emotions implied.¹⁹

Most non-Moslem descriptions of Islām have presented it as essentially harsh and formal. Close contact with Moslems, and the perusal of Moslem literature do not produce that impression. The error arises in part through lack of recognition that a certain element of mysticism is a factor in ordinary Moslem life and is not

restricted to the specifically Sūfī saints. The unprejudiced observer of Moslems cannot but subscribe to the statement made by Dr. Nicholson: "Mysticism is such a vital element in Islām that without some understanding of its ideas, and of the form which they assume, we should seek in vain to penetrate below the surface of Muhammedan religious life."²⁰

The Sūfī movement has been very wide and very varied. Consequently, it is unjust to characterize it solely by forms of expression used by extremists among its exponents. In theory Al Hallāj may have been expressing the logical conclusion in maintaining that the perfect unity of deity involved his identity with Him, nevertheless, when he said: "I am God" the orthodox executed him. It is not from the standpoint of its theoretical expressions that Sūfīism should be primarily considered: its original motive was one of feeling. It meant a cultivation of an intimate love of God which is far more fundamental than any of the formal statements of Moslem doctrine or any of its practices. Some Sūfīs estimated these latter as of such little worth that they might be dispensed with entirely.

The opposition of orthodoxy and of Sūfīism was to a large degree reconciled by the work of Al Ghazālī, who died in A.D. 1111. A great scholar of orthodox theology and law, he resigned from his position in the university of Baghdad, and turned to the cultivation of the love of God as stressed by the Sūfīs. He rejected their pantheistic forms of expression and their contempt for orthodox Islamic practices. As against the formalism of orthodox Islām he taught religion as an inner intuitive life of the soul. He presented the dominant attitude of love of God as a normal element in the religious life of Islām. Modern movements have a close association with the position of Al Ghazālī, "especially in the spirit which dominates the whole conception of the religious life as something inward and vital, an affair of the

heart.”²¹ Many Moslems give the impression of religious peace and a bliss suggesting that this attitude is fundamental for them. The literature of Sūfīism contains some of the most impressive utterances of Islām. What is important in them is not the particular ideas but their tone of an intimate relationship with God.

The Sūfīs grasped the truth that knowledge of God is not primarily a matter of the rational intellect: that a man who accepts the idea of God as a speculative hypothesis may be actually in no sense religious. “There is no reliance on the faith of him who believes on the ground of proofs, says Ibn Arabī, for his faith is based on speculation, and on this account is open to objection. Intuitive faith which is set in the heart and is impossible to refute is quite different. All knowledge resting on reflection and speculation is insecure against doubt and confusion.”²² Consequently the tone and spirit of Sūfīism is seen better in such a passage as the following than in its more philosophical discussions:

“This is love: to fly heavenward,
To rend, every instant, a hundred veils;
The first moment to renounce life;
The last step to fare without feet.”²³

One of the most difficult problems which have troubled both Moslem and non-Moslem students of the Qurān concerns its teachings as to the nature of man. A recent Moslem writer says: “Man, according to the teachings of the Prophet Muhammed, enters the world with an immaculate nature, free from sin and willing to abide by the law. He comes equipped with the highest capabilities to make unlimited progress.” But after his entry, is he free or predestined? It may with good grounds be maintained that the views of predestination and of determinism have prevailed widely among orthodox Moslems, impressed as they have so often been by the overwhelming power of God. That this has

been so is suggested by the attempts of modern Moslems to counteract such a tendency of thought. In an account purporting to be a report of a conference held not many years ago at Mecca, the belief in predestination was criticized as paralyzing energy and as having a numbing effect. Dr. Gibb suggests that the attitude of "political quietism" has not been entirely due to belief in fatalism, but that fatalism has itself been partly due to political changes and poverty.²⁴

At a Moslem educational conference at Delhi at the time of the 1911 durbar, the Āgā Khān as president maintained in a speech: "no fair or reasonably minded person who has read the Qurān can for a moment doubt that freedom of the will and individual human responsibility are there insisted upon, but Abdul Hasan al-Ashāri—whose piety and wisdom cannot be doubted—has placed the stamp of his unfortunately applied but great genius on Islām and given to Moslem thought that fatal fatalism which discourages effort and which has undoubtedly been one of the principal causes of the non-progressive spirit of modern Islām."²⁵ There has been endless controversy on this subject between the philosophers of Islām. Both determinism and the freedom and responsibility of man are taught in the Qurān. If a scientific and historical view of the Qurān is adopted, so that it is not looked upon as a perfect revelation from God, it is reasonable to urge that one should not expect to find in it statements on this problem showing philosophical and metaphysical precision. On the other hand, even modern philosophy justifies (at least as much as it justifies any theory) the view that though man has some freedom, there are limitations in the scope for its exercise and these limitations constitute elements of determinism. So it might be contended that the Qurān in implying both freedom and determinism is more in accordance with facts than if it taught simply one of these.

Muhammed Abduh has given a Moslem description

of man created surrounded by passions, encompassed by desires, shackled by purposes, a captive in their power . . . unable to overcome them or free himself from them, thus appearing a creature of contradictions. By the power of his reason he ascends to the highest planes of the world of the Unseen, and with his thought reaches up to the most elevated truths concerning the world of Divine Omnipotence. Though he matches his powers against the great forces of the universe, he also belittles himself and cowers and abases himself to the lowest degree of humiliation and submission whenever any matter presents itself to him the cause of which he does not know, or the origin of which he does not comprehend.²⁶

Orthodox Islām includes belief in a resurrection of the dead and in a final judgment of mankind. Accounts of the resurrection describe it as preceded by many signs as fantastic as those found in some of the Jewish and Christian apocalypses. Both men and animals rise again. At the last judgment those to be admitted to paradise will be gathered on the right hand and those to be sent to perdition on the left. A belief arose giving the Prophet a special part in the final things: that after Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, and Jesus have all been found unable to intercede successfully with God, the Prophet will ask and receive permission and will pray for Moslems. Infidels alone will suffer eternally.

In modern times—and often in earlier times also—a spiritual interpretation has been given to the sayings of the Qurān concerning the last things. Ameer Ali writes: "There is no doubt that the Suras of the intermediate period, before the mind of the Teacher had attained full development of religious consciousness, and when it was necessary to formulate in language intelligible to the common folk of the desert, the realistic descriptions of heaven and hell borrowed from

the floating fancies of Zoroastrian, Sabea, and Talmudic Jew, attract the attention as a side picture: then comes the real essence—the adoration of God in humility and love.”

Though not very pronounced there is a tendency to replace the orthodox ideas of resurrection by a view of spiritual immortality and to modify the connotation of the terms heaven and hell accordingly. “Heaven and Hell are states not localities . . . Hell in the words of the Qurān, is ‘God’s kindled fire which mounts above the hearts’—the painful realization of one’s failure as a man. Heaven is the joy of triumph over the forces of disintegration. . . . Man marches always onward to receive ever fresh illuminations from an Infinite Reality.”²⁷ Punishment ends when its purpose of purifying man from what hinders spiritual progress is achieved. The Quranic account of the delights of paradise is to be regarded as only figurative.

Dr. Iqbal, who interprets Islām from the standpoint of a wide knowledge of modern philosophy gives an exposition of its implications concerning immortality. “Whatever may be the final fate of man it does not mean the loss of individuality. The Qurān does not contemplate complete liberation from finitude as the highest state of human bliss. The ‘unceasing reward’ of man consists in his gradual growth in self-possession, in uniqueness and intensity of his activity of an ego.” “It is only as an evergrowing ego that he can belong to the meaning of the universe.” “It is highly improbable that a being whose evolution has taken millions of years should be thrown away as a thing of no use.” “Personal immortality is not ours as of right: it is to be achieved by personal effort. Man is only a candidate for it.” “The resurrection is not an external event. It is the consummation of a life process within the ego.” He regards it as clear that the Qurān teaches that the ego has a beginning in time, that after death

it is not re-incarnated, and that finitude is not a misfortune.²⁸

The essential practices of Islām are included in what are called the five pillars. The first of these, the *kalimah*, the profession of faith in God and the Prophet has already been referred to. The second is prayer. In spite of much apparent formalism there seems sufficient evidence to assert that the widespread practice of prayer has had a marked effect on the character of Moslem peoples. "Prayer is the essence of man's duties toward God." Islām has made it a constant and regular discipline. Islām is the religion of prayer. The call to prayer is made with impressive voice from a turret of the mosque, five times a day. Before prayer, if possible, ceremonial purification should be performed, for it is wrong to appear unclean before God. The face is turned toward Mecca, thus symbolizing Moslem unity of faith. The twelve poses during prayer include the positions of the hands in attitudes of adoration and supplication; bowing with the feeling of submission, and prostration in humility and abasement before the power of Allāh. These actions in prayer have influences upon the emotional disposition.

Islām is not as such an ascetic form of religion. Nevertheless, it includes fasting among the five pillars. Fasting is enjoined as a means of discipline and purification of the soul. It is described by modern educated Moslems as abstinence from anything which might unduly interfere with a closer religious communion with God. The traditional period for fasting is the month of Ramadhān. Another of the five pillars is almsgiving. Formerly this was of two kinds, legal and voluntary. Originally the legal alms were collected by the Prophet and his helpers, and used for the benefit of the poor. It came to be estimated as a fortieth of one's possessions to be paid once a year. Owing to political changes this "poor rate" is now more or

less voluntary. The other form of almsgiving, traditionally voluntary, includes all alms not included in the "poor rate." Some modern Moslem writers claim that this definite requirement of almsgiving constitutes one of the ways in which Islām excels other religions.

The pilgrimage to Mecca is the last of the five pillars of Islām. This is a continuance of the pre-Islamic practice of pilgrimage to the Kaabah, though with the eradication of idolatry and some primitive rites. When nearing Mecca, or even at a long distance from it, the pilgrim assumes a special robe and remains unshaven. Thus an external appearance of equality is obtained. He performs various ablutions, visits the mosque, touches with his right hand and kisses the black stone. Ascending Mt. Safā he praises God and asks for forgiveness of his sins, and then climbs seven times up the hill of Marwah. In the twelfth month, the special time for the pilgrimage, there are more elaborate exercises. The pilgrimage has been explained in allegorical fashion by Sūfīs and other Moslem teachers, as referring rather to an inner spiritual journey. The pilgrimage to Mecca has had a great effect in bringing a consciousness of unity among Moslems from all parts of the world. The belief often associated with it, that the performance of it is "sufficient atonement for the sins, excesses, and incontinencies of a life-time" has been described by a modern Moslem as "a caricature" and "a travesty" of Islām.²⁹

Dhikr, meditation or remembrance, is associated with the Quranic injunction: "Remember Allāh and praise him morning and evening." It may take various forms: sometimes it is intense meditation on God; sometimes merely the repetition of the names of God and of certain phrases. Man is to withdraw his thought from himself and all other things, and at the highest stage realize the fulness of meaning of the belief: There is not God but Allāh. Among the religious orders pre-

liminary aids (as in Hindu yogic practices) such as forms of deep breathing have been resorted to in order to induce physical conditions thought best for attaining an ecstatic feeling of unity with God. To the question asked in recent times whether Moslems should introduce music and the singing of hymns into their religious worship, it has been replied by a Moslem that "instrumental music in the churches tends to play upon the emotions and produces religious feeling of an unstable and emotional type, not quiet communion which is permanent."⁸⁰ Such communion is essentially what is implied by *dhikr*.

Islām is an ethical religion, but it is difficult to find any one principle which is paramount. In practice it has manifested a democratic attitude more conspicuously than any other religion: all Moslems being equal brothers in the faith. "This is the Islām of Muhammad," says Ameer Ali, "it is not a mere creed; it is a life to be lived in the present—a religion of right doing, right thinking, and right speaking, founded on divine love, universal charity, and the equality of man in the sight of the Lord." The ethics has a religious background: sin is a breach of the law of Allāh. "The person who violates his brother's rights is not a believer in the unity of God though he affirm it with his lips."⁸¹

The claim is made that Islām is rational. For centuries Moslem scholars were keen students of Aristotle, and Moslem thinkers such as Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) and Al Ghazālī, achieved high eminence in the realm of philosophy and theology. There have been great rationalist schools of thought, such as that of the Mutazīlites. Apart from the orthodox beliefs concerning the Qurān, the essentials of Islām must be admitted to be peculiarly simple and capable of rational presentation. Today there is a keen desire to show that Islām is compatible with modern science.⁸² It is maintained that Islām appeals to rea-

son and conscience as the ultimate authority. Nature and revelation are from the same source and thus science and religion cannot be in contradiction. It has no need of any belief in miracles, and its ritual may be given a symbolical and spiritual interpretation.

Islām as a distinct religion arose after Christianity had developed the main outlines of its theological and ecclesiastical system. It itself developed in part in opposition to ecclesiastical Christianity, especially to the doctrines of the Incarnation and of the Trinity. Yet a modern Moslem is prepared to say: "The true Moslem is a true Christian, in that he accepts the ministry of Jesus and tries to work out the moral preached by him." "Excepting for the conception of the sonship of Jesus there is no fundamental difference between Christianity and Islām." They have "identical aims and ideals and both agree in general principles." The same writer contrasts orthodox Christianity with the religion of Jesus. Moslems, he writes, "consider that Islām represents true Christianity. They do not think that Jesus who prayed in the wilderness and on the hillside, in the huts of peasants, in the humble abodes of fishermen, furnished any warrant for the gorgeousness of modern Christian worship with all its accessories, which beguile the mind, mystify the intellect, and thus divert the human heart from the worship of God toward a symbol and a type."³³ Thus it is argued that Islām contains the essentials of Judaism and of Christianity, and one of its functions is to unite all men in the bonds of one true religion.

Taking a wide survey of the Moslem world, it may be said that the most important individual influence for reform was that of Jamāl al-Din al-Afghānī (died 1897) who lived and worked for some time in Egypt, Turkey, Persia, and India, as well as in Europe. His influence was personal rather than through published writings or sectarian organization. Some of his writings

are still in manuscript, but he did publish a volume entitled *A Refutation of Materialists*. It is also interesting that while in Paris he carried on a controversy with Renan on "Islām and Science." He worked for a united Islām and trained his pupils to write on subjects connected with Islām politically, socially, and theologically. "To him," writes Dr. C. C. Adams, "the religion of Islām was in all essentials a world religion and thoroughly capable by reason of its inner spiritual force, of adaptation to the changing condition of every age."⁸⁴

The work of Jamāl al-Din was most definitely continued in Egypt, led especially by Muhammed Abduh and Muhammed Rashid Rida, editor of *Al Manar*, the chief periodical publication in the interests of reform. The aims of the movement were: to promote social, religious, and economic reforms; to prove the suitability of Islām as a religious system in present conditions; to remove superstitions and beliefs that do not belong to Islām; to counteract false teachings and misinterpretations of Moslem beliefs such as the prevalent idea of pre-destination, the abuses connected with the cult of saints; to encourage toleration and cooperation among the different sects; and to promote education and all other forms of modern progress.

There is an insistence on religion and morals as the basis of social life, and an endeavor to bring the fundamentals of Islām into relation with a wide view of the needs of our times. Dr. Kampffmeyer puts especial emphasis on a movement the name of which he freely translates as The Young Men's Moslem Association, the first regulations for which were drawn up in 1927. The leaders are persuaded that contact with Western civilization might easily lead to neglect of religion and morals, without which no healthy national life is possible. It has established branches in many countries. "I dare to say," writes Dr. Kampffmeyer,

"that the Y. M. M. A. is the one great movement of the Arabic speaking world today, and that its importance and influence at the present time and in the future can hardly be over-estimated." The Qurān is declared to be the guide for Moslem moral revival, without which all other advance is worth little, and the claim is made that "the moral culture of the Qurān is based upon the freedom of science and thought." It aims to take from the cultures of the East and the West all that is good, and to reject all that is bad. Atheism, irreligion, and Christian missionaries are to be combatted and the people enlightened concerning true religion.³⁵

Conflicting opinions are held concerning the status of Islām in modern Turkey. Certainly a liberal attitude had its earliest practical effects there. In 1905 a preacher in Constantinople made an eloquent and strong appeal to Moslems to rouse themselves to share in the advance of modern science and civilization. Ahmad Na'im Effendi stressed the need for cultured preachers filled with a sense of the nature and importance of their office. The preacher should not only be learned in the lore of Islām and in philosophy but also be "the refiner of the nation," "the teacher of moral heroism," "the communicator of knowledge," "the inheritor of the duty of prophecy."³⁶ Discouraging on "What is religion?", another preacher contended that the faith had not been learned from the original sources and so had become overwhelmed with unjustifiable details which restricted the progress of Islām. Dr. Iqbal says: "The truth is that among the Moslem nations of today, Turkey alone has shaken off its dogmatic slumber and attained to self-consciousness. She alone has claimed her right of intellectual freedom; she alone has passed from the ideal to the real—a transition which entails keen intellectual and moral struggle."³⁷ On the other hand Dr. Kampffmeyer writes: "There is no

Islamic movement in Turkey today. . . . There is no basis left in Turkey for religious development. There is no Islamic teaching in the schools." And he adds: "Neither can one speak of a modern Islamic movement in Persia."⁸⁸

In India there has been a widespread influence among educated Moslems from the thought and activities of a number of outstanding leaders including Syed Ahmad Khān, Ameer Ali, Khuda Buksh, and Muhammed Iqbal. Ahmed Khān made his motto Educate; educate; educate. His great achievement was the establishment of the Anglo-Muhammedan College at Aligarh in which along with a Western type of education religious instruction is given and the practice of Islām observed. The college was later developed into a Moslem University, and another Moslem University was established at Hyderabad. Ahmed Khān through his writings advocated modern methods in the study of Islām. The works of Ameer Ali are inspired with the desire to bring into relief the fundamentals of Islām and express their inner significance. Iqbal, apparently with an ardent faith in Islām and a keen appreciation of present religious needs, gives a carefully reasoned philosophical exposition of its principles.

Guided by the writings of these men educated Moslems in India are preserving the essentials of Islām in the context of modern thought. There are other movements which are in certain respects modernistic which are not based on or sufficiently attentive to scholarship and have had a wider appeal. The chief of these are two, originally united, with centers at Qadian and Lahore. The Ahmadīs at the former of these have been described as the most active propagandists at present in the Moslem world. Their views may be said to represent an advance on orthodox Islām in implying a progressive theory of revelation, and as an endeavor to present in simple form the main Islamic teachings. The

founder evidently had the desire to unite members of all the great religions.

During the last twenty years definite attempts have been made, with a missionary aim, to present Islām to the Occident. Along with criticism of orthodox Christian doctrine and practice they present the main principles of Islām as providing a rational religion in its place. It is insisted that Christianity has broken down in face of modern problems and that it is in conflict with science. On the other hand it is said that the Western world is becoming ethically more Moslem, and that the religious tenets of Islām appeal to the hearts of rational men. Lord Headley, a convert to Islām, thus described its strength: "There is nothing in Islām which is in any-way revolting to our reason or our scientific discoveries." "There must be nothing rigid in a universal faith except only the firm belief in the one and only God and the revelation made through the Holy Prophets." "I have always looked upon Islām as fitted for the whole of the human race and for all times." "Most of the strength of Islām lies in the knowledge that God is ever near . . . It is the very spirit of the faith."⁸⁹

Dr. Titus seems correct in his view that the change in the religious apologetic of Islām is to a new attitude of mind rather than to a new system of thought. For modern educated liberal Moslems, Islām may be said to include essentially: faith in the One God and belief in the perfection of His attributes, especially mercy; faith in the freedom of man with a tendency to re-interpret and in part discard some traditional ideas of predestination; faith in a future life, spiritual in character, in which men will reap the fruits of their thoughts, words, and deeds. To these articles of belief are to be added the practices of prayer, almsgiving, and fasting, and to a less extent meditation and the pilgrimage. Along with these, the Prophet is revered as an example of the good life. The essence of Islām has been summed up in a

quotation from the Qurān: "It is not righteousness that you turn your faces toward the East and the West, but righteousness is this, that one should believe in Allāh and the last day, and the angels, and the book, and the prophets; and give away wealth out of love for Him to the near of kin and the orphans and the needy and the wayfarer, and the beggars and for the emancipation of captives; and keep up prayer; and pay the poor rate; and the performers of their promise when they make a promise, and the patient in distress and affliction and in time of conflict—these are they who are true to themselves and these are they who guard against evil." "Humanity," says Dr. Iqbal, "needs three things today: a spiritual interpretation of the universe, spiritual emancipation of the individual, and basic principles of universal import directing the evolution of human society on a spiritual basis. . . . The Moslem is in possession of these ultimate ideas on the basis of a revelation which, speaking from the innermost depths of life, internalizes its own apparent externality."⁴⁰

BAHĀISM

Though Bahāism arose from Islām it has developed along its own lines toward a religious universalism, and has gained adherents in India, Europe, and America, as well as in the country of its birth. It had its origins in Persia in the nineteenth century movement of the *Bāb*, itself related with the Sheikhism founded by Sheikh Ahmed, described by M. Nicolas as the exponent of a "powerful and enlightened liberalism." Bābism is to be explained partly by reference to the doctrine of the twelve Imāms, a doctrine of the Shiah sect, according to which the twelfth Imām remains alive to reveal himself as occasion demands to restore the faith of Islām to its original purity.

In 1844 Mirza Ali Muhammed declared himself to

be the *Bāb* or door, meaning that through him the hidden Imām communicated with men. He aroused much fervor among his adherents, and the movement included a very important principle making for liberalism in its denial of the finality of the Qurān. *The Book of the Seven Proofs of the Mission of the Bāb* maintains not only that the sentences uttered by Mirza Ali Muhammed are equal in style and in spirit to those of the Qurān itself but further that they are an advance so far as they are meant for this age. The followers of the Bāb were thus to receive his utterances as later revelations than the Qurān. According to the Bāb there is no final revelation: a new prophet comes when the age needs him. Nevertheless, many of his own teachings were far from progressive, and the importance of the movement lies chiefly in its giving birth to Bahāism. After years of persecution he was executed in 1850.

Bahāism takes its name from Bahā Ullāh, who assumed the leadership of the greater portion of the community after the death of the Bāb. For Bahāism the Bāb was simply the "door," Bahā Ullāh claiming to be "he whom God shall manifest." Babism had been definitely Moslem: Bahāism would be universal.

That Bahā Ullāh was a very impressive personality the following, adapted from an account given by Professor E. G. Browne, is sufficient evidence: In the corner sat a wondrous and venerable figure whose face is unforgettable though indescribable. . . . His piercing eyes seemed to read one's very soul; power and authority sat on his ample brow; while the deep lines on the forehead and face implied an age which the jet black hair and beard flowing down in indistinguishable luxuriance almost to the waist seemed to belie. "Praise be to God that thou hast attained" . . . he said in a mild dignified voice. "We desire but the good of the world and the happiness of the nations; yet they deem us a stirrer up of strife and sedition worthy of bondage and banish-

ment. . . . That all nations should become one in faith and all men as brothers, that the bonds of affection and unity between the sons of men should be strengthened; that diversity of religions should cease and differences of races be annulled—what harm is there in this? . . . Yet so it shall be; these fruitless strifes, these ruinous wars shall pass away and the 'Most Great Peace' shall come. . . . Do not you in Europe need this also? Is not this that which Christ foretold? Yet we see your kings and rulers lavishing their treasures more freely on the means for the destruction of the human race than on that which would conduce to the happiness of mankind. . . . These strifes and this bloodshed and discord must cease and all men be as one kindred and one family. . . . Let not a man glory in this, that he loves his country; let him rather glory in this, that he loves his kind."¹

The idealization of Bahā Ullāh may be seen in the name given to him, the Blessed Perfection. The Bāb, Bahā Ullāh, and his successor Abdul Bahā (Abbas Effendi) have all been described as "divine manifestations," though the significance of the term is not clear. It ought perhaps to be interpreted in the light of the panentheistic conception of God which predominates in Bahāi writings. But the description of these three has also become more elaborate. They have been called a cosmic trinity,² and associated with love, will, and knowledge.

Bahāi leaders have disclaimed the purpose of founding a new sect, maintaining their aim to be the uniting of all the great religions of the world into a universal religion. "The object of the Bahāi revelation is the religious unification of all people."³ This side of Bahāism much impressed the late Oxford theologian, T. K. Cheyne, who wrote that "The union of religions must necessarily precede the union of races, which at present is so lamentably incomplete."⁴ "The Bahāi movement is not an organization. You cannot organize the Bahāi

movement. . . . The Bahāi movement is the spirit of this age.”⁵ “The gift of God to this enlightened age is the knowledge of the one-ness of mankind and the fundamental one-ness of religion.” “The principles taught by every true prophet are the same: there is no difference between them.” But Bahāi teachers have been far from showing this to be a fact. “All the religions are revealed for the sake of good fellowship. The fundamentals, the foundations of all are fellowship, unity, and love.” The sacred books of the religions are to be interpreted allegorically: “All religions are written symbolically.” That it is maintained is the only way in which truth can be written to withstand time and its changes. Bahāism is eclectic, and claims to embody fundamental principles held in common by every creed; it is a purifying force liberating the truth from masses of superstition. “Bahāism has no priesthood for sacerdotalism engenders the spirit of caste and a struggle for mastery between secular and spiritual powers. It lays no stress on metaphysical dogmas or ritual which is their material clothing. . . .”⁶

According to Bahāism no religion represents the absolute truth, which is not to be grasped by human minds. There is progressive revelation chiefly as the result of a closer communion of a few souls with God. The Prophet Muhammed is highly revered; but as he is supposed by orthodox Moslems to have surpassed Jesus, so Bahā Ullāh is held by the Bahāis to have surpassed Muhammed. By this belief especially, but also in other ways, Bahāism has tended to differentiate itself from orthodox Islām. “The Bahāi teachings confirm and complete all religious teachings which have gone before, and offer a practical philosophy which meets the present-day spiritual need of humanity in establishing divine harmony and peace.”⁷

Bahāism is regarded as suitable for this age in insisting on the harmony of religion and science. Civilization and science are necessary for the highest religion and

must be intimately associated with it. "There is no contradiction between Religion and Science." "Religion and Science are the two wings upon which man's intelligence can soar into the heights, with which the human soul can progress. It is not possible to fly with one wing alone. Should a man try to fly with the wing of Religion alone, he would quickly fall into the quagmire of superstition, while on the other hand with the wing of Science alone he would also make no progress, but fall into the despairing slough of materialism."⁸ The harmony of science and religion is thus viewed by an ardent Bahāi: "To behold all things of the universe as animate with a divine animation, so that a single atom becomes as wondrous as a sun; to feel in all things the essence of a consciousness so that not even a stone remains insignificant; above all, to realize by what eternities of evolution matter has been trained in order to serve as the temple of man—whereby man becomes the perfect microcosm within the perfect macrocosm—this glory that was the crown of ancient seers, returns now universally to become the education of all."⁹

It has been maintained that Bahāism teaches a conception of God as an impersonal force immanent in the universe. But though at times it is suggested that God is beyond the capacity of human thought to comprehend, the most frequent references are to attributes only intelligible as applied to a spiritual being. To the human mind God is incomprehensible, for the finite understanding cannot be applied to this Infinite Mystery. "God is love and peace. God is truth. God is omniscient. God is without beginning and without end. God is uncreated and uncreating, yet the Source, the Causeless Cause. God is Pure Essence, and cannot be said to be anywhere or in any place. God is Infinite: and as terms are finite the nature of God cannot be expressed in terms but as man desires to express God in some way, he calls

God 'love' and 'truth' because these are the highest things he knows. . . . But while God does not create, the first principle of God, love, is the creative principle. Love issues from God and is pure spirit."¹⁰

In the main the terminology and the general thought of the Bahāis is immanentist, stressing the inner spirit of a creative movement of a universal evolution. In this manner it endeavors to unite certain aspects of Moslem mysticism with what is taken to be the fundamental idea in the modern scientific theory of evolution. Thus, though the transcendence of deity is not denied, is even implied, the characteristic of divine personality tends to be blurred.

It is quite clear that for Bahāism God is not simply an intellectual principle of interpretation, a philosophical hypothesis but a Being calling for definite response from man. "It is astonishing; it is a most amazing thing; that God has created all humanity for knowledge of Himself, for the love of Himself, for the virtues of the human world, for the Life Eternal;—for perfect spirituality, for heavenly illumination has he created man;—nevertheless, man is utterly negligent of all this! He is seeking the knowledge of everything except the knowledge of God."¹¹ Nevertheless, it is in relation with God that men are to seek and will find their highest happiness. "There is nothing greater or more blessed than the Love of God. It gives healing to the sick, balm to the wounded, joy and consolation to the whole world, and through it alone can man attain life everlasting. The essence of all religions is the Love of God, and it is the foundation of all the sacred teachings." Love as the central quality of existence is of four kinds. "(a) The love of God toward the identity of God: Christ has said: God is Love. (b) The love of God for his children—or his servants. (c) The love of man for God; and (d) the love of man for man. These four kinds of

love originate from God. These are rays from the sun of reality; these are the breathings of the Holy Spirit; these are the signs of reality."¹²

In his account of human nature, Abdul Bahā appears to place all evil in the material part of man. "In man there are two natures: his spiritual or higher nature and his material or lower nature. In one he approaches God, in the other he lives for the world alone. Signs of both these natures are to be found in man. In his material aspect, he expresses untruth, cruelty, and injustice; all these are the outcome of his lower nature. The attributes of his divine nature are shown forth in love, mercy, kindness, truth, and justice, one and all being expressions of his higher nature. Every good habit, every noble quality belongs to man's spiritual nature, whereas all his imperfections and sinful actions are born of his material nature. If a man's divine nature dominates his human nature we have a saint."

Apparently man's spiritual life has no beginning, but the character of its pre-existence is not discussed. Similarly, it has no ending, though again the nature of its future is not defined otherwise than as a process to perfection. "Divine perfection is infinite, therefore the progress of the Soul is also infinite. From the very birth of a human being the Soul progresses, the intellect grows, and knowledge increases. When the body dies the Soul lives on. All the differing degrees of creative physical beings are limited, but the Soul is limitless."¹³ "Though death destroy his body, it has no power over his Spirit—this is eternal, everlasting, both birthless and deathless."¹⁴ "Life is eternal, but the individual human consciousness is not inherently so. It can only gain immortality by uniting with the pure Divine Essence."¹⁵

Bahāism is no passive mysticism. Perfection is to be attained only by constant effort, which when inspired by lofty motives is true worship. Further, Bahāism recognizes the profound significance of much of the suffering

that man endures. "The trials of man are of two kinds. (a) The consequences of his own actions. (b) Other sufferings there are, which come upon the Faithful of God. Consider the great sorrows endured by Christ, and by his apostles. Those who suffer most, attain to the greatest perfection." "Grief and sorrow do not come to us by chance, they are sent to us by the Divine Mercy for our perfecting. . . . Men who suffer not attain no perfection."¹⁶

True to the Moslem background of its origin Bahāism insists on prayer. "Know thou that prayer is indispensable and obligatory, and man under no pretext whatsoever is excused from performing prayer unless he be mentally unsound, or an insurmountable obstacle prevent him. The wisdom of prayer is this: That it causeth a connection between the servant and the True One, because in that state man with all heart and soul turneth his face toward the Almighty, seeking His association and desiring His love and compassion."¹⁷

The general neglect of religious meditation by the feverishly occupied peoples of Europe and America is a marked defect of modern life. Bahāism emphasizes its importance not only for attaining a state of peacefulness but also to recognize the profundities of existence. "Meditation is the key for opening the doors of mysteries. In that state man abstracts himself; in that state man withdraws himself from all outside objects; in that subjective mood he is immersed in the ocean of spiritual life and can unfold the secrets of things-in-themselves."¹⁸

There is to be complete tolerance toward all religions. Bahāis remain members of the religions in which they were nurtured. They may interpret dogmas and practices allegorically. Thus: "Real fasting is to abstain from carnal desires and the promptings of ego. Fasting means to purify the heart from every stain of egotism, replacing material tendencies with spiritual susceptibili-

ties, refining the moral fibre, intensifying the fire of the Love of God, cleansing the self from the dross of haughtiness, teaching humility, and dispelling the darkness of ignorance.”¹⁹ The ideas of hell and heaven are to be explained ethically, “Hell is the state of mind in which there are evil thoughts and purposes, yielding to the desires of the senses, and clinging to material things. In that state man is separated from God and in his ignorance he suffers. Salvation—heaven—is the conscious realization of God in this life, which is gained by love, kindness, and good deeds.”²⁰

The ethical teaching of Bahāism is a definite humanitarian cosmopolitanism. It sets in the forefront of its thought the “oneness” of mankind, and the aim of universal peace, “the Great Peace,” to attain which it advocates a world council and a world language. It champions the causes of liberty and justice in all their forms, making definite mention of the equality of the sexes. The claim is made,²¹ though apparently with little justification, that the teachings of Bahā Ullāh solve “the economic problems.” It is unfortunate that though universal peace and brotherly love occupy so prominent a place in their teachings, the Bahāi movement has suffered from considerable inner conflict between different groups, most often on questions of organization and the seat of power and authority.²²

CHAPTER IX

CHRISTIANITY

Founded by a Jew, in its fundamental spirit Christianity is essentially a continuance of prophetic Judaism. With allowance for the effects of differences of individual character and environment Jesus and Paul may be considered in the line of Hebrew prophets. Yet Christianity is not simply a reformed Judaism. It owes very much to early influences of the culture of the eastern Mediterranean, especially to the thought of classical Greek and Roman antiquity. Nevertheless, it will be widely contended that the chief difference between Christianity and Judaism is not the effects of these non-Jewish influences but the place ascribed to Jesus.

The question therefore may be raised at the outset: What, from the standpoint of modern scholarship, is the historical evidence concerning Jesus? The three Gospels, Matthew, Mark, and Luke, have not the value of three entirely independent and mutually supporting documents. All three depend in large measure either on an earlier now non-extant work, or Matthew and Luke are indebted to Mark. The acceptance and reproduction suggest approval, and that counts for something. The non-Markan portions of Matthew and Luke correspond so closely that it is highly probable that they used another document chiefly made up of discourses. As the non-Markan parts of Matthew and Luke give comparatively little of a biographical nature, the earliest account of Jesus may be regarded as obtained by a discriminating use of Mark.

What may reasonably be affirmed about Jesus if the influence of later developments of thought is avoided? ¹ Jesus was known as the son of Joseph and Mary. He was

attracted by the preaching of John the Baptist and was baptized by him. Apparently John was a believer in the early coming of the Messiah and represented his preaching of repentance as a preparation for that event. Jesus began to lead the life of a wandering teacher, and by His teachings and even more by His remarkable personality attracted to Himself a considerable number of followers.

Eventually the priests and other leaders of the people began to be openly hostile to Him, probably because of His frequent criticism of them. He offended them with regard to their formalism. They tried to embroil Him in political issues with relation to Herod and the Romans. The cause of their greatest hostility may have been the claim made for Jesus—and possibly eventually by Him—that He was the Messiah. The inscription alleged to have been put on the cross at His crucifixion suggests that they ridiculed such a claim. Expecting the Messianic era to begin in some remarkable fashion, to be set up as a glorious kingdom with a truly magnificent king, the simple wandering teacher, so lacking in deference, apparently so arrogant in clearing the temple courts, must have been irritating in the extreme.

For a while Jesus retired with His chief followers away from the crowds and out of the country in which His opponents were trying to embroil Him politically. During this time He taught His more intimate disciples and they formed the nucleus of what later developed into the Christian Church. To the crowds He talked in impressive parables; to this closer circle He explained their inner significance more definitely. One seems to obtain a better understanding of Jesus' sayings by admitting that He came to believe in His own Messiahship, and looked for an early coming of the Messianic kingdom by some sudden event, the time and hour of which even He as Messiah did not know.

Eventually, perhaps partly on a charge of blasphemy,

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and partly as being at least a possible cause of political disturbance, as claimants to Messiahship had formerly been, He was arrested and executed by crucifixion. That is all one appears justified in asserting historically of the life and death of Jesus. It is not primarily from these simple facts that Christianity arose but from the impression of the personality of Jesus and from the moral and religious teachings which may reasonably be regarded as having come from such a personality. "There is no argument and no reasoning," says Professor Bethune Baker, "that can prevail against the view, which is widely current today among Christians, that some of our narratives, which have been regarded as plain records of actual incidents, belong not to the prosaic plane of history but to the poetry of faith."²

The development of legends around the person of Jesus is seen even in the Synoptic Gospels. There are those, for example, around the circumstances and nature of His birth. In spite of the statement that Jesus called those who sought after a sign "a generation of vipers," "an evil and an adulterous generation," His power is represented as shown by a series of miracles. It is interesting to observe how the accounts of these grow in supposed impressiveness. In Mark, Jesus is reported to have healed one leper; in Luke to have healed ten. Mark tells only of the awakening of Jairus's daughter just after she had fallen asleep. Luke tells us of the raising of the widow's son as he was being taken out for burial. The writer of the Fourth Gospel makes the implication more definite and impressive by the story (not told in Mark) of the raising of Lazarus who had been four days in the grave. A similar kind of development is seen throughout. Mark gives the question of Jesus to the man who called him: Good Master, as "Why callest thou me good? None is good save one, God." Matthew alters the expression: "Why askest thou me concerning that which is good?"

The account of the attitude of Jesus in the garden of Gethsemane is entirely different in tone in the Fourth Gospel from that in the Synoptics. In the latter Jesus wrestles with the idea of death. Luke adds that God sent an angel to Him. In the Fourth Gospel Jesus is represented as praying for His disciples with a consciousness of being with the Father in heaven before the world was. The implication is quite different: "The cup which the Father hath given me, shall I not drink it? . . . And what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour. But for this cause came I unto this hour."

Those are only a few examples of the manner in which the views concerning Jesus developed. There were influences from wider movements of thought at that time. These are seen most definitely in the Fourth Gospel and in the Epistles of Paul. In the Fourth Gospel the Christian faith became viewed from the standpoint of the idea of a divine eternal Christ, the immanent light, life, and reason of the world. The advance of Christian teaching along Christological lines went with the expansion of the Christian community into the wider area of the Mediterranean. Much in Paul's teaching suggests traits in Greek religion.⁸ There are reasons for believing that the concept of the divine eternal Christ came from non-Jewish sources. What Paul and the writer of the Fourth Gospel did was to join that idea with the conception of Jesus as Messiah. From their day to ours Christianity has developed with relation not only to the historic Jesus but also to the theological concept of the eternal Christ.

What claims, however, did Jesus actually make for Himself? Perhaps that question can never be answered with certainty. In the authorized English translation Mark opens: "The beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God," but the marginal note of the revised version points out that ancient authorities omit the term "the Son of God." Nowhere in Mark does

Jesus specifically apply the term to Himself. The centurion at the cross is represented as saying: "Of a truth this was the Son of God." Three passages in Matthew have this implication, but they have no parallels in Mark or Luke, and they do not represent Jesus as making the claim for Himself. In all of these the phrase may imply Messiahship. In two of them it is the enthusiastic and emotional Peter who makes the statement: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God." Thus in the Synoptics there is virtually nothing on this so important matter, important, that is, if Jesus made such a claim. In the Fourth Gospel, Jesus is on several occasions represented as making the claim for Himself and other claims implicating His eternal nature. But these are all of a piece with the theological theory of the divine Christ which it is one purpose of the writer to expound. Modern scholarship cannot find sufficient evidence that Jesus made the claim to be the "Son of God" with the unique metaphysical significance which so-called orthodoxy has contended. Dr. Major points out⁴ that in the early Church, as pictured in the "Acts of the Apostles," Jesus was referred to in phrases such as the following: "Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved of God unto you"; "God anointed him with the Holy Ghost and with power"; he "went about doing good . . . for God was with him." There appears to be no evidence that Jesus told His followers to worship Him as God: rather He told them to pray to the Father.

It is possible that Jesus talked of the Holy Spirit of God, but he may not have done this with any other meaning than that implied by the writers and prophets of the Old Testament. The Holy Spirit is a way of referring to God, especially as in continuous relation with the world and man. Taking certain of His phrases, or phrases accredited to Him, some later thinkers under certain philosophical influences, developed the notion that in some mysterious manner, the Holy Spirit is a

person at one and the same time identical with God the Father and yet distinct from Him. Bringing this into relation with the Christology already referred to, the dogma of the Trinity was formed. The relation of the divine eternal Christ to the historical Jesus was expressed in the doctrine of the Incarnation. The process of growth of that doctrine was twofold. There was on the one hand the idealization of Jesus, the beginnings of which are seen in the Synoptic Gospels. On the other hand there was the humanization—if it may be so described—of the philosophical conception of God as the Logos, the immanent reason, the divine Spirit in the world and in man. The doctrine of the Incarnation is the fusion of these two. Though there is the idea of God coming down among men in the Old Testament, there is little or nothing to suggest Incarnation in the traditional theological sense. The idea of the Messiah as the ruler of a theocratic state may have suggested to some that he would necessarily be divine, but the dominant belief seems rather that he would be a Prince of the House of David.

As a result of such inquiries, modern Christian scholars are attaining freedom from many doctrinal forms of traditional Christianity, and are led to a closer consideration of the religion of Jesus. Though Christianity is more than the religion of Jesus, that is its fundamental root. Central for Jesus was His love of God and His persistent trust in Him. His idea of God was of a loving heavenly Father, whose sun shines on the just and the unjust, a Father who forgives not merely seven times but as it is symbolically expressed, seventy times seven, that is, always. He is an all-seeing Being who knows the heart of every man. The pure in heart may behold Him. He calls all men to love Him as Father and all mankind as brethren. "The dogmas in the teaching of Jesus are so few and so practical that they can hardly be shown to exceed the following: (1) That God is our

Father, and if we try to do His will and act after His example, we can become His sons; (2) That there is a Kingdom of God, and that to share in this kingdom is the *summum bonum* of human existence. This kingdom is at hand; (3) That Jesus Himself is the Messiah of the Kingdom of God, but He comes to serve not to reign, not to be ministered unto but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many."⁵

As in the religion of Jesus, so God is the central idea of Christianity. "If we allow the eternal background to drop out of our teaching," says Dean Inge, "we are building on a wrong foundation and are no longer the heralds of the good news we were ordained to proclaim."⁶ "Christianity," wrote Harnack, "is something simple and sublime: it means one thing and one thing only: eternal life in the midst of time by the strength and under the eyes of God."⁷ God is a spiritual personality, that is, a being of intelligence, feeling, and will. Traditional theology has described Him as perfect, infinite, almighty, omniscient, and eternal. He is holy, a being of glory and majesty. He is the heavenly Father, whose nature is best described by the term love. He is the source of truth; the moral governor of the universe. In calling Him creator, it is implied that nature and man owe their existence to His intelligent spiritual activity. Though expositions of Christian Theism have sometimes tended toward Pantheism, these have only served to emphasize the non-pantheistic character of the general historic conception. Man and the world are dependent upon God, but they are in no way identical with Him. "Christian faith, being essentially theistic," says Dr. Gardner, "vehemently asserts the Divine origin and the Divine government of the world. It is sure that the frame of things is not fortuitous, but is regulated by a Power more closely akin to man in intellectual and moral qualities than to any other part of creation."⁸ "The divine personality," writes Dr. Rich-

ards, "is indispensable for the Gospel of God: when personality fades gospel dies out. That aspect of the Deity is jeopardized by the modern view of the world by the attempt to reduce God to the level of our scientific knowledge in order to harmonize revelation and science."⁹

In recent times much stress has been placed upon the description of God as immanent, and confusion has been caused by associating that idea with the teachings of natural science concerning evolution in such a manner as to suggest an "etherial something" permeating the whole of nature and man. That mode of thought ends either in complete pantheism or in the insuperable difficulties of the question where precisely in nature or man the line is to be drawn between what is the immanent divinity and what not.

The fundamental idea which theologians have endeavored to express through such unsatisfactory conceptions of divine immanence seems to be that God is in continuous active relation with His creation. God is also called transcendent in the sense that His reality is other than that of the world, in all His qualities infinitely superior. The traditional Christian Trinitarian idea of deity has usually been described as a mystery. Sometimes it is regarded as an essential implication of the eternal love of God; or an affirmation of a differentiated Ultimate from which the differentiated world springs. A personal spirit, as the God of Islām or Judaism, may be said to be differentiated if conceived as a being of intelligence, feeling, and will, and some Christian thinkers have so thought of the doctrine of the Trinity in Unity.

Christianity has its definite doctrine of human nature. Man is primarily a spiritual being, and he is on earth allied with a physical body. The Christian ideal involves the welfare of the whole man, though it regards the spiritual as the more fundamental. Man has a measure

of freedom of choice, within the limits which God as the dominant factor in existence determines. His enjoyment of life depends upon his relation to God and to his fellows. None can achieve the good without at least his own proper attitude of will, though by his own will alone none can attain to perfection. In the capacity of choice there lies the possibility of sin; and in the fact of suffering man's life is marred. The doctrine that man's nature is radically corrupt, though it has been widely taught by Christians, cannot be justly regarded as essential to Christianity.

Christianity treats sin as central in human evil. For it, sin is not merely ethical wrong-doing, not simply the failure to achieve an ideal personality, not just hurt to others, not merely failure to attain social harmony and the welfare of humanity. Christianity conceives of sin as primarily a discord between man and God. Sin thus has a religious as well as an ethical reference. Christianity recognizes that men feel their weakness to overcome sin. The experience of Paul is found to be typical of man: "That which I would that I do not; that which I would not that I do." Thus while emphasizing the necessity of all that a man may do on his own behalf, and on that of others, Christianity insists that salvation from sin also depends on God. In the course of the history of the religion two things in this connection seem almost to have blended into an inseparable unity. Devotion to Jesus and the contagion of his love have seemed to give a power to overcome sin. This has been fused with the idea of grace coming from God in constant relation with man. Thus has arisen the Christian phraseology, that grace comes through Jesus Christ.

The relation to God being felt as a personal one, sin as discord brought into this relationship involves a two-fold process in order that the harmony shall be achieved: on the part of man repentance, sorrow, and change of

attitude; and on the part of God forgiveness. If man has the freedom to sin, he has the freedom to turn from his sin: he may change his attitude from opposition to conformity with the purpose of God. According to the Christian view, the conviction that divine forgiveness really means something is a most important factor leading to repentance.

Christianity has much to offer with relation to suffering. It acknowledges that much suffering is due to sin, and maintains that the way to eradicate this suffering is to eradicate the sin. In this connection it differs from some of the Oriental religions in its plain recognition of the significance of the solidarity of mankind: it sees that sin does not bring suffering simply to the sinner but often also involves others in its effects. Christianity acknowledges, further, that a considerable amount of suffering has no relation to sin as its cause. With regard to this it insists that suffering *may* draw men into closer personal relationship, into deeper love one of another, and of still greater importance, into closer relationship with God. But it is aware that this is not necessarily an inevitable result of any suffering: whether such a result comes depends on the attitude of mind of the sufferer. If unavoidable suffering is accepted with religious faith, such result may come. If the attitude of the sufferer is one of irritation, rebelliousness, and doubt, such result cannot arise. In and through the love of the brethren and of God, the sufferer seems to obtain power to bear the suffering with greater equanimity, sometimes even with cheerfulness. Suffering may have an effect of ennobling the character and making the personality more profound. Nevertheless, Christianity does not relieve man of the responsibility of utilizing every means in his power to prevent and eradicate suffering.

Consideration of the Christian attitude to sin and suffering leads to the question of the significance of the

crucifixion of Jesus for Christianity.¹⁰ Modern thought does not concern itself with obsolete theories according to which the death of Jesus was a ransom paid to the devil or a peace-offering to God. Nor need one discuss the degree and the extent of the suffering of Jesus. The crucifixion of Jesus is in the first place the most impressive example in history of how intense suffering is caused through the sins of others, through their ignorance and hardness of heart, their obstinacy to reverence things spiritual. Through His crucifixion and suffering, taken in relation with His personal attraction and teaching, Jesus has drawn men to Him: the supreme instance of how suffering may lead men to love and devotion. And, thirdly, the suffering of Jesus has been associated with an idea in the realm of Christology, the idea of the suffering of God with and for His creation. The cross has thus become one of the central symbols of Christianity, and one may venture to believe will remain so. Nevertheless, it may be doubted whether in the light of modern thought Dr. Horton expresses the significant implication correctly or acceptably when he says: "Orthodox theology was right, I believe, in its insistence that something was accomplished upon Calvary 'once for all,' and need never be repeated . . . a permanent change took place in the relation between God and man. God *got inside* humanity as never before."¹¹

The death of Jesus cannot be rightly considered in Christianity apart from the idea of resurrection. This has been associated with the belief in the actual resuscitation of the body of Jesus. Modern scholarship cannot find any adequate evidence for that belief. A recent American writer says that: "The doctrine of the physical resurrection of Jesus is one of the chief stumbling-blocks to the faith of the younger generation." He insists that, even if that is doubted the fact remains "that the spirit of Jesus lives and throbs in the heart of humanity

at the present time" and this "makes all the difference in the world."¹² Doubt as to the physical resurrection of Jesus does not involve the non-acceptance of the idea of resurrection. No view of Christianity is adequate without that idea, the significance of which is its implication of the reality of continued re-birth, not in a physical but in a moral and spiritual sense. The individual soul, dead in sin and depression, may rise again to newness of moral and spiritual life. The community, dead to the realities of religion, may arise again to cooperative life in and for it. Resurrection in this sense is a fundamental characteristic of the spiritual life, a truth to be preserved for the well-being of the individual and the progress of mankind. The story of the resurrection of Jesus and the ceremonies of the Easter festival may well be continued in use as expressions of the principle.

Christianity teaches belief in a "life-everlasting," that is, in immortality. Some few mystics and philosophers have described this as implying some form of union with God such that consciousness of the distinctiveness of human personality is transcended. But it can hardly be doubted that the dominant conception among Christians has been that of individual personal continuance. This has been allied with belief in a resurrection of the body. The idea of a resurrection of the body did not originate among Christians. Like some of their Jewish brethren, some early followers of Jesus may have thought of the resurrection of the body as the means by which the deceased should return to participate in the Messianic kingdom on earth. Paul suggested that the resurrection body would not be the natural body but another which he called a spiritual body. Even for modern thought belief in resurrection of the body may be of significance as implying that at all times the personality will have means of manifesting itself. Such a doctrine, as also that of immortality with which it is allied, is not capable of demonstrative proof.

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The importance of the Christian doctrine of immortality does not lie simply in the affirmation of a persistence of life beyond physical death but in an implication of values, especially the love of God and of man, which raise men above the discontent and trivialities associated with temporary selfish desires, and involve them in a life more profound, more sublime, more comprehensive than any based on the conception of his being merely a temporarily organized part of physical nature.

Associated with the belief in resurrection is the doctrine of a "last judgment" with the reward of heaven or the punishment of hell. Modern thinkers would generally regard judgment not as an event to occur at a specific time but as operating in the lives of men as being lived, and consider heaven and hell as states of body and mind. "Youth believes in hell," says Mr. Halliday, "though not in a medieval hell. It can see with its own eyes the kind of hell which evil-doing creates—the hell of a shattered body, of a diseased and disordered mind, of a dwarfed and paralyzed soul; the hell of remorse and anguish in which so many people are living at the present moment; the hell of the here and now, not the hell of the indefinite future."¹⁸

More than all other beliefs which divide Christians are those concerning the nature of the Church. According to Roman Catholicism, the bishop of Rome, the Pope, is the visible head of the Church on earth, a hierarchical organization with its priests and rites to be acknowledged by every true believer. At the other extreme is the view that the Church is the totality of the faithful, all who accept the "religion of Jesus" whether they do or do not belong to any religious organization. Between these two extremes there are various intermediary positions.

The importance of the Church lies chiefly in its being a means of spreading Christian influence and of expres-

sion of divine worship. There is no need here to describe the differences of the rites and ceremonies in the particular Christian communities. Baptism has the significance of an initiation ceremony; and confirmation, when performed, a mark of the conscious acceptance of the faith and its duties on the part of the adult. Ordination to the pastorate is a rite of solemn consecration. The theory of Apostolic Succession, held by the Roman Catholic Church and by some Anglicans, would seem to imply that rites and other religious ministrations have not their complete good effect unless performed by those ordained in the recognized line(s) of succession. But that suggests the attitude of magic. This is no argument against an episcopal form of church organization but only against a superstitious interpretation of it. Nor is it unlikely that at some later time great advantage might accrue from a united Christendom recognizing the Bishop of Rome, or some other, as its visible head.

The Mass, the Eucharist, the Holy Communion, the Lord's Supper, however it may be named, is the central Christian rite. It has grown up from a number of different influences. In the great Catholic Churches it is the center around which much that is beautiful in color, music, and language has been brought to the expression of religious feeling. The early Jewish Christians carried over into it some of their ideas and sentiments concerning the Feast of the Passover. Undoubtedly much has been incorporated from the ancient ideas regarding sacramental meals and "eating the God," being doctrinally allied with Christological conceptions. It is associated with the event, recorded in the Gospels, that Jesus breaking bread and giving thereof to his disciples, exhorted them: Do this in remembrance of me.

Prayer is a practice general in the Christian Churches, but religious meditation seems a lost art among Protestants, due perhaps to great neglect of the devotional

writings of the saints and mystics. As an aid to spiritual growth the Roman Catholic Church prescribes regular self-examination and auricular confession of faults before a priest. The Protestant Churches sometimes have general public confessions, leaving individual confession to be made privately to God. In the Catholic Churches the veneration of saints has added to the richness of religious life in drawing attention to their lives and characters and their religious utterances. The person of Jesus has often been held to provide sufficient scope for all such veneration, but it would be futile to deny the wealth of pious sentiment that has been aroused with regard to Mary, his mother. In this connection one should refer to the use of images by Christians. For some minds these seem to have a value, and modern Christian thought manifests no strong opposition to their use.

Though today many thinkers in the Occident regard marriage as a merely social and legal contract, Christianity, considering it also of religious significance, retains ceremonial forms for it. The mystery of death makes the occasion of burial a suitable one for religious thought and practice. Faith in the continued existence of the departed is kept more vivid in the Roman Catholic Church by the offering of masses for their souls.

A survey of contemporary Christianity reveals a number of more or less definite movements due to the influences of modern life. There is widespread study of Christian literature and doctrines with scientific methods, leading to the restatement of fundamentals in terms adapted to the best thought of the age. Under the stress of social problems the Christian teaching of social solidarity is being more adequately appreciated and emphasized. In this connection great lay movements have originated. Less obvious to the layman, though equally real to the Christian thinker, is the increased recognition of the importance of the mystical

side of religion. Though in the educational institutions of the Roman Catholic Church there is much research in the fields of secular knowledge, modern thought is not allowed to have any obviously or corporately admitted effect on the traditional forms of expression of the "faith once delivered to the saints." The Orthodox Churches of Eastern Europe do not appear to have made serious attempts to adapt themselves to the needs of modern life. It is chiefly among Protestants of Western Europe and the United States of America that efforts have been and are being made to view religion with reference to developing knowledge and changing social conditions.

A fair indication of the attitude of the leaders of the Christian Churches (with the exception of the Roman Catholic) may be found in the Proceedings of the World Conference on Faith and Order, which met at Lausanne, Switzerland, in 1927. Though the importance of the fact should not be overestimated, it must be borne in mind that most of the delegates to the conference were ordained ministers naturally inclined to keep to traditional formularies. For most, the Bible stands as a final authority, though it is generally agreed that it must be studied with the methods of modern scholarship. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the results of research on the Bible, there was a distinct tendency to retain the Apostles' and the Nicene Creeds as though their credibility was not affected by those results. There was some insistence that the creeds might be re-interpreted in accordance with the requirements of modern thought. The essential character of Christianity was described in a statement of the "Message of the Church":

"The Gospel is the joyful message of redemption, both here and hereafter, the gift of God to sinful man in Jesus Christ. The world was prepared for the coming of Christ through the activities of God's Spirit in

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all humanity, but especially in His revelation as given in the Old Testament; and in the fulness of time the eternal Word of God became incarnate and was made man, Jesus Christ, the Son of God and the Son of Man, full of grace and truth.

"Through His life and teaching, His call to repentance, His proclamation of the coming of the Kingdom of God and of judgment, His suffering and death, His resurrection and exaltation to the right hand of the Father, and by the mission of the Holy Spirit, He has brought to us forgiveness of sins and has revealed the fulness of the living God, and His boundless love toward us. By the appeal of that love, shown in its completeness on the cross, He summons us to the new life of faith, self-sacrifice, and devotion to His service and the service of men.

"Jesus Christ, as the crucified and the living one, as Savior and Lord, is also the center of the world-wide gospel of the Apostles and the Church. Because He Himself is the gospel, the gospel is the message of the Church to the world. It is more than a philosophical theory; more than a theological system; more than a program for material betterment. The gospel is rather the gift of a new world from God to this old world of sin and death; still more, it is the victory over sin and death, the revelation of eternal life in Him who has knit together the whole family in heaven and on earth in the communion of saints, united in the fellowship of service, of prayer, and of praise.

"The gospel is the prophetic call to sinful man to turn to God, the joyful tidings of justification and of sanctification to those who believe in Christ. It is the comfort of those who suffer; to those who are bound, it is the assurance of the glorious liberty of the sons of God. The gospel brings peace and joy to the heart, and produces in men self-denial, readiness for brotherly service, and compassionate love. It offers the supreme

goal for the aspiration of youth, strength to the toiler, rest to the weary, and the crown of life to the martyr.

"The gospel is the sure source of power for social regeneration. It proclaims the only way by which humanity can escape from those class and race hatreds which devastate society at present into the enjoyment of national well-being and international friendship and peace. It is also a gracious invitation to the non-Christian world, East and West, to enter into the joy of the living Lord."¹⁴

It has become apparent in the course of history that Christianity may be associated with almost any kind of philosophical theory except that of materialism. Thomism, the form of philosophy dominant in the Roman Catholic Church is a type of dualism. During the nineteenth century, largely under the influence of Hegel and Lotze, many Christian scholars described religion in terms of the Idealistic interpretations of reality. Others, especially followers of the Ritschlian School, adopted a Neo-Kantianism, trying to avoid metaphysical concepts. Within more recent times there have been forms of thought, not unfairly called Naturalistic, which refuse to affirm a materialistic or any form of metaphysic, and regard religion as an attitude toward Nature as a progressively evolving Whole. To the Whole the term God is sometimes applied. Writers of this school generally profess to reject anything which might be termed "supernatural." Thus Dr. Pauck,¹⁵ talking of the breakdown of the supernatural theory of God, describes the position as "the opinion that the universe which has produced such a remarkable being as man, is good and friendly and one must therefore trust in the total life-process," identifying religion with "cosmic emotion," finding "God in the cosmos," and regarding "man as its final product." This attitude is supposed to be in harmony with the stress on evolution in modern thought. Much of the Idealistic

theology adopted a markedly similar attitude in its emphasis upon God as immanent in the process of existence. Dr. C. C. J. Webb has maintained, with considerable evidence, that Christian theology in the latter half of the nineteenth century was essentially immanentist, quoting Edward Caird's study of Hegel implying "the complete rejection of ordinary supernaturalism," for "the world of intelligence and freedom cannot be different from the world of nature and necessity; it can only be the same world seen in a new light or subjected to further interpretation."¹⁶

Along with these developments in the realm of ideas, urgent social problems have turned the attention to economic welfare and justice. Thus many Christian writers and teachers have interpreted Christianity mainly as social ethics, the fundamental principle being the brotherhood of man, frequently viewing deity simply as the immanent process of social progress. The teaching of Jesus and the practice of the early Christians have been closely studied to bring into relief the social implications. The influence of this social form of Christianity has been the chief factor in the development of widespread lay movements, as the Young Men and Young Women's Christian Associations, and the Brotherhood Movement. "There is growing up a new morality, which substitutes for the old beliefs a sense of human needs; a new morality to which religion accommodates itself. The Church emphasizes more and more its non-religious aspects, its secular appeal, its ideal leadership in the brotherhood of man. Young Men's Christian Associations advertise their swimming-baths. They boast a culture of the body like Greek pagans instead of ascetic virtues of Christian saints, and sometimes try to make religion attractive by placing the accent on other things."¹⁷

In spite of these Christian movements, actual social and political methods in most countries are still far

from the realization of the principles involved; and before the solidarity of the "family of Christian brethren" is achieved, further steps in the direction of collectivism are needed and are likely to be taken. With these social problems in the foreground, it is not surprising that there has arisen a form of Humanism neglecting or virtually denying any doctrine of God or religious relation to Him. "Humanism believes in the supreme worth of human life and that man must therefore be treated as an end and not as a means to some other end. . . . We see man as the highest product of the creative process, we know of nothing above or beyond him, the highest things of which we can dream are but products of his mind and so man should be the end of our allegiance and our endeavor."¹⁸

It was inevitable that some Christian thinkers should regard the emphasis on the social as too frequently an abandonment of or a failure to recognize the nature of Christianity as a religion. "Men in their zeal for changing the world into a 'Kingdom of God' too quickly shifted from the necessity of changing lives to the necessity of changing environments."¹⁹ "The tendency to re-interpret theology in terms of sociology," says Dr. Hocking, "is particularly strong among educated men; for thought does tend to humanize religion. But this tendency, given full swing, becomes one of the superstitions of the academic mind."²⁰ Dean Inge, in lectures on "The Church and the Age" insisted that Jesus' conception of the Kingdom of God was not merely or primarily one of social ethics. He urged that the gospel of the Kingdom taught by Jesus can "pretty well be comprehended in sayings like these: 'The Kingdom of Heaven is within you.' 'My Kingdom is not of this world.' 'Is not the life more than meat and the body than raiment?' 'The Kingdom of God is not eating and drinking, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost.' 'Here we have no

continuing city.' ”²¹ “Realistic theology,” says Dr. Horton, “reacts against liberalism . . . and tends to revert to a more traditional conception of the Kingdom of God. It tends to regard it as God’s kingdom, not man’s, governed by an often inscrutable Providence whose workings man must humbly seek to discern, if his small efforts are to count at all, and it tends to doubt whether the perfect consummation of the Will of God is ever going to come to pass within the sphere of earthly life.”²² “The Kingdom must be within men before it can be wrought into the diverse forms of human relations in the community,” writes Dr. Richards who is even prepared to go so far in his criticism as to say: “The Kingdom has nothing to do with merely temporal human ends, even the highest; it is the purpose and will of God. This is realized in men not through the forces of nature or the efforts of men, however noble, but through the power of God. ‘The fashion of this world passes away’; ‘the word of God abideth for ever.’ ”²³

A reaction has been for some time in progress in the realm of philosophical theology on behalf of a definite recognition of divine transcendence and personality as against a merely immanentist view. And in opposition to Humanism there has been an emphatic affirmation of the reality of deity. “The attempt to believe in man without believing in God,” says Mr. Hardwick, “seems to be laudable, but we know it to be vain.” The Christian view of man involves that “apart from God, he is impotent, insignificant, miserable.” Humanism and naturalistic evolutionism, with its “cosmic emotion” as religion fail to treat seriously the tragedies in human lives. Christianity has taken the incongruencies of human life as a central problem. For “the tragedy of humanity is that of a creature divided against himself.” It is futile to ignore the differences between mankind and the infrahuman animate world. “Man’s differen-

tiation from the animals is indeed his undoing—it lies at the root of his troubles. But it also lies at the root of his religion; and his religion and his troubles are indissolubly connected.”²⁴

Dissatisfaction with modernism of the merely immanentist type and half-disguised Positivism, led in the United States of America to a reaffirmation of traditional orthodoxy under the name of Fundamentalism.²⁵ In spite of an unscientific, unphilosophical, and unhistorical view of the Bible as the authoritative Word of God and of methods of obscurantism, the leaders of the movement brought into relief certain fundamentals significant for Christianity which not a few modernists had neglected or failed adequately to appreciate. In the forefront was the idea that man is incompetent to effect his salvation alone: God, as a genuine reality, is the main factor in such redemption. God seeks man and is not merely sought by him. Man may endeavor to discover God, but his efforts would lead to nothing unless God revealed Himself to him. But it is far more than a question of a knowledge of God: it is a practical problem of redemption from sin. It is urged that by intellectual and moral striving men do not achieve peace: there are defects in their nature; and in their lives tragedies beyond their own control. In this situation it is God who is able to redeem mankind. Fundamentalists have therefore emphasized the notion of “justification by faith” and have dogmatically reaffirmed the traditional doctrines that God revealed Himself to man in Jesus Christ, and through His death and resurrection brought about atonement for mankind.

That the finite individual man, or even communities of men, with the existent multifarious relations beyond man, should be able themselves to attain perfection and bliss unaided is certainly denied by Christianity, and the modern man needed to be reminded of it. That perhaps has been one of the main reasons why so much

attention has been given in Europe and America to the theology of Karl Barth.²⁶ Although Barth professes to give full scope to modern scholarship, it seems as though he regards it as of little or no importance, and presents again an exposition of Christianity as dogmatic as any type of sixteenth or seventeenth century Protestantism. His attitude involves the unfortunate combination of affirming truths essential to modern thought and life, and insisting on a terminology and dogmas quite alien to our times. Man is a fallen and disobedient creature, who has lost all capacity to receive the Word of God unless God first open His heart to it. The "dogma of the godhead of Jesus," Barth admits, is not found as such in the Biblical texts; but he regards it as a relevant interpretation, which however is not revealed to us by "flesh and blood." Jesus was not produced by history but "came down into history." Nature and the heart of man give us no sure revelation. The Word speaks to us and in "Jesus Christ the Word became flesh in the most literal way."²⁷ "It is not the right human thoughts about God which form the real content of the Bible but the right divine thoughts about man. The Bible tells us not how we are to speak to God but how God has spoken to us; not how we find a way to God but how He has sought and found a way to us."²⁸ Barth challenges both a false optimism and a false pessimism, the former with its too great faith in man, the latter with its too little faith in God. Yet surely Barth himself has a false pessimism in his view that in his very nature man is "prone to hate God and his neighbor." Barthianism is proving a real stimulus to Christian thinking, but it can hardly be said to present Christianity in the terms required for modern life and thought.

Another movement which has spread into many Christian countries and to the missionary fields in non-Christian lands is also in part a reaction against certain conditions of modern life. It was inaugurated by Dr.

Frank Buchman and is called Buchmanism or the Oxford Movement.²⁹ The interpretation of Christianity as a social ethics has led many to active participation for social reform by political and economic adjustments. Buchmanism maintains that real progress is to be made not primarily by improving the environment through social reorganization but by changing individual lives. The underlying principle thus reaffirmed is valid not only for Christianity but for all the great religions. Without the individual's free cooperation, no religious salvation is possible. Up to the present, however, it does not appear that the adherents of the movement have been generally awakened to the social implications of Christian discipleship. There is also good reason for the charge that it is reactionary in character with regard to its theological concepts which, though usually expressed in vague terms, are the traditional dogmas. There is no explicit evidence of recognition of the importance of the theological study of the past century. Thus, though of real significance as a form of practical religious revival, Buchmanism is more reactionary rather than progressive with reference to modern social and intellectual problems.

The so called Modernist movement³⁰ in the Roman Catholic Church which received condemnation in an Encyclical of Pope Pius X included scholars engaged in historical and scientific research as well as philosophical theologians. But it represented an unstable compromise with traditional dogmas. Its adherents were devout sons of the Church in which they lived their religious life. They were impressed with the importance of continuity of doctrinal expression, and proposed the view that dogmas should be regarded definitely as symbols which, though outwardly remaining the same, have changing and growing significance. Thus, though a dogma may apparently refer to an event and be untrue to fact, it may nevertheless express

a religious value. This view was indicated in a distinction between "truths of faith" and "truths of fact." "Each is right in its own order of truth, each wrong in its trespass on the other's territory; both right only when they listen and learn from each other and strain after that perfect accord which belongs to their ideal perfection."³¹ Reason can tell us of proximate ends, of nature and of history, but "the ultimate ends with which they are continuous lie in the darkness beyond which faith peers, in that Whole of which sense and reason give us but some infinitesimal fraction. But though our belief as to the character of that Whole be a free choice by which we stand or fall self-judged, yet it is not an arbitrary or capricious choice but one based on a power of vision that is conditioned by our self-formed character, by our moral dispositions."³²

Roman Catholic Modernists stressed the idea of evolution and adopted an essentially immanentist conception of deity. The attitude of most of them manifested a sort of neo-Kantian fear of metaphysics and a pragmatic expediency as a criterion of truths. The movement included genuine historical research of permanent worth, but the psychological and philosophical positions adopted had too much the character of temporary attempts to safeguard religious views in face of perplexities arising out of theories of modern science. Dr. Major seems right in his judgment: "The Roman Catholic Modernist position was fundamentally unsound: it seemed, even to those who sympathized with its aims, to support a pantheistic theology, a pragmatist philosophy, and a polytheistic worship, in the name of scientific research, historical criticism, and Jesus Christ."³³

Nevertheless, these Modernists brought into the foreground of attention the character of the Christian life as a social one of corporate worship. This was indicated especially in Loisy's "The Gospel and the Church" in contrast with the supposedly more individualistic Prot-

estant view expounded by Harnack in his "What is Christianity?" "For a Modernist, to believe what the Church believes is, indeed, to repeat the old creeds, to join one's voice to the chanting of the community, but it is more besides; above all, it is to live with the life of the Church—the life of a society which in the midst of time thinks of eternity, which will not let itself be crushed by the cares of the present time, but feels its strength and fecundity. It is neither to despise tradition nor to canonize it; but to draw from it as a plant draws from a generous soil, elements which seem quite inferior—to assimilate and elaborate them and bear new fruit. For the Modernist, to be a Catholic is not to have the ideas of one man, of one period, of one school, it is to vibrate in unison with the thought of all the ages, to understand its sequence, its evolution, its stages, its life."⁸⁴

Many of those called Liberal Protestants held views analogous to some of those of the Roman Catholic Modernists, regarding propositions of faith as dependent on judgments of value. The French Protestant, Auguste Sabatier, for example, insisted that dogmas are purely symbolic representations of religious experience: "The Object of religion is transcendent: it is not a phenomenon. Now, in order to express that Object our imagination has nothing at its disposal but phenomenal images and our understanding logical categories which do not go beyond space and time. Religious knowledge is therefore obliged to express the invisible by the visible, the eternal by the temporal, spiritual realities by sensual images: it can only speak in parables."⁸⁵

Eschewing the metaphysical, these Liberals made the historical human Jesus central in their expositions. Réville admirably stated their position: "True Christianity is the religion of Christ, the religion which Jesus taught and lived, not the one which, later on, his disciples built around his person and work." Although Lib-

eral Protestants, pledged to modern methods of investigation, would not often admit it, Réville maintained that their researches and general attitude involved the rejection of the metaphysical deification of Jesus, "so foreign to the gospel that Jesus with His strict Jewish monotheism would have been profoundly shocked had He known of it." "Christolatry," he continues, "that product of the invasion of Greek paganism into primitive Christianity, is the absolute negation of the pure monotheism of the gospel." "What has remained, what now remains as the true substance of Christ's gospel, is what was for Him, before all else, religion, apart from doctrine and ethics, apart from sacraments and institution, namely, God, as the heavenly Father whatever may be the philosophical description of the Divine Being; men, as the sons of God and therefore all brethren, whatever the philosophical notion of man's nature; that is what the gospel has long since taught us to regard as its essence: it is the sovereign affirmation—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy mind; and thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." "86

English modernists profess to give full play to the freedom of the spirit to follow where intellectual, moral, and religious enlightenment lead, maintaining at the same time that for the best religious life it is necessary to remain in the communion of the Christian Church. They claim liberty to interpret the Bible and the historic expressions of faith in accordance with the requirements of modern thought, and yet most of them write as though they adhere to the fundamental orthodox teaching concerning Jesus Christ. There is a difference of attitude, for example, between the following statement and that of the Liberals represented by Réville: "I have set side by side the historic picture of the human Jesus and the mystic vision of the exalted Christ, and I have maintained that the spirit of the

Christian passes by faith from one to the other, and unites them by an effort of will and personality." "It is the Eternal Christ, dimly seen through the veil of the life of the historic Jesus, which has been the inspiration of the Church, and which has enabled her often to renew her youth after ages of decay and convention." But when Dr. Gardner explains: "The Eternal Christ is the side of God turned toward the world, God in relation to man. . . ." ³⁷ it appears to be what Liberal Protestants in general connote by the term God; and the differences between the respective positions are not great or significant.

Other English modernists, however, endeavor to keep closer to orthodox expression by what they regard as a restatement of the doctrine of Incarnation. "The Incarnation" says Dr. Major, "is becoming in the minds of many the key to the interpretation of the evolutionary process." ³⁸ "The whole world is incarnation in process: in man it becomes increasingly personal; and in the course of the process, 'in the fulness of time,' in Jesus Christ, the manifestation of God in humanity reached its highest stage." ³⁹ With the idea of Divine immanence as involved in evolution it is suggested that "the indwelling of the Divine Logos in Jesus Christ is no isolated event but the culmination of an age-long process which it is the Divine Will should be accomplished in others through Him." Thus "the indwelling of God in Jesus Christ differs in degree but not in kind from the Divine indwelling in sons of men who are potentially sons of God." ⁴⁰

The difficulty in the conception of immanence implied in the position just stated is not faced, but passage is made to forms of expression essentially the same as the traditional ones. "In its attitude toward Jesus, in its fundamental estimate of Jesus," says Dr. Major, "English Modernism is united to primitive Christianity. It is in that respect essentially orthodox." ⁴¹ And Dr.

Bethune-Baker writes: "Our whole attitude to Jesus today would be gravely affected, if knowledge that has accrued especially in recent years did not justify belief in Him as Incarnate Son of God, very man of very man, very God of very God. I pause for a moment to emphasize the fact that the Christian Faith is in One who was at once both very man of very man and very God of very God."⁴² It may be questioned whether recent knowledge justifies any such belief: the most that might be said is that it does not necessarily rule it out. Dr. Temple, a staunch advocate of orthodoxy, admits: "Our Lord's language did not necessarily imply that He claimed to be Himself Jehovah." That doctrine had to wait for recognition. "We see the human life," he says, "and infer the divine Person." But Dr. Temple really regards the matter as beyond the capacity of human intelligence: "If any man says that he understands the relations of Deity to Humanity in Christ, he only makes it clear that he does not understand at all what is meant by an Incarnation."⁴³

In recent times among Christians there has been a definite revival of interest in the symbolical, sacramental, and mystical aspects of religion. This also has been in part a reaction against the merely ethical interpretation of the gospel. It has received support from studies in the psychology of religion and from investigations of the nature of religion as found in Oriental faiths. There is a preponderance of opinion that Christian mysticism is not essentially contemplative and passive but devotional and active: it is not a form of trance in which the individual loses a sense of his individual personality in identification with God but an intimate communion of personalities leading to enthusiasm for active social service. "It is a mysticism far removed from any kind of quietism." "It is a mysticism purely and solely religious, objective, and empirical, being

merely on the practical side the endeavor of the soul to mount to God in prayer and seek union with Him and surrender itself wholly to His love; and on the theoretical side just the endeavor to describe the first-hand experiences of the personal relations between the soul and God in contemplation and union."⁴⁴

The view is now widely accepted that there is an aspect of mysticism in all religion. As such, however, it is a type of experience: it does not signify, as some defenders of traditional views seem to suppose, that one is to accept the old dogmas as mysteries. Mysticism is in no sense to be understood as abrogating the claims of intelligence. Recent emphasis on the mystical has been accompanied in the Protestant Churches by an enriching of worship so that it cultivates the mystical experience as well as provides an expression for it.

Within recent times there has been a marked change in the attitude of Christians, even the ordained leaders of the Churches, with regard to other faiths. Although Christianity is still presented as the highest religion, worthy to become the faith of all mankind, efforts are now made to appreciate the elements of value in other religions. There is also a corresponding tendency for the different Christian sects to become more tolerant of variations in doctrine and practice, and to strive for actual cooperation. More modern views of religion and the urgency of practical economic problems are leading to federations of Christian churches, thus in part meeting the objection of non-Christians concerning the oppositions among Christians. The way is thereby opening for advance to a more comprehensive and socially effective Christian life.

The essential thing to appreciate in the Christian world today is the great variety of views held as to the significance and relative importance of the doctrines associated with traditional Christianity. Among Christian thinkers there is a desire to maintain the most com-

prehensive attitude and a reluctance to rule out any possibilities. With that there is a demand for intellectual freedom as involved in religious sincerity.

It seems to be coming increasingly recognized that while the so-called modernist movements have emphasized particular features of Christianity important for this age, the so-called reactionary movements have brought into relief again certain fundamentals which cannot rightly be neglected as they have been by many modernists. Thus, a wider and more profound view is being developed than is represented by either of these types of movement. "Christian faith," writes Dr. Shailer Mathews, "has power and life because it brings us into proper relationship with God and man. This was the first message of the Church to the ancient world. This is the appeal of supernaturalism to the common man and the mystic. This is the appeal of Modernism as it seeks to bring men both individually and socially into intelligent, helpful relations with God."⁴⁵

Whatever varied meanings may be given to some of the expressions used, it may be reasonably supposed that all Christians would accept as far as it goes, Dr. Réville's statement: "Jesus came to invite men, all men, of every class, race, and creed to enter into the Kingdom of God. He bid them repent and cultivate a lively feeling of their wretchedness and faults, not indeed in order to lose themselves in despairing revolt, nor to sink beneath the feeling of their native and fatal powerlessness, but in order, on the contrary that the consciousness of their many wants might give rise in their hearts to an ardent desire for restoration, to an intense longing for release, and a better, juster, purer, happier, holier life, and that they might gain divine forgiveness through the renewing of their being. He also opened to them the inexhaustible treasures of love for the Heavenly Father and of love for their brethren, saying to them: Come unto me; prove the benefits which I bring you;

do the will of your Father who is in Heaven and who speaks to you, not in the thunder of Sinai and the oracles of the sanctuary but through the consciences of men, of prophets, of the Son of Man, of the best and holiest of His children; in the only living sanctuary, that is your own heart, in the inmost depths of your soul. Be just, for God's law is justice; be good, for goodness is the earth's greatest treasure; be merciful, love one another, for love is the source of life; sacrifice yourselves one for another, for happiness lies in mutual sacrifice, in solidarity; aspire to become perfect, even as your Father in Heaven is perfect."⁴⁶

CHAPTER X

RELIGION AND MODERN THOUGHT

In his essay on the immortality of the soul, David Hume wrote: "It is an infinite advantage in every controversy to defend the negative." Those who today reject religion feel themselves in such a position. Nevertheless, the presentation of religion as of real significance and worth may be undertaken with confidence. If the traditional orthodox views of the religions were considered it would be easy to show the serious limitations of their conceptions, the incongruities of many of their contentions, the incompatibility of their different emphases; the conflicting estimate of what is most fundamental in life; the inconsistencies in their views as to how man has come or may come to truth in religion. But a different impression is gained by attention to the modern scholarly movements in the religions. It is not that they have yet attained to complete harmony, to absolute consistency but that they are beginning to reveal tendencies which are capable of coordination and reconciliation. Freed from superstitious and unjustifiable doctrines, and presented in modern forms, religion challenges acceptance by the modern mind.

From this standpoint attention may be turned again to the trends of modern life and thought previously enumerated:* secularism, nationalism, neglect of and opposition to religion, the increase of scholarly interest in religion, and universalism. Some of the religions have at times been presented as nationalistic; nevertheless, in their fundamental principles all the great religions involve a transcendence of nationalism. What are

* In Chapter I.

the characteristics of modern nationalism? It is based on a deeply rooted feeling on the part of peoples against being governed by an alien race. Religion says nothing directly for or against this sentiment.

There is good ground for believing that the predominant motive of modern nationalism is economic. The peoples of each nation are concerned through their governments or otherwise to obtain the greatest economic advantages for themselves, whether in cooperation with, or in conflict with others. The values motivating modern nationalism are primarily and essentially secular: in its actual expression nationalism is a manifestation of contemporary secularism. It is true that under the impetus of nationalistic motives some Oriental peoples have begun to revive the study of their traditional religions. In course of time such study must inevitably lead them beyond the political nationalism from which the revived interest has arisen. Those who stand for the significance of religion have two things to say with regard to this modern nationalism: they challenge the adequacy of the underlying secular attitude to satisfy mankind; and they maintain that even economic welfare is likely to be more advanced by the cooperation of peoples under the inspiration of religious ideals than by conflict.

When the general situation is considered it appears that the fundamental issue involved is between secularism and religion. Secularism is at the basis of an unsatisfactory nationalism, and it is the reason for neglect of and aggressive opposition to religion. There are certain practical causes of modern secularism. The development of modern industrialism has led to a loss of balance, so that the thought and activity of the individual is directed in the main into its service. It has also provided a great variety of means for secular enjoyment.

Religion has thus been pressed out of the lives of many who have not yet realized that their continuous

or constantly recurring experience of discontent and futility is largely due to this fact. Modern social organization has tended to enslave the masses in the machinery of production and to divert the attention of the few to secular forms of enjoyments of the profits of industry and commerce. It may be doubted whether these practical causes of secularism will be removed until a radical change has been achieved in social organization. There are signs that this is coming. From the standpoint of the just distribution of secular values, those interested in religion which recognizes such as of worth in themselves should be concerned with the modern movements for social reorganization. They ought also to appreciate the fact that though it is not the only thing necessary, such social reorganization is required in order that there shall be opportunity for due attention to and the cultivation of religion.

The claim is made for secularism that it is based on the teachings of natural science. That claim need not be challenged, but objection must be made to the attitude implied that everything not arrived at by scientific methods, or which cannot be shown to depend upon the experience of the physical senses must be treated as unreal and based on superstition. For it is not at all clear in what scientific methods consist when thus spoken of in general, other than logical inference on the basis of empirically observed facts. Yet modern thought has certainly gone beyond the restriction of the term to methods of quantitative measurement such as are found in physics, for it is recognized that different sciences have particular methods dependent upon the nature of their empirical data and the concepts they use. Self-preservation has a significance in biology, and self-development in ethics, but neither has any application in mathematics or physics; nor can these concepts be defined in terms used in mathematics or physics.

The term "scientific method" has often become the

childish catchword of persons who have had no systematic logical or philosophical training. The particular methods appropriate to the mathematical and physical sciences have led to noteworthy results in their own spheres: but by the simple reiteration of the phrase "scientific method," not a few modern writers on social science talk with an arrogance as though they have already achieved similar results in their fields by the same mode of procedure, but they are not justified in posing as though they have achieved solid results. It must frankly be said that some of these writers reveal a dogmatism as definite as any ever found in relation with religion.

Those who advocate secularism on intellectual grounds are not justified in suggesting that natural science shows that nothing exists except that which can be observed with the aid of the physical senses.† Natural science includes inference due to mental functioning: and neither the understanding of the inferences nor the process of inference is yet capable of being apprehended by the physical senses. The facts of valuation, the distinctions made between good and bad, true and false, beautiful and ugly, cannot be denied by the secularist, rather he is inclined to affirm them emphatically. Yet no one has been able to explain such valuation as solely

† In America secularism has allied itself also with what has been called "Behaviorism." This has been possible because the latter, insisting on the study of external behavior, has suggested to some that knowledge is to be regarded as coming only through what is observed by the aid of the physical senses. It is because of its congruity with the secularism of the age that so much attention has been paid to Behaviorism. It is commonplace to maintain that one should study the external behavior of organisms: that is a part of the methods of every sound empirical psychology. One would have supposed that it is equally commonplace to maintain that for the interpretation of external behavior one is compelled often if not indeed always to have reference to what is introspectively known. Yet it is just this use of introspection which the mere Behaviorist thinks he can dispense with, though actually he cannot get away from forms of explanation which imply it. Behaviorism as a part of scientific method in psychology is open to all: secularism obtains a spurious support from it only when it is presented as a form of naturalism and naturalistic theory of knowledge.

a matter of sense experience. "Science and method will not help us in the choice of purposes and principles of life; but when we have formed our purposes they will help us to attain them."¹

Modern secularists are anxious to insist on the higher values of human culture: they rightly object to being considered materialistic in the derogatory sense in which that description has been frequently used. But many higher values of culture when clearly thought through involve the existence of characteristics of reality other than those which one becomes aware of with the organs of sense and the methods of physical science. In short, in the attempt to base secularism on natural science, its advocates go beyond what natural science in their meaning of the term justifies. They do not face the problems of metaphysics and the theory of knowledge involved. In theory, they too often claim to hold a naturalistic and quasi-mechanistic theory of reality and a view of knowledge as based solely on sense experience; and yet they insist on values, the apprehension and realization of which implicate fundamentals in conflict with that theory of reality and that view of knowledge. They are the more confused in that the teachings of natural science, especially in the realm of biology, frequently support the view of evolution as a process of increasing integration toward significant ends. The intentions of modern secularists are better than their methods of justification. The importance they attach to the values of culture is more significant than the naturalistic theory that too frequently prevails among them.

If the implications of secularism are followed out and the inadequate naturalistic background is abandoned, the difference between secularists and those who press the claims of religion, is a difference as to the values to be recognized and the relative emphasis to be placed on them. It is interesting however to notice how this is obscured by some modern writers. Dr. Elmer Barnes,

for example, says: "The good life can, therefore, no longer be regarded as that type of existence designed to promote salvation in the world to come, but rather must be viewed as that type of conduct which will lead to the most complete and perfect satisfaction of human desires here on earth. The whole perspective of man, then, is transformed from a supernatural and other-worldly psychosis into a purely secular proposition and a wholly worldly enterprise."² Such a statement blurs the whole question at issue. Can it be rightly maintained that "human desires here on earth" do not include desires which lead beyond the terrestrial as Dr. Barnes appears to understand it? Can there be "perfect satisfaction" if religious desires are not taken into account? The evidence of the religions suggests that on earth man has desires which the earth does not satisfy. It is a serious question whether "a purely secular proposition and a wholly worldly enterprise" will fully satisfy man. Dr. Barnes and secularists generally assume that it will. Yet the long history of religion in the past, the life of religion in the present, and, indeed, even the nature of modern secularism itself, all seem to suggest that it will not. "It is on the broad basis of man as capable of religion and in need of religion that all the faiths are based. And it is to this permanent element in humanity that all the great religious teachers make their appeal. They have to use language which varies from age to age, but the religious feelings and the facts of conduct to which they appeal are fixed. And the relations between the individual and the spiritual environment remain permanent through all changes of civilization. The great religious genius is steeped in the permanent, and he brings from heaven to earth a sense of the relation of man to the unseen which is perpetuated by his adherents through generation after generation."³ The religions are not simply the expressions of transient human wishes: they are the attempts, in part successful,

to satisfy needs which, whether one likes it or not, have forced and still force on mankind definite problems of thought and living. To regard the religions as due to mere wishing is unutterably superficial and indicates a lack of knowledge of and insight into the arduous toil which mankind has undertaken and still undertakes to meet the religious problems forced upon him by his own nature and the realities with which he is in contact.

The sciences, as distinct from pure mathematics, which achieve high standards of accuracy are those whose methods include experimentation. This is evident especially in physics and chemistry and in some measure in biology. The world and human life may be and indeed must be looked at also from the point of view of history. Scientific method in history amounts to little more than an insistence upon extreme care and objectivity in the collection and presentation of the data and logical reasoning in the inferences on the basis of these data. In historical investigation there can be no experimentation such as is used in the natural sciences. The pursuit of the natural sciences is dominated by the desire to arrive at valid generalizations. History is concerned in large measure with the understanding of the currents of co-ordinate and conflicting individual events in their spatial and temporal relationships. It may be possible to reveal certain uniformities of psychological reaction in historical events, yet these never give any very decisive ground for prediction as to the nature of future events.

In the realm of the historical the student has to consider the various values which individuals and communities have striven to achieve with reference to which the events have significance. These values are facts which cannot be adequately treated by methods of the sciences concerned mainly with quantitative considerations. They cannot be entirely subsumed under the categories of mathematics. They do not admit of the form of experimentation used in the more exact physical

sciences. So far as they are facts they are achieved experiences or ideas of experiences which it is desired to achieve. The only form of experimentation possible with regard to them is the testing whether certain experiences satisfy the mind which has the ideas of these values, and understands what the ideas truly involve.

Secularism cannot obtain justification from natural science for a limitation of the range of values. It is right in maintaining that natural science gives aid toward the realization of certain values, but it ought not to be forgotten that natural science aids in destruction in war as well as in construction in peace. The religions discussed are sufficient evidence that history contains activities directed toward the achievement of values beyond those acknowledged by secularism. The only experimental method which might be applied with relation to these is the one of testing how far the religions satisfy certain demands of the human mind. The natural sciences give no basis for denying the possibility of the achievement of the values which the religions affirm. A particular individual may say that the secular way of life will completely satisfy him: in the last issue that is a personal affair. Those not intellectually satisfied with remaining at such a merely individual point of view cannot but take into consideration the fact that great masses of men in all periods of history as at the present time have felt the need of, have sought for, and frequently thought they have attained something beyond the secular values.

Secularism in recent times has been described as Humanism, probably with the intention of distinguishing it from practical and theoretical materialism. The Humanist, when he is merely a secularist, is not humanist enough; he leaves out of consideration that part of human nature which has expressed itself definitely enough in religion that points beyond the merely human. The Humanist is not wrong in his championship of

secular values; but in ignoring or denying the reality of other values. Frequently he suggests that the teachers of religion so advocate specific religious values (or alleged values) as to deny, or ignore at least some of the secular values. Unfortunately, it is true that leaders of religion have too often encouraged an ascetic attitude toward the physical and the culture values related with it. But the fact that exponents of some religions have underestimated or even denied the importance of secular values is not a sufficient reason for the condemnation of religion as such. The modern thinker has also to guard against one-sidedness. With the advance of modern movements the exaggeration of asceticism is being counteracted by the religions themselves. The fundamental principles of religion as revealed in the modern tendencies in the religions are in no way opposed to the appreciation and cultivation of secular values. But the recognition of secular values and of religious values is one thing: the relative importance placed upon them is another. Religion unhesitatingly gives secular values a subordinate place. It looks on human life not simply from the standpoint of man as a part of physical nature and in relations with it but also from a cosmic or theistic point of view.

The natural sciences prove nothing which can rightly be said to conflict with the recognition of religious values. On the other hand it is possible to maintain that they suggest something in conformity with fundamental principles implied in those values. The scientist starts out with the conviction that he may find intelligible relations between things, and he achieves a very large amount of success in his ventures. He finds that the world of nature is in many respects an intelligible world. In such a world it is possible for mankind to live a more or less, more rather than less, rational life. In such a world values both secular and religious can be achieved. Consequently, if the final choice in the interpretation of

existence is between an ultimate intelligence and an ultimate fortuitousness, it is not unreasonable to choose the former rather than the latter. Indeed, the choice of the former appears actually reasonable. With this attitude on the fundamental issue it may be maintained that the natural sciences contribute at least this in conformity with religion that they reveal a continuance of consistent characteristics in reality which make values possible and significant. The conviction that existence is intelligible, having its source in intelligence, is a necessary constituent of religion. It is quite possible to go further than this with reference to certain detailed conclusions of natural science. For it may be contended that the scientific study of biological evolution reveals a trend toward an increasing dominance of mind. Within the course of mental evolution in the human species there is an increasing striving for values beyond the immediate satisfaction of the senses. "The World we live in is not a phantasmagoria but a cosmos. We cannot think of it evolving from a primitive chaos, and there is no warrant for supposing there ever was a such a state of affairs." "As age has succeeded age there has been emergence of finer, more masterful, more emancipated forms of life. The biggest fact of all is the growing dominance of the mental aspect."⁴ While it cannot yet be proved on the basis of a factual study of past history that in the advance of human culture there is an increasing tendency toward recognition of genuine religious values, it is possible that as man is in the evolutionary and historical process there may be a tendency toward the dominance of religious values in the course of the future. Such a view may be considered purely speculative: a matter for hope or despair as one seems inclined.

Natural science does not prove the existence of God, which, as Professor Thomson says, is a conclusion "too large for the premisses."⁵ Nevertheless, the admission of a group of experiences which find their expression in

the ideas, feelings, and practices of religion involves no violation of the principle of consistency upon which natural science depends. Rather there are good reasons for believing that the realm of nature is consistent with a realm of religion. It is just in religion that man experiences something other than the particular methods of natural science enable him to experience. If religion is a form of apprehension and an attitude different from that of natural science, religious beliefs, however obsolete and dogmatic in form, cannot be dismissed as baseless and worthless. An unfettered modern effort for truth in religion insists primarily on free inquiry into the facts of the religious experience, making what use it can of the traditions of the past. The truth of a belief is not established by showing that it has been or is generally held; nevertheless, in the absence of definite refutation from science and philosophy, the existence and persistence of certain types of religious beliefs and practices form a not irrational prejudice in their favor. Those in the different religions who are trying to present fundamental values of religion in modern terms are inspired by the conviction that they have to do with that which may bring the highest satisfaction. They maintain that religious values have to be won through continued and strenuous effort. Although they cannot point to evidence that minds at the present stage of evolution are mainly turned in this direction, they believe that in later stages they may be. Religion is not superstition which is being outgrown but involves an ideal which has yet in its fulness to be achieved.

Under the influence of modern life and thought some who today regard themselves as advocates of religion present it in terms which they believe avoid any suggestion of the ultimate doctrines of the historical religions. They describe religion as a cooperation with the forces of integration in universal evolution. Their attempts reveal a lack of patience with the metaphysical

problems involved.⁶ It is not that they have no metaphysics but that they do not make their metaphysics clear to themselves, and at various points in their exposition break away from the metaphysical principles underlying their general position. These writers always place their greatest stress upon religion as a form of social ethics. Even within the religious communities religion is often being presented as predominantly, if not entirely, social morality. The brotherhood of man, the love of one's neighbor, is so emphasized as to draw attention away from the more profound and mystic elements of religion. The worth of these social teachings cannot be overestimated in themselves. Yet the accounts of living religions given in the previous chapters show that religion cannot be adequately described in terms of social ethics. Though it has almost always some implications of that kind, it is primarily something different. This has to be admitted as a matter of fact, whether one personally accepts religion or not. "Every great religious teacher," says Professor Whitehead, "has revolted against the presentation of religion as a mere sanction of rules of conduct. St. Paul denounced the Law, and Puritan divines spoke of the filthy rags of righteousness. The insistence upon rules of conduct marks the ebb of religious fervor. Above and beyond all things, the religious life is not a research after comfort."⁷

Nevertheless, the influence of a religious background or foundation for social morality ought not to be ignored. Dr. Gardner was prepared to say: "No man can long persist in trying to benefit society if he is convinced that all is a matter of chance, that evil is as near to the heart of the universe as good, that there is no directing hand on the wheel of fortune."⁸ To present religion as simply social morality is not only to ignore its intrinsic character but also to rob it of its effective influence. "A religion whose scope in public life is reduced to the exhortation of morality is not in command of the sit-

uation. Unless it can interfere and by an act of power compel the allegiance of men, it has lost control.”⁹ In spite of some occasions when leaders of religions have obstructed ethical progress, religion has in the main been allied with advancing views of morality. It may with good grounds be said that the most effective moral teachers in history have been the great religious leaders. Nevertheless, it is fundamentally incorrect to identify morality and religion. From one point of view morality is subsidiary, is a corollary to religion. One may perhaps be moral without being religious: but it certainly would be more difficult if at all possible to be genuinely religious without being moral. As today morality and religion are so frequently confused, in this book details of the ethics associated with the religions have not been especially considered: an endeavor has been made to emphasize the more distinctively religious. Religion is concerned primarily with particular experiences felt of immediate worth in themselves, especially such as are variously described as “nirvāṇa,” “communion with God,” “God-realization,” the praise and worship of God, and so on. There is no way of demonstrating their worth by reference to something other than themselves. The secularist is ultimately in the same position with reference to the higher values which he acknowledges: the worth of music, for example, is in the end known only by someone experiencing it.

It should, however, be admitted that in the past religions have become associated with particular moral rules, and their adherents today too often persist in teaching these rules and insisting upon their application in practice in modern conditions which call for something different. This constitutes one of the chief grounds for attack by those who oppose the religions; and in challenging many of these teachings and practices they are performing a much needed service. But it is a cause for regret that confusing such moral rules and religion

they alienate sympathy by indiscriminating attacks on religion as such.

Modern Secularism and Humanism are too superficially optimistic. The religions have stressed aspects of existence which Humanism and modern science do not seriously consider. As Dr. Horton puts it: "The very existence of religious plans of salvation and philosophic ways of life proves that the course of human existence does not and never did run smooth." And he continues: "It is very evident today that science alone is not going to bring in the social millennium and that the erection of ideal human relationships is a different problem from the mastery of nature."¹⁰ "That man is not fully satisfied with this life," says Dr. Gour speaking of Buddhism, "finds an echo in all religions."¹¹ Science reveals the impressive uniformities, the order in existence. Humanism holds up to man ideals of human civilization. In contrast there are the yearnings of the Buddhist sisters, the sighs of contrition of the Hebrew psalmists. Though they may not have given an entirely satisfactory theoretical treatment of evil, the religions have not ignored it. On the contrary, they have treated evil seriously as one of their most fundamental problems. In the life of the individual, in his inner heart-rendings, his struggles and his attainments, there is a reaching out beyond the merely human to a transcendent reality in which confidence may be felt. The life of humanity as a community or set of communities need not be one of blind striving but may follow a divine guidance in the acceptance of ideals revealed in and through the religious prophets and saints. For religion, life is not simply a process of evolution and of expanding human civilization. Though the young may not fully realize it, few in later years escape the fact: that much of what is worth while is attained only through suffering; that beyond the failure of the highest hopes one may still have faith in something better. Religion

represents a wider vision than any of its non-religious competitors, and is truer than they to the deepest experiences and the highest aspirations of mankind. The dramatist Henry Arthur Jones forcibly expressed the essential religious attitude in this connection: "We cannot rest in a materialistic interpretation of the universe. The last creed that I can accept is that which affirms the spirit of man to be a transitory emanation from dead matter, and resolving it back into dead matter, accuses the universe of being a huge trick organized by futility and nothingness to delude and defeat mankind. We refuse to deify futility and nothingness. The spirit of man will always throw up to heaven its triumphant affirmation, 'Though He slay me, yet will I trust Him.'"¹²

Thus it becomes apparent that any philosophical justification of religion "at present worthy of consideration must start, not from the data of physics but from the data of the sciences of man." "The inescapable reality of religion itself, both as an individual experience and as a social institution" has to be recognized.¹³ And in one way or another each and all of the religions imply the inadequacy and incompleteness of human life lived independently of religion. They point in two ways beyond man's experience as immediately related with the physical world and with human society. In the first place, they affirm the reality of existence transcending nature as known to the senses and man as aware of his own immediate consciousness. However this existence may be described in the different faiths, whether as the Cosmic Whole or as a Supreme Being, man is concerned with his relations to It. Even for Jainism the highest Self is somehow distinguishable from nature and from man's actual character here and now. What Dr. Gardner says in the following with specific reference to Christians might be applied to the religions in general: "The sum is, that in the minds of a great number of

devout Christians, many of them of the most ordinary intelligence, there is a constant sense of a Presence which is inwardly revealed, of transactions between the soul and something which surrounds and dominates it, which may be described in various ways and from many points of view, but which is a thing of reality. In great crises of life it often impresses the spirit as much more real and objective than things which appear to the bodily eyes, such as the stars. But in ordinary times of activity in the world it seems underlying rather than conspicuous."¹⁴

Some modern thinkers alienated from the historic religions, give to their practically secularist attitude a theoretical background, with regard to which they express themselves in mystical fashion. There is a widespread tendency to form a conception of the Whole, to call it "impersonal," and to oppose it to what is considered to be the personalist implication of some historical religions. The manner in which this is done is itself evidence that a naturalistic secularism does not completely satisfy. This accords with Dr. Saunders' contention that: "The rationalist's belief in reason and the humanist's belief in man are aspects of a reverence for the world we live in which, thought out, will lead to mysticism."¹⁵ The adherents of religion insist on further consideration. The Whole, though called impersonal, is accredited with qualities experienced only as the qualities of minds such as our own. Thus, there is the rationality implied by dominant order, and there is a process, or there are processes tending to integration, to the attainment of or increase of experiences of worth. Men are called on to ally themselves with these processes and the tone of the exhortation suggests a type of reverence or awe for the Whole in process. Though the Whole is described as impersonal, the attitude implied toward it is essentially that appropriate to a person.

Unfortunately, those who adopt these modes of expression fail to recognize that they are not keeping to facts, although it is just upon keeping to facts that they pride themselves. It is not at all evident that the Whole has the character they ascribe to it: they have idealized it, failing to give due recognition to the fact that it manifests much not apparently orderly; that there is disintegration as well as integration, dissolution as well as evolution; that it includes that which arouses opposition and disgust as well as cooperation and reverence. In its advance religion has increasingly emancipated itself from the theoretical tendencies which have sometimes appeared in its history to conceive the Object of its worship as identical with the Whole. It is fundamental to note that where pantheistic expression has been most resorted to in the history of religion, the physical world has usually been described as lacking ultimate reality. Yet the Whole which such modern naturalistic theory of religion describes as impersonal and offers as the supreme object for awe is the Whole whose nature is supposed to be known solely through the organs of physical sense, and the scheme (or schemes) of theoretical inferences formulated in natural science. Such attempts to provide for the demands of the religious side of human nature fail theoretically in respect of their use of the term impersonal for that to which they really ascribe spiritual attributes; and practically in that the Whole they point to arouses conflicting emotions, to some of which man as religious is definitely opposed. It has not been through merely arbitrary caprice that in the course of its development religion has increasingly led to the description of its Object as spiritual, and has differentiated it from the Whole, however closely that Object is related with the parts of the Whole other than Itself.

The scientific investigation of the physical world has revealed and is continually revealing much that im-

presses, almost staggers, the imagination. On the one hand it points to the vast interstellar spaces, to the myriads of the astronomical bodies; and it calculates in millions of light years. On the other hand, it opens our eyes to the microscopic, the infinitesimal. The thought of the multiplicity and the tremendous variety of living organisms is almost overwhelming. These revelations of modern science not only fascinate men: they often make them feel their own insignificance. For many they seem to have made the traditional conceptions of God seem trivial, little more than a slightly elaborated copy of the insignificant being man. A prominent scholar has spoken of a failure of nerve in the ancient world. One might speak of a failure of imagination with regard to religion today; a failure to rise in our conceptions of spiritual reality to the heights that thought has reached with reference to the physical. It is not a question of banishing the idea of deity but of conceiving His nature as adequate to the supremely great and the extremely small. The conceptions of Hinduism are obviously capable of this: and so are those of all the other great living religions. The God of Jesus, the God of the Jews, who clothes the massy heavens as with a garment, is declared not unconcerned with the fall of a sparrow: "yea, even the very hairs of your head are numbered." If human minds are capable of comprehending these visions which science calls up before them, they may hold a conception of God as the creative principle both in the infinitely great and the infinitesimally small. A view of reality as including and in part expressing a supreme spiritual being, robs us of nothing that science may teach concerning the vastness and richness of existence. The teachings of science should enlarge our conception of the glory of God and increase religious awe and reverence.

It is strange that an age which has thus widened the vision of man and intensified his attention to the min-

utest of details, an age in which the cosmic is presented in so impressive a manner, should have as one of its main movements an effort to concentrate on man as man. The advocates of secularist Humanism might be urged to give a little more consideration to the far reaching visions of modern science, pointing man beyond the narrow confines of industrial and social human life. The advances of modern thought have broadened the outlook of religions: "Mystery is the raw material of experience, the unappropriated elements which thought has still to work over into its artistic forms. The progress of thought is therefore constantly enlarging contacts with mystery instead of lessening them, as is sometimes hastily assumed. It is only those who become absorbed in the process of their investigations who fail to realize this fundamental condition of all intellectual work." "Mystical religion makes all experience its instrument and all knowledge its outlook. The task before it is simply this, to insure a consciousness of the encircling, all-pervading mystery, which is the setting for the whole drama of our thought."¹⁶

Modern Secularism and Humanism insist emphatically on the apprehension and realization of values beyond those of merely physical enjoyment, and modern thought is much concerned with values. Many of those admitted by secularism are spiritual in character and have spiritual implications. "The value theory with its prominent reference to degrees and variety of values, opens out the likelihood of fresh values being disclosed to us and appreciated by us from time to time. . . ." writes Dr. Caldecott. "If new values do, as a matter of history, emerge—that is, are not mere effects or rearrangements of those already presented—and if they cannot be regarded as self-originating, resort to theistic explanation is plainly offered to our choice."¹⁷

To many such an explanation is essential for the adequate understanding of the specific religious values.

Dr. Farnell, a life-long student of religions, thus states his own conclusion: "An impersonal religion, a religion based on the idea of impersonal divinity, divine love, or power or order, even an 'eternal not ourselves that maketh for Righteousness' may be a source of strength to some rarely endowed thinkers, but has not yet played a vital part in our religious history or appealed with any force to the popular mind."¹⁸ The "religious consciousness," writes the Scotch philosopher Pringle-Pattison, "demands a personal God: no profound and enduring relation to the non-personal is practicable."¹⁹ "The center of religious thought must always be the conception of God," writes Dr. Hocking. There is a "necessity of experience of the presence of God." "Despite the differences in the thoughts of God in different traditions, the meaning of God in terms of experience is the same for all men. The worship of God is the deepest of all common bonds in the human family."²⁰ As still another recent writer expresses it: "God is a discovery; the idea of God is an invention. Religious experience turns on the discovery of God. The constantly changing ideas of God may be said to be the inventions by which the meaning and significance of the basic discovery are made available for life."²¹

Many modern thinkers find difficulty in accepting a conception of God under the description of "personal," but the question is whether it is possible to find a more satisfactory expression. Dr. Pratt makes the suggestion: "If we could still put full and definite meaning into the term *spiritual* while stripping it of the connotations that cling about the word *personal*, it might well be a refuge for the religious soul who cannot and will not accept naturalism as the last word concerning Reality and yet who finds it very difficult to interpret the Divine under the limitations which the word *personal* almost necessarily implies."²² As the same writer insists, the doctrinal terminology and the practices of the religions

are largely symbolic. Different individuals and different religions use diverse symbols for experiences essentially similar and consistent. Opposition between religious communities is chiefly because "we do not understand one another's *symbols*, and we seldom try. And this is partly because we have not stopped to consider the tremendous importance of symbolism in religion, its universality, and the method of its growth. If we should all realize in what varied forms the same truth or the same emotional attitude may be symbolized forth, there would be less mutual recrimination between followers of different faiths."²³

It is important to recognize the nature of the relation of religion to intellectual reflection. The development of religious concepts and religious doctrines has obviously involved the use of intellect. Nevertheless, the study of religions does not suggest that they are based on philosophical reflection. Neither the great leaders of religion nor the normal adherents have based their religion on the acceptance of hypotheses arrived at by intellect. Thought has been brought in for the purpose of finding forms of expression of experience including its religious features. The individual does or does not feel that the worth and significance of life is solely made up of the cultural values limited to terrestrial existence. At least this is clear: that the religions have arisen and continued historically with relation to the experience of persons who have found physical and other secular values not to give complete satisfaction. Religious doctrines are based on certain experiences which, going beyond terrestrial culture values, give a satisfaction these fail to provide. "The purpose of religion is not to explain problems. That is the function of philosophy. Religion is to give us vision and to set us tasks. . . ."²⁴ The Moslem, Dr. Iqbal, contends that "religious ambition soars higher than the ambition of philosophy. Religion is not satisfied with mere conception; it seeks

a more intimate knowledge of and association with the object of its pursuits. The agencies through which this association is achieved is the act of worship or prayer ending in spiritual illumination."²⁵ The beliefs in the religions are expressed in language not specifically meant for the highly learned, who should bear in mind that "formulas and ceremonies cannot be devised to satisfy the profoundest thinker in the community; they must be intelligible to the average intellect and conscience; at least they can only be a very popular presentation of what the wisest man believes."²⁶

The historic religions also imply a "beyond" in another manner besides that of a Divine Object of worship: namely, with reference to the nature and duration of human existence. This has not been explicitly evident and definitely expressed at all stages of their history: it has come only gradually into view. Though the nature of the continuance has been variously described, as transmigration in a series of lives; as perpetuation in a universal consciousness; or as a member of a realm of spiritual beings, the implication of continuance is there. In its more evolved stages the religious mind has never looked upon physical death as a simple disintegration of the entire human being. Nothing that naturalistic secularism can urge is capable of proving that the religions are wrong. The advocates of religion may reasonably contend that in denying or ignoring this belief secularists are guilty of narrowness in a far more definite way than the religions have been. Devotees of religion have not, except in the rarest instances, entirely ruled out the secular goods of this life: the secularist would ignore even when he does not definitely rule out the whole of the prospects of a continued existence beyond terrestrial conditions. Proof of the continuation of life after physical death is logically impossible. There are reasons, chiefly ethical and religious, why men accept the belief. They are ethical so far as there is a yearning

in humanity for an ideal which is not attainable in this life. To some, that ideal and the efforts to reach it appear meaningless if the individual is annihilated on the way to its achievement. Religiously, belief in immortality is associated with the desire for fuller realization of the ideal relationship with the Supreme, for participation in a realm in which spiritual values are fully realized. It has been a serious error of some minds that they have taken the idea of immortality simply as meaning a continuance of existence after death, and have been led to deprecate the values of the present. That betokens a misunderstanding of the teachings of the religions. Immortality for religion is "eternal life" with the implication of the experience of values here and now as well as in a future existence. Immortality or eternal life may be considered as a comprehensive experience of values toward which human effort and Divine cooperation may increasingly lead us in the terrestrial historical process and beyond it.

Religion, then, as embodied in the religions, implies at least these two things: that man participates in a wider whole than the immediately apparent world of physical nature and human society, and that human life is more enduring than the terrestrial existence of three score years and ten, a little more or a little less. Therewith the fundamental question arises: Is the outlook of man, is human endeavor to be dominated by the affairs of earthly life, his relation with nature and society, or somehow oriented mainly with reference to this wider whole? The religions have maintained that man's happiness depends upon its being the latter. From their standpoint a secular sociology must be forever inadequate. Religion is not simply an expression of the emotions associated with a naturalistic social organization but includes the molding and development of society itself under the guidance of ideals attained by relations to a spiritual reality which transcends it. In this the

individual's own inner life plays its part; in this the great religious teachers and saints have their special significance; and as expressing and aiding in the cultivation of this the social historical religious organizations have originated and continue. Thus, though from one standpoint secular and religious values may be distinguished, the chief historical religions in the light of modern thought are seen to involve their intimate relation. All values are constituents of the whole in which the specifically religious values dominate. Thus Professor Gibb in his introduction to a book of studies on Islām says: "Islām of our study is not so much a religion, in the modern detached and private sense of the word, as a fully-rounded society on a religious basis which comprehends every aspect of human life."²⁷ "There is no such thing as a profane world," writes Dr. Iqbal. "All this immensity of matter constitutes a scope for the self-realization of spirit. All is holy ground. As the Prophet so beautifully puts it: 'The whole of this earth is a mosque.'"²⁸ Dr. Griswold gives as a characteristic of Hinduism "the dominance of the religious point of view in all the affairs of life or the supremacy of the religious consciousness."²⁹ Dr. Pratt describes the life of the Hindu as "essentially a religious life. . . . It is a life lived in conscious and constant recognition of a wider environment than the merely immediate and physical, and in un-failing realization of relations that bind human life to a supernatural world."³⁰ And apart from the apparently Zionist attitude of his exposition Mr. Kaplan also virtually contends that Judaism implicates the whole life of the Jews.³¹ With similar implications many Christians talk of a Christian civilization.

The idea has thus been formed, and is still widely held, of divergent cultures allied with the different great religions. Oriental culture has been contrasted with Occidental. There is a sense in which such dif-

ferentiation is valid, but the tendency of modern thought is to transcend it. The inconsistency of Oswald Spengler³² in maintaining that cultures are in conflict with one another, and in fact unintelligible one to another, while yet himself undertaking to describe those cultures shows that the view is unsatisfactory. In contrast there is the idea of a comprehensive universal human culture, which is being developed through world-wide intercourse of very varied kinds. The so-called different cultures and religions are to be regarded as embodying parts—often some of the same parts—of this whole, and placing the main emphasis differently. These cultures make their individual contributions toward the development of a more comprehensive whole. The different religions should also be looked upon similarly with reference to a fuller appreciation of religion and a wider religious life.

The aim of the student of religions at the present time should not be simply to look for common elements in them as though such elements constitute the only really significant aspects of religion. Rather he has to strive for a view of religion which will give a place for all the varied valuable contents of the different religions. That obviously involves the critical consideration of apparent and sometimes real inconsistencies between the historical faiths as they have been traditionally, and are still in the main presented today. Nevertheless, it is important to reiterate, what has been contended above, that as contrasted with modern secularism, the great living religions are in agreement in their implication of human relations beyond the limits of life in contact with nature and human society. On the other hand, the historical religions in their present forms place their main emphases differently: Islām for example on prayer and the doctrine of Divine Unity; Buddhism on salvation from suffering; Christianity on redemption from sin; Zoroastrianism on the

fight against all forms of evil; Hinduism on mystical union or communion with God. Such a statement is necessarily only illustrative: it does not refer to all upon which in these religions emphasis is put.

Religion, as other constituents of human culture, is in process of development, and compared with the long biological evolution of man, he is with regard to culture only in his infancy. But already the ideal, however inadequately conceived as yet, has been put forward in the historical religions that the development of that culture should be dominated by religion. The error that different peoples have diverse and conflicting cultures is unjustifiably used to support a pernicious nationalism. Advance in philosophical study of religion as dominating yet involving an all-inclusive life of values should aid the modern movements in the historical religious communities in such a way as to be the most effective influence against such nationalism. "The larger modernism aims at a world-wide advance of current civilizations through understanding and cooperation between the living religions of East and West with one another and with a humanized science."³⁸ One fundamental ground for most of the conflicts in modern life, between nations and between individuals, is the confusion of thought as to what constitutes the content of a life worth while. Such confusion can be overcome not by reiteration of the general ideas of the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, in the manner of the Idealist philosophies, but only by a detailed consideration and coordination of particular specific values, physical, intellectual, moral, aesthetic, and religious. With a clear comprehensive view of what human welfare actually involves, the fundamental question arises as to whether these are to be obtained by cooperation or through conflict.

It may not yet be possible to reach any completely organic unity of all religious values to which the mod-

ern movements in religions converge. But the hope is reasonable that the reform movements will tend toward increasing harmony in bringing into relief real religious significance. The ideal of a "Fellowship of Faiths" has been advocated, which will give scope for recognition of valuable distinctive contributions of the different religions. The question in each religion is not "How much might be rejected?" but "How much might profitably be retained?" The aim is not uniformity and identity of beliefs and practice among adherents of the same or of different religions but of consistency and harmony of purpose and endeavor. As the liberal Jew, C. G. Montefiore puts it: "There are many pathways which lead to God." To appreciate the implications of this involves an attitude of tolerance, "the reverence for all the possibilities of truth."

The religious wealth of mankind will most probably be increased by scholarly adherents of particular religions remaining faithful to their religions and striving to realize the elements of value in them. The way to comprehensive truth and unity is not likely to be found in the present universal adoption of any one existing religion. There are no signs of any tendency to such adoption. Some indications of the way of advance may be gained by observing how humanity has progressed in other spheres of thought and action. A conference of natural scientists or of industrialists gathered from all parts of the world would reveal many differences of opinion and of practice, but it would also reveal a great amount of consistency of principles and much congruity in action. How has this unity of methods in industry, how have these commonly accepted truths in science been attained? History shows that real, orderly progress began to be made when men asserted a freedom of thought and of action, turned from mere custom and from the reitera-

tion of opinions found in books and popular tradition and began to study nature itself. In the realm of religion and theological expression, a revolution is called for analogous with that which took place with regard to nature and natural science following the work of Bacon. This means a study of the facts of religious experiences, a clear conception of the terms used with reference to them, a careful formulation of the problems involved. And that, in effect, implies this: an abandonment of dogmatism for freedom of the spirit in continued inquiry and progressive attainment. The "confusion and disorder" in religions today is due primarily to dogmatism based upon the authority of certain literary records. In the historical religions, and especially in their sacred scriptures, we have particular formulations of what to persons of past times and different places appeared of religious significance. The fixation of their statements in the form of unchangeable dogmas is no more justifiable than the fixation of past views of nature and human society would be. Man has to be aware of suppressing his own spontaneous religious emotion and restricting his own intellectual effort in order to adhere to traditional schemes.

The future lends an illimitable prospect. What is not achieved today one may try to achieve tomorrow. "*Der Weltgeist hat Zeit genug*"—the world spirit has time enough—says a German proverb. The conviction that values can be achieved, the active effort to attain the best open to us: that is of the essence of religious faith. What life may become is only partially known to us: the knowledge of the ideal, like its achievement, comes only gradually in history. It has not seldom happened that apparent failures have led on to the greatest successes. A failure for a time may be a gain in the long run. So from philosophical

discussion and theological phraseology religious confidence passes to poetical expression:

“We know full well that, in the dim Hereafter,
The Thread of that Great Scheme, whereof this Life
Is—as a something tells us—but a part,
Shall not be lost, but taken up again,
And woven into one completed Whole.”

NOTES *

CHAPTER I

MODERN LIFE AND RELIGION

1. See especially, Wang, T. C.: *The Youth Movement in China*. New York, 1927. pp. 7, 32, etc.; and *China, Yesterday and Today*. ed. by J. E. Johnsen. New York, 5th ed., 1927.
2. Clennell, W. J.: *The Historical Development of Religion in China*. 2nd ed. London, 1926. New Preface.
3. High, S.: *China's Place in the Sun*. New York, 1922. p. 142 quoting Putnam Weale.
4. Gilbert, R.: *What's Wrong with China?* London, 1926. p. 75.
5. Peffer, N.: *China, the Collapse of a Civilization*. New York, 1930. p. 173.
6. Dewey, J.: in *Asia*. July, 1921.
7. Cash, W. W.: *The Expansion of Islam*. London, 1928. p. 7; see also Franck, H. A.: *The Fringe of the Moslem World*. New York, 1928; and Stoddard, L.: *The New World of Islam*. Boston, 1922.
8. Yusuke Tsurumi: *Present Day Japan*. New York, 1927. pp. 55-56.
9. T'ang Leang-li: in *The Foundations of Modern China*. London, 1928. p. 231.
10. Chirol, V.: *The Occident and the Orient*. London, 1924. p. 82.
11. Close, U.: *The Revolt of Asia*. New York, 1927. p. 247.
12. Mathews, B.: in *The Moslem World of Today*. New York, 1925. p. 63.
13. Clennell, W. J.: *op. cit.* p. 245.
14. Chirol, V.: *op. cit.* p. 4.
15. Levonian, L.: *Moslem Mentality*. London, 1928. p. 133.
16. Wang, T. C.: *op. cit.* pp. 187, 188.
17. Widgery, A. G., and Bhambhani, P. M.: *The Dev Samaj: A Modern Indian Ethico-Religious Movement*. *The Indian Philosophical Review*. Vol. III. 1919-20.
18. Shotwell, J. T.: *The Religious Revolution of Today*. New York, 1924. 2nd ed. p. 66.
19. Cooper, C. C.: *Religion and the Modern Mind*. New York, 1929. Editor in his introduction.
20. Macnicol, N.: *The Making of Modern India*. London, 1924. p. 41.

*Owing to the special aim of this book, most of the sources in the main texts of the religions involved in this study are not mentioned here: they have been given in detail in my earlier systematic work: *The Comparative Study of Religions*. London, 1923.

21. Yusuke Tsurumi: *op. cit.* p. 7.
22. Ketkar, S. V.: *An Essay on Hinduism, its Formation and Future.* London, 1911. p. 157.
23. Hackmann, H.: *A German Scholar in the East.* London, 1914. p. 223.

CHAPTER II

HINDUISM

1. See for example, Radhakrishnan, S.: *The Hindu View of Life.* London, 1927. p. 32. who quotes: "The worshipers of the Absolute are the highest in rank; second to them are the worshipers of the incarnations like Rama, Krishna, Buddha; below them are those who worship ancestors, deities, and sages; and lowest of all are the worshipers of the petty forces and spirits."
2. Hume, R. E.: *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads.* London, 1921. p. 423.
3. See further: Widgery, A. G.: *Comparative Study of Religions.* London, 1923. pp. 52-53. Even Swami Dayananda, founder of the modern Arya Samaj, said "The four Vedas, the repository of religious truth, are the word of God." Lajpat Rai: *The Arya Samaj, an Indian Movement.* London, 1915. pp. 79, 43, writes of the Swami's teaching: "The Vedas were the word of God; they had been revealed in the beginning of creation for the good of the race: they alone were the primeval revelation."
4. L. D. Barnett's translation: *Bhagavad-Gītā or The Lord's Song.* London, 1905, has a long introduction discussing the various philosophical implications. The latest translation is by E. J. Thomas. London, 1931.
5. With, of course, frequent polytheistic appearances. See Macnicol, N.: *Indian Theism from the Vedic to the Muhammedan Period.* London, 1915.
6. *Kaṭha Upanishad.* 5.12.
7. *Svetāśvatara Upanishad.* 4. 19-20.
8. *Bhagavad-Gītā.* X. 8.
9. *Bṛhād-Araṇyaka Upanishad.* 7.23.
10. Pratt, J. B.: *India and Its Faiths: A Traveler's Record.* New York, 1915. pp. 64, 65.
11. Avalon, A. (Woodroffe, John): *Hymns to the Goddess.* London, 1913. pp. 45, 30.
12. Radhakrishnan: *op. cit.* p. 15. From this standpoint another Indian scholar criticizes the Occidental attitude: Shastri, Prabhu Dutt: *The Essentials of Eastern Philosophy.* New York, 1926. p. 9. "You seem to be laboring under the impression that the intellect provides you with a master key to the solution of every problem."
13. *Bṛhād-Araṇyaka Upanishad.* 4.6.
14. *Ibid.* 1. 3. 28.
15. See further. Widgery, A. G.: *The Principles of Hindu Ethics.* *International Journal of Ethics.* January, 1930. pp. 232-245.

NOTES: HINDUISM

16. Mahabhadgavat, L.: *The Heart of the Bhagavad-Gītā*. Baroda, India. 1918.
17. Macnicol, N.: *Psalms of Maratha Saints*. Calcutta, 1919. p. 35.
18. On this important subject see Dasgupta, S. N.: *Yoga Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems of Indian Thought*. Calcutta, 1930; also *The Yoga Sūtras of Patanjali* translated by Rama Prasada, Allahabad, 1912. Educated modern Hindus even if they do not reject the stories of supernormal powers obtained by the practices of *Yoga*, do not regard such powers as of any important significance as compared with the state of religious peace supposed to be attained. A "Yoga Institute of India" has been recently established in Bombay for the promotion of the study and practice of *Yoga* and has inaugurated a monthly magazine, "Yoga," described as the International Journal of the Science of *Yoga*.
19. *Bhagavad-Gītā*. IX. 26-27.
20. Sharma, S. R.: *Swami Rama Tirtha, The Poet Apostle of Practical Vedanta*. Mangalore, India. 1921. pp. 57-58.
21. An account of most of the outstanding modern movements in Hinduism is given in Farquhar, J. N.: *Modern Religious Movements in India*. New York, 1915. This work, however, does not sufficiently consider the real motives and spirit of the movements. It treats as reactionary those which cling closely to fundamentally Hindu conceptions and practices, regarding as truly reforms only those which like the Brahmo Samaj show a predominant Western influence. The book is useful simply for its historical, geographical, numerical, and bibliographical facts concerning the movements.
22. Anonymous: *The Swami Narayan Sect and its Leaders*. Rajkot, India. 1909.
23. See Sivanath Sastri: *History of the Brahmo Samaj*. Calcutta. Vol. I. 1911. Vol. II. 1912.
24. Müller, F. Max: *Ramakrishna: His Life and Sayings*. New York, 1899. pp. 181, 180, 135, 140, 367, 186.
25. Vivekananda, Swami: *Raja Yoga*. New York, 1927.
26. *Ibid.* p. 338.
27. *Ibid.* p. 245.
28. Vivekananda, Swami: *Inspired Talks*. Mylapore, Madras. 1921. pp. 126, 84, 61.
29. Vivekananda, Swami: *The Science and Philosophy of Religion*. Calcutta, 1915. pp. 130-131.
30. *Why Do We Not Believe in God?* Lahore, n.d. p. 9.
31. *A Message for My Educated Countrymen*. Lahore, n.d. p. 14.
32. Radhakrishnan: *op. cit.* p. 130.
33. See for example Dasgupta, S. N.: *History of Indian Philosophy*. Vol. I. Cambridge, 1922; Vol. II. 1932; Ranade, R. D.: *Constructive Philosophy of the Upanishads*. Poona, 1926; and *Indian Mysticism*. Poona, 1933; Radhakrishnan, S.: *Indian Philosophy*. London. Vol. I, 1923; Vol. II, 1929; and the series "The Sacred Books of The Hindus," published from Allahabad.
34. Shastri, Prabhu Dutt: *Essentials of Eastern Philosophy*. New York, 1926. p. 28.
35. See Thomas, W.: *Hinduism Invades America*. New York, 1930.
36. Pratt, J. B.: *op. cit.* pp. 474-475.

CHAPTER III

BUDDHISM

1. For details concerning the records of the life of Buddha, see especially Thomas, E. J.: *The Life of Buddha as Legend and History*. London, 1927; Brewster, E. H.: *The Life of Gotama the Buddha* (compiled exclusively from the Pali Canon). London, 1926. In *Gotama the Man*. London, 1928, Mrs. C. Rhys Davids gives in more popular form a sort of "selbstdarstellung" of the Buddha and his teaching. Of earlier works mention must be made of Oldenberg, H.: *Buddha*, 9th ed. Berlin, 1921; and Coomaraswamy, A.: *Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism*. New York, 1926. Concerning the Buddhist Scriptures, see Thomas, E. J.: *The History of Buddhist Thought*. London, 1933. Appendix I and Bibliography.
2. *Mahāvagga*. VIII. 26. 3. SBE. Vol. XVII. p. 241.
3. Thomas, E. J.: *op. cit.* p. 32.
4. *Dīgha Nikāya*. XIV. As quoted by Brewster, E. H.: *op. cit.* pp. 19; 28-29.
5. *Mahāvagga*. I. 6.8. SBE. Vol. XIII. p. 91.
6. *Saṃyutta Nikāya*. I. 1.2. trs. Rhys, Davids C. A. F.: *The Book of the Kindred Sayings*. London, 1917. Vol. I.
7. *Mahāvagga*. I. 11. 1 SBE. Vol. XIII. pp. 112-113.
8. de Silva, W. A.: in *Buddhist Annual of Ceylon*. 1927. p. 5.
9. See Saunders, K. J.: *Epochs in Buddhist History*. Chicago, 1924. concerning main lines of the history of Buddhism.
10. *Mahāvagga*. I. 6. 19-23. SBE. Vol. XIII. pp. 95-96.
11. *Ibid.* I. 6. 17-18. SBE. Vol. XIII. pp. 94-95.
12. *Saṃyutta Nikāya* IV.
13. For discussions of this subject, see especially: Rhys Davids C. A. F.: *Buddhist Psychology*. 2nd ed. London, 1924; Keith, A. B.: *Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon*. Oxford, 1923. pp. 75-95; De la Vallée Poussin: *The Way to Nirvāṇa*. Cambridge, 1917. pp. 30-56; Thomas, E. J.: *The History of Buddhist Thought*. London, 1933. pp. 93-106.
14. *Mahāvagga*. I. 6.33.
15. *Ibid.* I. 5.12.
16. Concerning the varied accounts of the chains of causation, an important feature of Buddhist discussion, see Dasgupta, S. N.: *History of Indian Philosophy*. Cambridge, 1922. Vol. I. p. 84 ff.
17. Warren, H. C.: *Buddhism in Translations*. Cambridge (Mass.), 1922. p. 83.
18. *Mahāvagga*. VI. 31.6. SBE. Vol. XVII. p. 112.
19. See Saunders, K. J.: *Buddhism in the Modern World*. London, 1922. p. 32. "Buddhism is often labelled pessimistic, because its writings are full of attempts to make men realize the suffering and the worthlessness of the life to which they cling. The critics, however, do not realize the hopes which it holds out to a suffering world, which are just as characteristic of Buddhist teaching. The Buddhist replies: If medical science is pessimistic then Buddhism is also pessimistic. It diagnoses the disease in order to cure it."

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21. *Dhammapada.* XV. 197-200. SBE. Vol. X. Oxford, 1898. p. 54.
22. De La Vallée Poussin: *The Way to Nirvāṇa.* Cambridge, 1917. p. 131; and later *Nirvāṇa.* Paris, 1925.
23. *Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta.* II. 100. In *Dialogues of the Buddha.* Trs. Rhys Davids, T. W. and C. A. F. London, 1910. Vol. III. p. 108.
24. Quoted by Thomas, E. J.: *The History of Buddhist Thought.* London, 1933. p. 254.
25. Keith, A. B.: *op. cit.* pp. 293-294.
26. Quoted by Saunders, K. J.: *Epochs in Buddhist History.* p. 142.
27. Thomas, E. J.: *The History of Buddhist Thought.* p. 217.
28. Pratt, J. B.: *The Pilgrimage of Buddhism and a Buddhist Pilgrimage.* New York, 1928. pp. 218-219.
29. Anesaki, M.: *History of Japanese Buddhism.* London, 1930. p. 173.
30. Miyamoto, S.: on *Mahāyāna Buddhism in Religions of the Empire.* ed. W. L. Hare. London, 1925. p. 194.
31. Anesaki, M.: *op. cit.* p. 174.
32. Pratt, J. B.: *op. cit.* p. 654.
33. Miyamoto, S.: *op. cit.* pp. 182, 194.
34. Thomas, E. J.: *History, etc.* pp. 257-258.
35. For the latest and most comprehensive study of the general conditions of modern Buddhism see Pratt, J. B.: *op. cit.* See also Saunders, K. J.: *Buddhism in the Modern World.* London, 1922.
36. Hackman, H.: *Buddhism as a Religion.* 2nd ed. London, 1910. pp. 112, 119.
37. Purser, L. C. B. and Saunders, K. J.: *Modern Buddhism in Burma.* Rangoon, 1914.
38. Campbell, J. C.: *Siam in the Twentieth Century.* London, 1902.
39. Starr, F.: *Korean Buddhism.* Boston, 1918; and Pratt, J. B.: *op. cit.*
40. Johnston, R. F.: *Buddhist China.* 1913. p. viii; also Hodous, L.: *Buddhism and Buddhists in China.* New York, 1924. pp. 66-69; Yu Yui Tsu: "Present Tendencies in Chinese Buddhism" in *The Journal of Religion.* Chicago. May, 1921.
41. Dahlke, P.: *Buddhist Essays.* Eng. trs. London, 1908. p. 361. See also Grimm, G.: *The Doctrine of the Buddha: the Religion of Reason.* Leipzig, 1926. A lady, apparently a convert with theosophical sympathies, Cleather, A. L.: in *Buddhism, the Science of Life.* Peking, 1928. p. 8, says: "Nothing but general acceptance of the pure teachings of Buddhism can save the human race from falling into 'that bottomless pit where despair is forgotten and where effort is unknown.'" Cf. Strauss, C. T.: *The Buddha and His Doctrine.* London, 1923. Bhikshu Subhadra in *A Buddhist Catechism* for the use of Europeans. 1895. trs. from the 4th German edition, gives a rationalized summary of Buddhism on Thera-vāda lines maintaining that it is a faith that will hold the educated of today.
42. *The Eastern Buddhist.* 1921. p. 80; *The Mahābodhi Journal.* 1927. pp. 301, 207; *The Buddhist Annual of Ceylon.* 1927. p. 76; and Anagarika Dharmapala: *The Arya Dhamma of Sakya Muni, Gautama Buddha.* Calcutta, 1917. pp. 130-131.

43. Anesaki, M.: *op. cit.* pp. 53-54; Hodous, L.: *op. cit.* p. 69; Anesaki, M.: *ibid.* p. 66; Ananda Metteya: *Buddhism and the Modern World in Buddhist Annual of Ceylon.* 1928. p. 147.

CHAPTER IV

JAINISM

1. For discussion of this subject see Barodia, U. D. *History and Literature of Jainism*, Bombay, 1909, and "Seeker" *Notes on the Sthanakwasi or the non-idolatrours Shwetambar Jains*, Dewas (India) 1911.
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3. These dreams and their interpretation are given in attractive language in the *Kalpa Sūtra*: see the translation by Jacobi H. in *Sacred Books of the East*, Oxford, 1884. Vol. XXII, pp. 219-222.
4. *Ācārāṅga Sūtra*. Trs. by Jacobi, H. *Sacred Books of the East*, Oxford, 1884. Vol. XXII, pp. 200, 261.
5. Barodia, U. D.: *op. cit.* p. 41.
6. *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra*. Translated by Jacobi, H. *Sacred Books of the East*. Oxford, 1895. Vol. XLV. p. 156.
7. In translation of Sri Umaswami Acharya: *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra*: A treatise on the essential principles of Jainism. Arrah (India) 1920. p. 15.
8. Jain, C. R.: *The Key of Knowledge*. Arrah, 1919, 2nd ed., pp. 887, 886.
9. Jain, C. R.: *op. cit.*, p. 887.
10. Nemichandra Siddhānta-Chakravarti: *Dravya-Saṃgraha*. A compendium of substances. Translated by S. C. Ghosal, Arrah, 1918. Preface.
11. *Ācārāṅga Sūtra*. p. 27.
12. *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra*. p. 21.
13. *Dravya-Saṃgraha*. p. 105.
14. See Jhaveri, H. L.: *The First Principles of Jain Philosophy*. London, 1910. "The highest being is a person, and not an impersonal characterless or qualityless being."
15. Jain, C. R.: *What Is Jainism?* Arrah, 1917. p. 5.
16. Sri Kundakundacharya: *Pañchāstikāyasāra*, the five cosmic constituents. Translated by A. Chakravarti, Arrah, 1920. p. 17.
17. *Pañchāstikāyasāra*, p. 33.
18. *Pañchāstikāyasāra*, p. 19.
19. *Ācārāṅga Sūtra*, p. 33.
20. Jain, C. R.: *The Gospel of Immortality and Joy*. Hardoi, 1919. p. 9.
21. Stevenson, S. (Mrs.): *The Heart of Jainism*. London, 1915. p. 192.
22. Jain, C. R.: *What Is Jainism?* Arrah, 1917.
23. Jain, C. R.: *Key of Knowledge*. p. 887.
24. *Dravyasaṃgraha*, p. 109.
25. *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra*, pp. 37, 32, 70, 91.
26. *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra*, p. 24.

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27. Karbhari, B. F.: *The Karma Philosophy*. (Speeches and Writings of V. R. Gandhi.) Bombay, 1913. pp. 3, 5. This book discusses the subject in detail.
28. Stevenson, S.: *op cit.* p. 39.
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30. Jaini, J. L.: *Outlines of Jainism*. Cambridge, 1916. p. xxi.
31. Jain, C. R.: *Gospel of Immortality and Joy*. p. 6; *The Key of Knowledge*, p. 153.
32. Barodia, U. D.: *op. cit.* p. 15.
33. *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra*. pp. 40, 63.
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35. Stevenson, S.: *op. cit.* p. 260.
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SIKHISM

1. The one indispensable authority on Sikhism, to which this account is chiefly indebted is Macauliffe, M. A.: *The Sikh Religion, Its Gurus, Sacred Writings and Authors*. In six volumes. Oxford, 1909. See also Khasan, Singh: *History and Philosophy of the Sikh Religion*. Lahore, 1914; Cunningham, J. D.: *A History of the Sikhs*. 2nd ed. Oxford, 1934.
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3. *Ibid.* pp. 11, 21.
4. *Ibid.* Vol. V. p. 245.
5. *Ibid.* Vol. I. pp. 195, 123; Vol. IV. p. 242.
6. *Ibid.* Vol. III. p. 256.
7. *Ibid.* Vol. I. pp. 196, 15, 135.
8. *Ibid.* Vol. I. pp. 33, 24.
9. *Ibid.* Vol. II. pp. 162, 328.
10. *Ibid.* Vol. IV. pp. 117, 417; Vol. I. pp. 280, 28, 337.
11. *Ibid.* Vol. IV. p. 396; Vol. II. p. 191; Vol. I. p. 270; Vol. II. p. 145; cf. Introduction I. pp. xxiv-xxv.
12. *Ibid.* Vol. IV. p. 261.
13. *Ibid.* Vol. I. p. 60.
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4. Goddard, D. in: *China, Yesterday and Today*. New York, 1932. 5th ed. pp. 66-67.
5. Bonsall, B. S.: *Confucianism and Taoism*. London, 1934. p. 40.
6. Lyall, L. A.: *The Sayings of Confucius*. 2nd ed. London, 1925.
7. Starr, F.: *Confucianism: Ethics, Philosophy, Religion*. New York, 1930. p. 238.
8. Giles, H. A.: *Confucianism and Its Rivals*. London, 1915. p. 66.
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10. *Ibid.* pp. 68-75.
11. Dubs, H. H.: *Hsintze, the Moulder of Ancient Confucianism*. London, 1927. pp. 60-61.
12. Giles, H. A.: *op. cit.* pp. 234, 240, 239.
13. Bruce, J. P.: *Chu Hsi and His Masters*. London, 1923. pp. 316, 294, 303, 306, 293.
14. Giles, H. A.: *op. cit.* p. 264.
15. Dubs, H. H.: *op. cit.* pp. 275-276.
16. *Ibid.* p. 60.
17. Lyall, L. A.: *op. cit.* p. 31.
18. Dubs, H. H.: *op. cit.* p. 64.
19. Bruce, J. P.: *op. cit.* p. 281.
20. Yi-Pas-Mei: *The Ethical and Political Works of Motse*. London, 1929. pp. 142, 150, 153.
21. Lyall, L. A.: *op. cit.* pp. 52, 13.
22. Bruce: *op. cit.* p. 308.
23. Giles: *op. cit.* p. 95.
24. Maclagan, P. J.: *Chinese Religious Ideas*. London, 1926. p. 155.
25. Tsai, Y. P. in: *China, Yesterday and Today*. p. 91.
26. Maclagan, P. J.: *op. cit.* p. 173.
27. Lyall, L. A.: *op. cit.* p. 47.
28. Anesaki, M.: *History of Japanese Religion*. London, 1930. p. 100.
29. Wang, T. C.: *The Youth Movement in China*. New York, 1927. p. 145, quoting a letter of Lin Su.
30. *Ibid.* p. 103, quoting from the writings of Wu Ni.
31. *Ibid.* p. 102, quoting Chen Tu-sen.
32. See T'ang Leang-li: *The Foundations of Modern China*. London, 1928. p. 109.
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SHINTO

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2. Anesaki, M.: *History of Japanese Religion*. London, 1930. pp. 7, 19.
3. Underwood, H. G.: *The Religions of Eastern Asia*. New York, 1910. p. 84.
4. Kato, G. (Professor of Shinto at the Imperial University, Tokyo): *A Study of Shinto: The Religion of the Japanese Nation*. Tokyo, 1926. Introduction.
5. Knox, G. L.: *The Development of Religion in Japan*. New York, 1907. p. 77.
6. Lowell, P.: *Occult Japan*. London, 1894. p. 19; see also Allen, G. C.: *op. cit.*
7. Nitobe, I.: *The Japanese Nation*. New York, 1912. p. 131.
8. Anesaki, M.: *op. cit.* p. 39.
9. *Nihongi*, I: 77.
10. Anesaki, M.: *op. cit.* p. 34.
11. Anesaki, M.: *op. cit.* p. 237.
12. Quoted by Kato, G.: *op. cit.* p. 185.
13. Quoted by Kato, G.: *op. cit.* p. 168. See further Anesaki: *op. cit.* p. 268, referring to Nohiyoshi (1615-19) who attempted to introduce a religion verging on monotheism and Goretarii (1616-94) who discarded the supposed occult ideas and practices and emphasized the ethical.
14. Anesaki, M.: *op. cit.* p. 268.
15. Underwood, A. C.: *Shintoism, the Indigenous Religion of Japan*. London, 1934.
16. Ashton, W. G.: *Shinto, the Way of the Gods*. London, 1905. pp. 368-369, 371.
17. Kato, G.: *op. cit.* p. 165, quoting a writer of the Tokugawa regime.
18. Nitobe, I.: *op. cit.* p. 133.
19. Tsurumi, Y.: *Present Day Japan*. New York, 1927. p. 40.
20. Quoted by Underwood, H. G.: *op. cit.* pp. 74-75.
21. Anesaki, M.: *op. cit.*, p. 314.
22. Anesaki, M.: *op. cit.*; Ashton, W. G.: *op. cit.* p. 375, give different accounts of Tenrikyo; though Anesaki's is probably more accurately expressed. Ashton says the worship centers about two deities who are, however, thought of as diverse but related aspects of existence; Izanagi and Izanami—the early mythological deities, now symbolized as Heaven and Earth, or in human society as though man and wife. "These Gods are spiritual beings revealed in the heart of man, and endowed with personal attributes." The sect is said to have high moral aims and to have made such rapid progress that by 1894 it claimed nearly one and a half million adherents and thousands of priests.
23. Anesaki, M.: *op. cit.* p. 372.
24. Knox, G. L.: *op. cit.* p. 79.
25. *The Biblical World*. July, 1919.

26. *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*. xlix, pt. 2, p. 99. Even Professor Kato: *op. cit.* p. 200, speaks of the "feeling of national pride and strong faith that Japan, of all nations under the sun, is unique, rejoicing in the divine rule of one and the same Imperial Dynasty, unbroken and co-eternal with Heaven and Earth. Needless to add, such being the case the people of Japan cannot help believing in the Providence of unseen help of the national deities on high. . . ."
27. Underwood, A. C.: *op. cit.* p. 111.
28. Nitobe, I.: *op. cit.* pp. 137, 136.
29. Knox, G. L.: *op. cit.* pp. 75-76.

CHAPTER VI

ZOROASTRIANISM

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2. Jackson, A. V. W.: *Zoroaster, the Prophet of Ancient Iran*. New York, also Geiger, W.: *Zarathustra in the Gathas*; etc. ed. by Sanjana, D. P.: Leipzig, 1899.
3. Geldner, K.: in *Encyc. Brit.* 11th ed. vol. xxviii. p. 1040.
4. *Vendidad*. XIX. 6.
5. Modi, J. J.: *The Persian Farziat-Nameh and Kholasch-i-Din of Dastur Darab Pahlav*. Bombay, 1924. pp. 68-69.
6. From Moulton, J. H.'s translation of the *Gathas*: *op. cit.* pp. 343-390; see also his *Early Religious Poetry of Persia*. Cambridge, 1911.
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8. Dhalla, M. N.: *Zoroastrian Theology*. New York, 1914. pp. 51, 17.
9. Hormusjee, B.: *The Creed of Zarathustra* in *Journal of the Iranian Association*. Vol. II. p. 2.
10. Dhalla, M. N.: *op. cit.* pp. 289-290.
11. Moulton, J. H., has discussed the subject in detail: *op. cit.* Lecture VIII.
12. Modi, J. J.: *The Religious Ceremonies and Customs of the Parsees*. Bombay, 1922; see also Murzban, M. M., and Menant, D.: *The Parsis in India*. Vol. 2. Bombay, 1917.
13. Modi, J. J.: *op. cit.* pp. 85-86.
14. On the whole subject, see Pavry, J. D. C.: *The Zoroastrian Doctrine of a Future Life*. New York, 1926.
15. Dhalla, M. N.: *op. cit.* pp. 348-349.
16. *Vendidad*. V. 21.
17. Modi, J. J.: *op. cit.* p. 195.
18. Hormusjee, B.: *op. cit.* p. 66.
19. Anklesaria, B. T.: *Journal of the Iranian Association*. Bombay. Vol. IV. 1915. p. 322.
20. Madan, D. M.: *Journal of the Iranian Association*. II. p. 216-217.
21. *Journal of the Iranian Association*. Vol. IV. p. 133.
22. Cursetjee, C. M. in the *Journal of the Iranian Association*. Vol. IV. p. 88.

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23. *Journal of the Iranian Association*. Vol. III. 1914. p. 176.
24. Modi, J. J.: *A Catechism of the Zoroastrian Religion*. Bombay, 1911. p. 3; see also Mills, L.: *The Lore of the Avesta in Catechetical Dialogue*. Bombay, 1916.
25. *Journal of the Iranian Association*. Vol. II.
26. *Zoroastrian Theology*. pp. 370-371.
27. Dhalla, M. N.: *Our Perfecting World*. New York, 1930. p. 9.

CHAPTER VII JUDAISM

1. See Graetz, H.: *History of the Jews*. New York, 1926. Smith, W. R.: *Religion of the Semites*. London, 1914. Kohler, K.: *Jewish Theology*. New York, 1918.
2. It was not till 1858 that the Jews gained complete emancipation in England. A bill for the emancipation of the Jews had passed both Houses of Parliament in England in 1753, but had eventually to be withdrawn because the public agitation against it was so great. In France, the Jews obtained civil emancipation in 1791. By an edict in 1812, Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia gave Jews considerable liberty in his dominions. Writing in 1899, Arnold White in *The Modern Jew*, New York, states that "anti-Semitism is palpably on the increase." Today it is a policy sanctioned by the German government. There are various reasons for anti-Semitism, but this is not the place to consider them otherwise than to state that religious differences are not a main cause of the present outbreak.
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6. Joseph, N. S.: *Essentials of Judaism*. London, 1906. pp. 5-6.
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10. Farbridge, M. H.: *Judaism and the Modern Mind*. New York, 1927. p. 162.

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16. Levinthal, I. H.: *op. cit.* p. 125.
17. *The Legacy of Israel*, ed. by E. R. Bevan, and C. Singer. Oxford, 1927. p. 521.
18. Levinthal, I. H.: *op. cit.* p. 129.
19. *Ibid.* p. 23.
20. Schechter, S.: *Studies in Judaism*. Philadelphia, 1924. Vol. 3. p. 273.
21. Joseph, M.: *The Message of Judaism*. London, 1907. p. 180.
22. Farbridge, M. H.: *op. cit.* p. 19.
23. Fleg, E.: *Why I Am a Jew*. New York, 1929, p. 67.
24. Levinthal, I. H.: *op. cit.* p. 163.
25. Kaplan, M. M.: *Judaism As a Civilization: Toward a Reconstruction of American Jewish Life*. New York, 1934. p. 9; but consult whole of Chapter I.
26. Levinthal, I. H.: *op. cit.* p. 145.
27. Philipson, D.: *op. cit.* p. 489.
28. Philipson, D.: *op. cit.* p. 492.
29. Joseph, M.: *op. cit.* p. 99.
30. Montefiore, C. G.: *Outline of Liberal Judaism*. p. 168 and note.
31. Philipson, D.: *op. cit.* p. 489.
32. *Judaism: a Manual for the Instruction of Proselytes*. Cincinnati, 1928. p. 5.
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34. Karpeles, G.: *Jews and Judaism in the Nineteenth Century*. Philadelphia, 1905. p. 81.
35. Philipson, D.: *op. cit.* p. 461.
36. See Montefiore, C. G.: "Has Judaism a Future?" *Hibbert Journal*. October, 1920.
37. Gottheil, R.: *Zionism*. Philadelphia, 1914. pp. 207, 190, 206. See also in criticism of Zionism: Jastrow, M. (Jr.) *Zionism and the Future of Palestine: The Fallacies and Dangers of Political Zionism*. New York, 1919. He says that reform Judaism logically involves removing from the religion all Zionist aspects. Judaism implies the eradication of all national and racial barriers, under the inspiration of the belief that Providence extends His care over all mankind. See also Lichtenstein, M.: *op. cit.* pp. 175, 177; and *The Legacy of Israel*. p. 517.
38. Levinthal, I. H.: *op. cit.* pp. 205, 206.
39. Rall, H. F. and Cohon, S.: *Christianity and Judaism Compare Notes*. New York, 1927. pp. 69, 18, 19.
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41. Wise, J. W.: *Liberalizing Liberal Judaism*. New York, 1924. pp. 39, 47, 50, 68.

42. Kaplan, M.: *op. cit.* The whole volume deserves careful study. See especially chapter ix; pp. 130, 173, 169, 209.
43. Hirsch, E. G., in the *Jewish Encyclopedia*. x. p. 350.
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CHAPTER VIII

ISLĀM

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2. Cromer (Lord): *Modern Egypt*. London, 1908; 2nd ed. 1911. p. 637.
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4. *The East and the West*. London, 1911. Vol. IX. p. 319.
5. *World Missionary Conference Report*. Vol. I. p. 152.
6. Iqbal, M.: *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām*. Lahore, 1934. p. 9.
7. Gibb, H. A. R. (ed.): *Whither Islām?* London, 1932. p. 343. See also Stoddard, L.: *The New World of Islām*. New York, 1921. p. 58. who says: "Nothing better shows modern Islām's quickened vitality than the revival of missionary fervor during the past hundred years."
8. The Wāḥḥābī movement, a puritan movement, aimed at a return to primitive Islām, and took the Qurān interpreted literally as the sole guide for human action. After a time it appeared essentially reactionary and to lose its power, nevertheless, its influence became a definite factor in leading to later reform, as is indicated by Gibb, H. A. R.: *op. cit.* p. 58; and Stoddard, L.: *op. cit.* pp. 30-31.
9. Ali, Muhammed: *Islām, the Religion of Humanity*. London, 1916. p. 6.
10. Ali, Ameer: *Islām*. London, 1914. p. 53, quoting the *Mishkāṭ*.
11. *Islamic Review*. II. 1914. p. 49, 4; V. 1917. pp. 12, 17. For an account of Muhammed by a modern Moslem, see Kamāl-ud-din, Khwāja: *The Ideal Prophet*. London, 1925. In his introduction the author tries to rebut the charge that the picture of Muhammed is idealized in Neo-Islām. He says: "The space here debars me from describing the various sides of the character of the Holy Prophet. History fails to point to any other personality than him where we find the assemblage of all the virtues that contribute an evolved humanity. His simplicity, his humanity, his generosity, his frugality, his broadmindedness, his forbearance, his earnestness of purpose, his steadfastness, his firmness in adversity, his meekness in power, his humility in greatness, his anxious care for animals, his passionate love for children, his bravery and courage, his magnanimity, his unbending sense of justice. Volumes are needed to do justice to this superman."
12. For detailed discussion see: Nicholson, R. A.: *Studies in Islamic Mysticism*. Cambridge, 1931. pp. 87, 107-108.
13. There are a few isolated instances of a change of attitude. Levanon, L.: *Moslem Mentality*. London, 1928. pp. 63-64, quotes an

eminent Turkish writer Djelal Nouri Bey from a book entitled *The Turkish Revolution* as follows: "In my opinion, even the collection of the Qurān in the form of a book was not good and profitable. We do not know whether the Prophet ordered such a collection to be made at all. . . . Each commandment in the Qurān is related to the special situation of that time. With regard to the Hadīths, no one can prove their truth except in the case of perhaps ten or fifteen only. . . . Our doctors could now show Islām to the people in an attractive form." Titus, Murray T.: *Indian Islām*. London, 1930. p. 216, quotes Ahmad Hussain, *Notes on Islām*, pp. 39, 83, as calling the Qurān "a collection of sermons, commands, and instructions, delivered and issued from time to time as occasion required. . . ." and saying "you have to interpret the Qurān quite naturally as any other book or historic document." Mr. Titus appears justified in his contention that Muhammed Ali who claims to be thoroughly modern and scientific in his commentary on the Qurān, does not seriously face the question as to its real nature and origin.

14. Blunt, W. S.: *op. cit.*
15. Ali, Ameer: *The Spirit of Islām*. London, 1891.
16. Adams, C. C.: *Islām and Modernism in Egypt*. London, 1933. p. 201.
17. *Ibid.* pp. 109, 190.
18. *The Review of Religions*. Qadian. Vol. XV. p. 296.
19. For the personal tone of Sūfiism, see Nicholson, R. A.: *The Idea of Personality in Sufism*. Cambridge, 1923.
20. Nicholson, R. A.: *Studies in Islamic Mysticism*, preface vi. cf. also Wilson, S. G.: *Modern Movements among Moslems*. New York, 1916. pp. 14, 21. who maintains that Sūfiism has permeated and modified Islām, quoting Von Kremer that "Sūfiism is the preponderating element in Moslem civilization."
21. Adams, C. C.: *op. cit.* p. 203.
22. Quoted in Goldzieher, I.: *Vorlesungen über den Islām*. 1910. Chapter IV.
23. Nicholson, R. A.: *The Mystics of Islām*. London, 1914. p. 116.
24. Gibb, H. A. R.: *op. cit.* p. 34.
25. *The East and the West*. London, 1903. Vol. I. p. 153.
26. Adams, C. C.: *op. cit.* p. 151.
27. Iqbal, M.: *op. cit.* p. 170.
28. *Ibid.* pp. 161, 163, 165, 167.
29. Bukhsh, S. K.: *Essays Indian and Islāmic*. London, 1912. p. 264.
30. *Islāmic Review*. 1914. Vol. II. p. 67.
31. Ali, M.: *op. cit.* p. 27.
32. Titus, Murray T.: *Indian Islām*. 1930. p. 208. "This, in fact, is the plea of all the modernists: they all agree that the 'Islām of Muhammed', the 'Islām of the Qurān', is without blemish and without spot, and that 'its genuine and chief principles are in perfect harmony' with Nature and reason." See also Adams, C. C.: *op. cit.* p. 134.
33. Ali, Ameer: *Hibbert Journal*. 1906. pp. 242, 259.
34. Adams, C. C.: *op. cit.* p. 13.
35. In: *Whither Islām?* Chapter III. pp. 36, 115.
36. See *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*. Vol. II. p. 905; also *Hibbert Journal*. 1910. Vol. VIII. p. 643.
37. Iqbal, M.: *op. cit.* p. 225.

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38. In: *Whither Islām?* p. 166.
39. *Islamic Review*. July, 1927. pp. 234-244.
40. Iqbal, M.: *op. cit.* p. 248.

BAHĀISM

1. Browne, E. G.: *Episode of the Bāb*. Recounting a visit to Bahā Ullāh near Acre in 1890.
2. Holley, H.: *Bahāi: The Spirit of the Age*. New York, 1921. pp. 33, 45, 46, 71.
3. Remy, C. M.: *The Universal Consciousness of the Bahāi Religion*. Florence, (Italy) 1925. p. 12.
4. Cheyne, T. K.: *The Reconciliation of Races and Religions*. London, 1914. Preface.
5. Holley, H.: *op. cit.* p. 28, quoting Abdul Bahā.
6. Skrine, F. H.: *Bahāism, The Religion of Brotherhood and its Place in the Evolution of Creeds*. London, 1912. p. 57.
7. Remy, C. M.: *op. cit.* p. 17.
8. *Talks by Abdul Bahā given in Paris*. London, 1915. pp. 132-133.
9. Holley, H.: *op. cit.* p. III.
10. Holley, H.: *Bahāi Scriptures*. New York, 1924. Section 609.
11. *Ibid.* Section 648.
12. *Talks by Abdul Bahā*. pp. 74, 169.
13. *Ibid.* pp. 53-54, 81.
14. *Ibid.* p. 59.
15. *Bahāi Scriptures*. Section 614.
16. *Talks by Abdul Bahā*. pp. 44, 45.
17. *Bahāi Scriptures*. Section 869.
18. *Talks by Abdul Bahā*. p. 163.
19. Sohrab, M. A.: *Abdul Bahā in Egypt*. New York, 1929. p. 148.
20. Phelps, E.: *Abbas Effendī, His Life and Teachings*. New York, 1912. p. 134.
21. Remy, C. M.: *The Bahāi Revelation and Reconstruction*. Chicago, 1919. pp. 77-78.
22. See, e.g., White, R.: *The Bahāi Religion and Its Enemy the Bahāi Organization*. Rutland, 1929.

CHAPTER IX CHRISTIANITY

1. For the vast literature on the New Testament and the Person and Teaching of Jesus Christ the relevant bibliographies must be consulted. Reference may be made to Moffat, J.: *An Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament*. New York, 1911; Scott, E. F.: *The Literature of the New Testament*. New York, 1932; Burkitt, F. C.: *The Gospel History and Its Transmission*. 2nd ed. Edinburgh, 1907; Schweitzer, A.: *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*. London, 1910; Weinel, H., and Widgery, A. G.: *Jesus in*

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- the Nineteenth Century and After*. Edinburgh, 1914; Forrest, G. F.: *The Christ of History and of Experience*, 6th ed. Edinburgh, 1908.
2. Bethune Baker, J. F.: *The Modern Churchman*. Oxford, 1925. p. 354.
 3. Note, for example, two ideas of Greek religion as described in Murray, G.: *Five Stages of Greek Religion*, London, 1925, one as to the Vegetation Spirit: "In the first stage living, then dying with each year, rising again from the dead, raising the whole dead with him. The Greeks call him in this phase the third one or the Savior. The renovation ceremonies were accompanied by casting off the old year, the old garments, and everything that is polluted by death. And not only death, but clearly, I think, in spite of protests by some Hellenists, of guilt and sin also." The other is the view that "This actual present priest, who initiates you and me, is himself already an image of God, but above him there are greater and wiser priests, above them others, and above them all there is one eternal divine mediator, who being in perfection both man and God, can alone fully reveal God to man, lead man's soul up the heavenly path beyond change and fate and the House of the Seven Rulers to its ultimate peace."
 4. Major, H. D. A.: *English Modernism: Its Origins, Methods, and Aims*. Cambridge (Mass.), 1927. pp. 151-152.
 5. *Ibid.*, p. 80.
 6. Inge, W. R.: *The Church and the Age*. London, 1912. p. 77.
 7. Harnack, A.: *What is Christianity?* London, 1901. p. 8.
 8. Gardner, P.: *Modernity and the Churches*. London, 1909. p. 68.
 9. Richards, G. W.: *Beyond Fundamentalism and Modernism*. New York, 1934. p. 153.
 10. I have discussed this subject at length in *Personality and Atonement* published with *Human Needs and Religious Beliefs*. London, 1918. pp. 1-46.
 11. Horton, W. M.: *Realistic Theology*. New York, 1934. p. 137.
 12. Halliday, J. F.: *Robbing Youth of Its Religion*. New York, 1929. p. 121.
 13. *Ibid.* p. 161.
 14. Hodgson, L. (ed.): *Convictions*. Report II of the World Conference on Faith and Order. London, 1934. pp. 227-228. Notwithstanding the close parallel of the "Message" as quoted in the text with the traditional creeds, we are told (p. 17) that at Lausanne nobody got up to assert the identity "of the object of Faith" with "dogma" and to say to the unhappy post-war world, "The message of the church is the Nicene Creed." Yet in spite of much expression of adherence to modern scholarly investigation of the Bible, there is an insistence on "firmly adhering" to the witness of the Apostles' and Nicene Creed (see e.g., p. 231). An impression is given that there are many theologians today who take back with one hand what they have conceded with the other.
 15. Pauck, W.: *Karl Barth: Prophet of a New Christianity?* New York, 1931. pp. 102-103.
 16. Webb, C. C. J.: *A Study of Religious Thought in England from 1850*. Oxford, 1933.
 17. Shotwell, J. T.: *The Religious Revolution of Today*. New York, 1924. p. 60.

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18. Barnes, H. E.: *The Twilight of Christianity*. New York, 1929. p. 456, quoting Dr. J. H. Dietrich.
19. Richards, G. W.: *op. cit.* p. 281.
20. Hocking, W. E.: in *Religion and Modern Life*. New York, 1927. p. 354.
21. Inge, W. R.: *op. cit.* p. 31.
22. Horton, W. M.: *op. cit.* p. 154.
23. Richards, G. W.: *op. cit.* pp. 94-95. There is much literature presenting Christianity as a Social Gospel: see e.g., the works of Shailer Mathews and Walter Rauschenbusch. In 1908 the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America adopted the following "Social Creed": Equal rights and complete justice for all men in all stations of life; the abolition of child labor; such regulation of the conditions of toil for women as shall safeguard the physical and moral health of the community; the suppression of the sweating system; the gradual and reasonable reduction of the hours of labor to the lowest practicable point, for that degree of leisure for all which is a condition of the highest human life; release from employment one day in seven; the right of all men to the opportunity of self-maintenance; the right of workers to some protection against the hardships often resulting from swift crises of industrial change; a living wage as a minimum in every industry and for the highest wage that each industry can afford; the protection of the worker from dangerous machinery, occupational disease, injuries, and mortality; suitable provision for old age of the workers and for those incapacitated by injury; the principle of conciliation and arbitration in industrial dissensions; the abatement of poverty; the most equitable division of the products of industry that can ultimately be devised.
24. Hardwick, J. C.: *The Modern Churchman*. Oxford, 1925. pp. 323, 321.
25. On Fundamentalism see especially Cole, S. C.: *The History of Fundamentalism*, New York, 1931, which gives a representative bibliography. He says it involved every evangelical denomination in America, and describes it as a conservative attempt to perpetuate the distinctive tenets that they had traditionally held. Concerning its reaction against the "social gospel," see p. 134. Dr. Cole characterizes the Fundamentalistic controversy as "mainly a conflict between two types of Church Leaders." (p. 321.) The movement expressed the desire for unshakeable religious security. "They rested their religion on the foundation of uncritical piety." (p. 335.) See also Machen, J. G.: *Christianity and Liberalism*, New York, 1923; Sparrow-Simpson, W. J.: *Modernism and the Person of Christ*, Milwaukee, 1923.
26. In addition to the works of Barth and his close associates there is much literature concerning Barthianism, but as yet no adequate bibliography. McConnachie, J., has given sympathetic general expositions in *The Significance of Karl Barth*, New York, 1931. An excellent critical study, though from a standpoint itself open to serious objections, is Pauck, W.: *Karl Barth, Prophet of a New Christianity?* New York, 1931.
27. McConnachie, J.: *The Barthian Theology and the Man of Today*, New York, 1933. pp. 227, 115, 75.
28. *Ibid.* p. 102, quoting Barth; also p. 256.
29. On Buchmanism see: Crossman, R. H. S. (ed.): *Oxford and the*

- Groups, Oxford, 1934; Henson, H. H.: *The Oxford Groups*, London, 1933; Spencer, F. A. M. (ed.): *The Meaning of the Groups*, London, 1934; Allen, G.: *He That Cometh*, London, 1932. The movement is called one of "world-revival," "witnessing to the healing power of Christ," manifested in a new personal consecration, a new penitence for personal sin, new vision of the will of God. The spiritual life, it is maintained, starts with "an inner act of self-surrender" and "owes nothing to external circumstances." There is an emphasis on sin, and Dr. L. P. Jacks rightly comments: "When a man comes to die, our first thought is to induce him to confess his sins, than which a more ingenious method of making death horrible could hardly be conceived." (Crossman, *op. cit.* p. 125.) Dr. Henson says of the movement: "It is obviously indifferent to the intellectual difficulties which confront the modern believer and which must be honestly faced and surmounted if the Christian's religion is to be intelligent and self-respecting." (*op. cit.*, p. 82.)
30. On Roman Catholic Modernism, see Sabatier, P.: *Modernism*, London, 1908; Lilley, A. L.: *Modernism, a Record and a Review*, London, 1908; Major, H. D. A., *op. cit.* The Roman Catholic Modernists were largely influenced by the works of Blondel, Leroy, Laberthonnière, and Von Hügel, and were applying in their own way Cardinal Newman's theory of development. As an example of their immanentist view is Lilley's quotation from the Abbe Marcel Hébert: "The ancient belief in the transcendent God must yield to the affirmation of the immanent Divine." Considering that their theory of dogmas as religious symbols was one of accommodation, it is interesting Loisy should have charged Harnack with an "impossible compromise with orthodoxy."
 31. Tyrrell, G.: *Through Scylla and Charybdis*. London, 1907. p. 233.
 32. Tyrrell, G.: *A Much-abused Letter*. London, 1906. pp. 57-58.
 33. Major, H. D. A.: *op. cit.*, p. 21.
 34. Sabatier, P.: *Modernism*. London, 1908. p. 87.
 35. Sabatier, A.: *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*. London, 1897. p. 322.
 36. Réville, J.: *Liberal Christianity*. London, 1903. pp. 38, 70-71. See also Merrill, W. P.: *Liberal Christianity*. New York, 1925.
 37. Gardner, P.: *Modernity and the Churches*. London, 1909.
 38. Major, H. D. A., *op. cit.*, p. 94.
 39. Bethune-Baker, J. F.: *The Modern Churchman*. Oxford, 1925. p. 358.
 40. Major, H. D. A., *op. cit.*, pp. 166, 159.
 41. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
 42. Bethune-Baker, J. F.: *The Modern Churchman*, 1925. p. 355. Dr. Major expresses himself in similar traditional language: "Jesus Christ must be confessed to be both 'perfect God' and 'perfect man.' . . . For Christian orthodoxy as formulated at Chalcedon, Jesus Christ is both God and man. With that conclusion the English modernist has no quarrel: it is the very essence of his faith." *op. cit.*, p. 157; see also pp. 98, 147.
 43. Temple, W.: *Christus Veritas*. London, 1924. pp. 107-108, 139.
 44. Butler, C.: *Western Mysticism*. London, 1922. pp. 187-188.
 45. Mathews, S.: *The Faith of Modernism*. New York, 1925. pp. 100-101.
 46. Réville, J. *op. cit.*, pp. 57-58.

CHAPTER X

RELIGION AND MODERN THOUGHT

1. Gardner, P.: *Modernity and the Churches*. London, 1909. p. 229.
2. Barnes, H. E.: in *Religion and the Modern Mind*, ed. by Cooper, C. C., New York, 1929. p. 37. See also his book: *The Twilight of Christianity*. New York, 1930, in which he states that he is "unalterably opposed to all vestiges of the old supernaturalism, with its distorted and rudimentary views of the universe, God, man, and human life." (Preface v.) He contends that modern man must abandon, along with certain specific Christian doctrines, any primary interest in the question of God; . . . absorption with considerations of the Infinite and the Absolute; . . . all assumptions of a supernatural world alien to man's natural conditions and inscrutable by the methods of science and secular knowledge; the personality obsession, particularly as related to the effort to personify the cosmos and God; . . . the outstanding theoretical fossils, such as the conception of the soul, immortality, sin, the Spirit World, prayer and the sense of sanctity and the Sacred. (p. 429.)
3. Gardner, P.: *op. cit.* pp. 31-32.
4. Thomson, J. A.: "The Naturalists' Approach to Religion" in *Religions of the Empire*. London, 1925. pp. 415, 416.
5. *Ibid.* p. 417.
6. Ames, E. S.: *Religion*. New York, 1929, is an example of the instabilities and inconsistencies of this type of view.
7. Whitehead, A. N.: *Science and the Modern World*. pp. 274-275.
8. Gardner, P.: *op. cit.* p. 56.
9. Shotwell, J. T.: *The Religious Revolution of Today*. New York, 1924. pp. 54-55.
10. Horton, W. M.: *Realistic Theology*. New York, 1934. pp. 41, 60.
11. Gour, H. S.: *The Spirit of Buddhism*. London, 1929. p. 484.
12. Jones, H. A.: in *My Religion*. London, n.d., p. 84.
13. Randall, J. H. and Randall, J. H., Jr.: *Religion and the Modern World*. New York, 1929. pp. 56-57.
14. Gardner, P.: *op. cit.* p. 78.
15. Saunders, K. J.: *Whither Asia?* p. 221.
16. Shotwell, J. T.: *op. cit.* pp. 185-186.
17. Caldecott, A.: *The Modern Churchman*. Oxford, 1925. p. 300.
18. Farnell, L. R.: *The Attributes of God*. Oxford, 1925. p. 20.
19. Pringle-Pattison, A. S.: *The Philosophical Radicals*. London, 1907. p. 270.
20. Hocking, W. E.: in *Religion and Modern Life*. p. 366.
21. Krumbine, M. H.: in *Whither Christianity?* Ed. by L. H. Hough. New York, 1929. p. 71.
22. Pratt, J. B.: *The Pilgrimage of Buddhism and a Buddhist Pilgrimage*. New York, 1928. p. 664.
23. Pratt, J. B.: *India and Its Faiths*. New York, 1915. p. 12.
24. Richards, G. W.: *Beyond Fundamentalism and Modernism*. New York, 1934. p. 34.
25. Iqbal, M.: *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām*. p. 122.

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26. Inge, W. R.: *Truth and Falsehood in Religion*. London, 1906. p. 42.
27. Gibb, H. A. R.: *Whither Islām?* p. 21.
28. Iqbal, M. *op. cit.* p. 217.
29. Griswold, H.: *Insights into Modern Hinduism*. New York, 1934. p. 24.
30. Pratt, J. B.: *India and Its Faiths*. p. 139.
31. Kaplan, M. M.: *Judaism As a Civilization*. New York, 1934.
32. Spengler, O.: *The Decline of the West*. New York, vol. I, 1926, vol. II, 1928.
33. Branford, V.: *Living Religions: A Plea for the Larger Modernism*. London, 1924. p. x.

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